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List of Symbols and 
Abbreviations 
The following list contains the most important symbols. 
:=: definition, is by definition. 
•: end of proof. 
X: a social choice problem. 
Ω: the set of finite subsets of X with at least three elements. 
A: agenda, an element of Ω. 
TV: the set of players, agents, individuals, voters, actors. 
S: a coalition, a subset of TV. 
R: preference on X. 
P: Strict preference on X. 
1: Indifference on X. 
ß(A, R): the set of .R-best elements of A. 
μ(Α, R): the set of maximal choices of A. 
C: choice function. 
p: a preference profile, i.e. an element of Π. 
Π: the set of preference profiles. 
i?f : the preference of agent i in profile p. 
B(X)·. the set of complete and reflexive relations on X. 
A(X): the set of reflexive, complete and acyclic relations on X. 
Q(X): the set of reflexive, complete and quasi-transitive relations on 
O(X): the set of reflexive, complete and transitive relations on X. 
L(X): the set of antisymmetric, complete and transitive relations on 
F: a social choice rule. 
Φ: the collection of social choice rules. 
&SDF'> the set of social decision functions. 
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Фсз'. the set of quasi-transitive social choice rules. 
ΦSWF' the set of social welfare function. 
Con(A, p): the Condorcet set for A under p. 
bi(x,p): the Borda score of χ in R?. 
σ(Α, R): the generalized optimal choice set of A. 
G = (Ν, W): simple game. 
W: the nonempty set of winning coalitions. 
Wtze: the set of minimum size coalitions. 
цгтпт. jhg
 s e t 0f m i n i m a i winning coalitions. 
Θ: weak order of policy positions. 
WMC: the set of minimal and closed coalitions. 
p: preference on coalitions. 
π: strict preference on coalitions. 
¿: indifference on coalitions. 
Л(А, Ry. the Hamming distance between R and R'. 
The following list contains the logical symbols: 
•Ф^: equivalence, if and only if. 
=$>: implication, if..., then 
Л: conjunction, and. 
V: inclusive disjunction, or. 
-ι: negation. 
V: universal quantifier, for all. 
3: existential quantifier, there exists. 
The following list explains the most important abbriviations: 
BCS: Black-Condorcet System, 
BR: Borda Rule, 
GESTS: Generalized Stable Set, 
GOCS: Generalized Optimal Choice Set, 
ΠΑ: Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, 
PC: Pareto Condition, 
PR: Plurality Rule, 
ND: Nondictatorship, 
QS: Quasi-transiti ve Social choice rule, 
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SCR: Social Choice Rule, 
SDF: Social Decision Function, 
SMD: System of Majority Decision, 
SWF: Social Welfare Function, 
UD: Unrestricted Domain. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 The Relevance of Political Coalition Forma-
tion 
Essential in politics is winning. What counts is the enforcement of a 
decision, the passing of a bill, winning an election, carrying a policy 
through, the formation of a majority coalition, etc. However, in politics 
it is impossible to win by staying alone. Coalitions must be formed in 
order to enforce the victory. Even a dictator cannot rule by staying alone. 
A dictator too must form alliances with some societal elites in order to 
enforce his or her preferences. Thus, coalition formation is at the heart of 
political life. 
This view on politics is not new. Especially the American political 
scientist W. Riker opts for this view in several places of his work. In 
his The Theory of Political Coalitions and in his Introduction to Positive 
Political Theory, which Riker wrote in cooperation with P. Ordeshook, he 
introduces without hesitation the behavioral assumption that the purpose of 
each political actor is to form winning coalitions (see for example Riker 
and Ordeshook 1973: 179). In his more recent work on the place of 
political science in public choice, Riker argues that "[m]ost things that 
people want they cannot get by themselves" (Riker 1988: 249). He then 
constructs a continuum of possible forms of cooperation among people. 
At one extreme of this continuum 
"... there is the ideal type of a team effort against nature, 
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guided by a Platonic rule of justice. There is a joint product 
which all participants desire with equal intensity; they agree 
about the appropriate means to obtain it; all members know 
and accept a role in the division of labor, and they always 
choose the action prescribed by the role, so there is never a 
private interest apart from the shared interest in the success of 
the group endeavor". (Riker ibid: 249). 
This ideal type of cooperation is called harmonious by Riker. At the other 
side of the continuum there is 
" . . . the ideal type of cooperation in which goals are only par-
tially shared In this kind of cooperation, then, a winning 
coalition excercises the authority of the entire group to sup-
port outcomes that, while perhaps benefiting the whole body, 
still benefit especially the members of the winning coalition. 
The winning coalition is able to do this because the losers are, 
in some way, constrained to continue to participate and thus 
to recognize the obligation, even the validity, of the winners' 
advantage". (Riker ibid: 249). 
This type of cooperation is called exploitative and, according to Riker, 
political science is "the study of cooperation in deciding on social actions, 
policies, and norms, where the cooperation is closer to the exploitative 
ideal than to the harmonious" (Riker ibid: 251). 
In Riker* s view, the winners take all and the losers are obliged to 
accept the consequences of the actions of the winners. This last aspect 
is interesting. The outcomes of the execution of power of a winning 
coalition concerns the whole population, hence also the losers. The losers 
are obliged to take these outcomes for granted, whether these outcomes are 
beneficial for them or not If the outcomes are beneficial, then the losers 
have 'luck". In the other case they have "bad luck". In either case, the 
losers are non-excludable. In this respect, the outcomes of the execution 
of power of a winning coalition have the character of a public good (cf. 
Barry 1980, Holler and Packel 1983). 
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1.2 The Game-Theoretical Study of Political Coali­
tion Formation 
Coalition formation being so relevant in political life, it is no surprise that 
political scientists have spent considerable research efforts and resources 
to investigate this phenomenon. In particular, there is a well-established 
tradition in political science of studying coalition formation from a game-
theoretical point of view. For convenience, we will call it the game-
theoretical tradition or approach. It is not the aim of this section to give 
an overview of this tradition. We only sketch the 'historical moments' that 
in our view are crucial for the development of this tradition. 
The starting shot is given in 1962 in the already mentioned seminal 
work The Theory of Political Coalitions of William Riker. The basic 
statement of Riker's theory is the well-known size principle (Riker (1962: 
33, 47): 
"In social situations similar to η-person, zero-sum games with 
side-payments, participants create coalitions just as large as 
they believe will ensure winning and no larger". 
Why formulating this principle? After all, a great part of game theory 
formulated in Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) and made accessible 
for social scientists in the lucid work of Luce and Raiffa (1957), deals 
with coalitions. This part is called n-person cooperative game theory. 
Hence what is the rationale for the size principle and, more generally, for 
coalition formation theories? According to Riker (1962, esp. chapter 2), 
η-person cooperative game theory is oriented towards payoff structures. It 
tries to investigate what a player1 gains when joining a specific coalition. 
More technically, it tries to establish what payoff vectors may emerge. 
As such, it says nothing about the coalitions that may be formed. Game 
theory is payoff-oriented and is not designed to predict coalitions2. In 
order to predict coalitions, other theories must be constructed in which ad­
ditional concepts and assumptions with respect to the standard apparatus 
'Alternatively, we speak of 'player', 'actor', 'agent' and 'individual'. In all cases, we 
mean the same thing, namely a separable decision-making unit. 
2Also cf. Ordeshook (1986: 408). 
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of cooperative game theory must be used. 
After the starting shot fired by Riker, the next historical event to mem-
orize in the game-theoretical tradition of coalition formation theories is 
the appearance of De S waan's Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formation 
(1973). In this work, a number of existing theories of coalition forma-
tion with a root in game theory are critically investigated. De Swaan also 
presents a new theoiy of coalition formation, namely policy distance the-
ory. In this theory, the notions of policy position and of policy distance 
are introduced. As the name of the theory suggests, especially the notion 
of policy distance is of crucial importance. The basic idea, here, is that 
each actor strives to form a winning coalition with a policy position that 
is as close as possible to his own policy position. 
The important new aspect of policy distance theory is that it allows 
the construction of a preference profile3 - one preference relation for each 
actor - concerning the set of winning coalitions. With the aid of this pref-
erence profile a dominance relation is constructed over the set of winning 
coalitions. If dominance is defined, then also undominance can be defined. 
The set of undominated coalitions, given the constructed dominance re-
lation, is called the core. The prediction is that only coalitions from the 
core will be formed. 
In his theory, De Swaan uses standard game theoretical concepts be-
sides plausible behavioral and political assumptions. Moreover, De Swaan's 
work indicates a research possibility, namely the investigation of actors' 
preferences for coalitions, that hitherto has not been explored. It is pre-
cisely this research line we wish to explore in this work. 
De Swaan's work is also important from another point of view: it 
confronts the investigated theories with data about cabinet formation in 
nine West-European multi-party systems, thus combining the purely the-
oretical approach with an empirical approach. Together with Government 
Coalitions in Western Europe of Taylor and Laver (1973), De Swaan's 
work is the starting shot of an empirical research tradition that confronts 
the game-theoretical coalition theories with data about cabinet formation 
in multi-party systems. 
The works of De Swaan and Taylor and Laver show an impressive 
3De Swaan speaks of a matrix of preferences. 
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empirical support of Axelrod's conflict of interest theory (Axelrod 1970). 
In a nutshell, Axelrod's theory says that only winning coalitions will be 
formed that 
1. are minimal in "the sense that they contain no more members than 
is necessary" to win (De S waan 1973: 75) and 
2. are closed in the sense that they contain only members that are 
adjacent on a one-dimensional policy scale (Axelrod 1970: 169, De 
Swaan 1973). 
Winning coalitions satisfying these two properties are called minimal closed. 
In Axelrod's view, these coalitions have minimal conflict of interest and 
will therefore be formed. 
De Swaan was so impressed by the empirical success of Axelrod's the-
ory that he decided to employ it as "a basis for the classification of parties 
and party systems" (De Swaan 1982: 237). Depending on the number 
of feasible minimal closed coalitions and given the outcome of elections 
and the parties' policy positions, he calls a party system monolemmatic, 
dilemmatic or polylemmatic, a classification, however, that did not find 
much acceptance in political science. 
Nowadays the relevance of the empirical results of De Swaan, Taylor 
and Laver and others working within the empirical tradition is highly ques-
tioned (Browne and Franklin 1986, Laver 1986, Nolte 1988, Tops 1989). 
For an account of this topic, consider Tops (1989). 
Another important moment in the history of the game-theoretical tradi-
tion is the work of the mathematician and game theorist Peleg. He presents 
a coalition formation theory in which a specific actor plays an essential 
role (Peleg 1980, 1981). This actor is called dominant. More specifically, 
a dominant actor is an actor with two characterising properties. First, it is 
an actor who has the ability to control completely the internal opposition 
of a winning coalition (cf. Van Deernen 1989). Second, it is an actor with 
more opportunities to form winning coalitions than any nondominant actor. 
Thus, a dominant actor has more threat potentials than any nondominant 
actor participating in the coalition formation process (Van Deernen 1989). 
The essence of Peleg's theory is that this dominant actor will have enough 
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power to determine the process of coalition formation in the way he likes 
(Peleg 1981, Van Deernen 1989). 
Peleg's work introduces the actor-oriented approach in the game-
theoretical study of political coalition formation. Having remained un-
noticed for a remarkable time, Peleg's theory was put under the attention 
of political scientists in Van Deemen (1987, 1989). These works also 
present new results and a variation (the center-player approach) to Peleg's 
actor-oriented approach. We will extensively discuss our contributions to 
Peleg's coalition theory in chapter 5. 
1.3 Theoretical Problems in the Game-Theoretical 
Study of Political Coalition Formation 
1.3.1 The Absence of an Actor-Oriented Policy Theory 
Since the celebrated work of De Swaan, it is customary within the game-
theoretical tradition to classify coalition formation theories into two classes 
(Grofman 1984, Van Deemen 1989). The theories in the first class predict 
coalitions by using information about the power positions of the rele-
vant political actors. Since no notion of policy is used in these theories, 
these coalition formation theories are called policy-blind. A well-known 
representative of this class is the already mentioned and very frequently 
discussed minimum size theory (Riker 1962, Riker and Ordeshook 1973). 
Also Peleg's dominant actor theory is policy-blind. 
The second class of coalition formation theories contains the so-called 
policy theories. These theories all deal with coalition formation pro-
cesses in simple games in which the policy position of a player in a 
one-dimensional or multi-dimensional scale is relevant. Thus, besides the 
power positions also the policy position of a political actor in a uni- or 
multi-dimensional space is used as an important variable for predicting 
coalitions. Examples of one-dimensional theories are the already men-
tioned policy distance theory of De Swaan (1973) and Axelrod's conflict 
of interest theory. An example of a multi-dimensional theory is the com-
petitive coalition theory of McKelvey, Ordeshook and Winer (1978). 
This classification is widely accepted. For example, it can be found in 
the bundle Coalitions and Collective Action edited by M. Holler (1984). 
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It also allows to detect the 'blind spots' in the theoretical developments 
within the game-theoretical tradition. So this classification makes clear 
that there is no actor-oriented coalition formation theory that belongs to 
the class of policy theories. That is, there is no theory in the style of 
Peleg's in which besides the power also the policy position of a player is 
crucial. This observation leads to the formulation of our first problem: 
Problem 1 Is it possible to formulate an actor-oriented coalition formation 
theory within the game-theoretical tradition in which policy positions (one 
for each player) play a decisive role. 
Solving this problem would provide a competitive theoretical alternative 
for Peleg's theory of dominant players that, in contrast to Peleg's the-
ory, belongs to the class of policy theories. The problem may also have 
empirical relevance. Applying the coalition formation theories to cabi-
net formation in multi-party systems. De Swaan (1973), Taylor and Laver 
(1973) and Browne and Dreijmanis (1982) show that policy positions of 
political parties in multi-party systems are important in the formation of 
government coalitions. 
1.3.2 Players' Preferences for Coalitions 
Coalition formation theories formulated within the game-theoretical tra-
dition typically ignore the players' preferences with respect to coalitions. 
There is only one exception: policy distance theory. As already has been 
noticed, this theory leads to the construction of a set of preferences, one 
preference for each player, with respect to coalitions. The thus resulting 
preference profile is used to derive a prediction set. 
Since game theory starts from the assumption of rational agents, i.e. 
agents who choose alternatives which are best according to their prefer-
ences, this ignorance is, indeed, remarkable and difficult to explain. Per-
haps it has to do with the fact that the theories may become complex when 
besides players' preferences for payoff structures, also players' preferences 
for coalitions are introduced. The theories then must deal with two types 
of individual preferences that may, in addition, interact with each other. 
Another possible cause of this ignorance may be the game-theoretical 
origin of the coalition theories itself. In game theory, it is assumed that 
players have preferences with respect to payoffs and not with respect to 
17 
coalitions that may be formed in order to get as much payoff as possible. 
Shifting the attention away from payoff towards coalition formation does 
not, by itself, lead to efforts of constructing theories in which the formation 
of coalitional preferences is essential. The relevance of payoff preferences 
does not imply the relevance of coalition preferences. 
In our view, to see the relevance of players' coalition preferences re-
quires another view on coalition formation processes. It is then necessary 
to see coalition formation itself as a choice process. Preferences become 
relevant in situations in which a choice must be made from a set of al-
ternatives (a choice problem). In particular, coalition preferences become 
relevant in situations in which a selection must be made from a set of 
possible coalitions. 
This view can be made more complicated by seeing a player in a game 
as an agent with two preferences. One preference is concerned with the 
possible outcomes of the game and the other preference with the possible 
coalitions in the game. Since the formation of a coalition is a method to 
realize an outcome, it is reasonable to assume that the player's preference 
for coalitions is, in some way or another, determined by the player's pref-
erence concerning the outcomes. 
The main theme of this work is to explore the idea that coalition 
formation is a choice process that is guided by the players' preferences 
with respect to coalitions. More specifically, the above discussion leads 
to the following problem: 
Problem 2 /. Consider a nonempty finite set of agents and a nonempty 
finite set of possible winning coalitions. How will these agents form 
preferences with respect to this set of possible winning coalitions 
and how will the agents use these preferences concerning coalitions 
in order to form a winning coalition? 
2. Consider a nonempty finite set of agents who have to make collec-
tively a choice from a nonempty set of mutually exclusive alternatives 
(outcomes, policies, payoffs etc.). Also consider a nonempty finite set 
of possible winning coalitions. Suppose each agent has a preference 
on the set of alternatives. Also suppose that agents only can choose 
an alternative by forming a winning coalition. How will an agent 
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form a preference concerning the set of winning coalitions? How 
can the players' preferences concerning coalitions be explained in 
terms of their preferences concerning the set of alternatives from 
which a choice collectively has to be made? 
In order to solve the first part of this problem, theories must be constructed 
that describe and explain the formation of players' preferences for coali­
tions and that use the players' preferences for coalitions in order to predict 
a set of coalitions. The solution of the second part of the problem re­
quires the formulation of theories that explain the formation of players' 
preferences concerning coalitions in terms of preferences concerning alter­
natives (outcomes, policies, payoff). Of course, also these latter theories 
must explain how the players' preferences concerning coalitions may be 
used in order to predict a set of coalitions. 
The formulated problem is theoretically relevant. Solving it would 
give us theories that describe and explain the formation and use of prefer­
ences concerning coalitions in an explicit way. Knowing the preferences 
concerning the coalitions would enable us to predict the coalitions that 
may be formed. Theories for the second problem even can explain the 
formation of coalitions in terms of other preferences. Knowing the prefer­
ences of each player with respect to a set of outcomes would be sufficient 
then to predict the coalitions that may be formed. Since the complexity is 
raised by introducing coalition preferences and aggregation of these pref­
erences, the theories may be better approximations of political reality than 
the already existing ones. But, of course, on this last point, only empirical 
research can decide. 
1.4 Simple Games and Social Choice 
In order to solve the two formulated problems, we will use both simple 
game theory and social choice theory. 
1.4.1 Simple Game Theory 
Our exploration of coalition formation as a choice process will be within 
the game-theoretical tradition. Especially we will use η person simple 
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game theory where η > 3. This theory was first defined and studied in 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953 Ch. X). It has been further refined 
in Shapley (1962, 1967, 1981). 
Simple games are cooperative games in which two types of coalitions 
play a role, namely winning ones and losing ones. Essential of simple 
games is that the winners - the members of a winning coalition - take all. 
The losers - members of a losing coalition - have no power to control 
the game. The decisions of the winners concern the whole set of players 
and the losers are obliged to take these decisions for granted, whether 
the effects of the winners' decisions are favourable for them or not. An 
example is the majority voting game. In this game only a majority coalition 
of voters can win, i.e. determine a winning alternative. 
It must be stressed that simple game theory deals with winning or 
losing in general, that is, without referring explicitly to the rules that 
determine winning or losing. The advantage of this abstract approach is 
that classes of simple games can be studied without refemng to particular 
rules as majority rule, unanimity rule, bargaining rules, etc. 
Since winning and losing is essential for politics, simple games are 
extremely useful to model political situations and processes, especially 
coalition formation4. With the choice of simple game theory as the game-
theoretical framework for our theories, we keep in line with tradition5. 
1.4.2 Social Choice Theory 
Social choice theory is about choice processes in which two or more agents 
are involved. The theory has its roots in the Enlightenment of the eight-
teenth century. Especially Borda and Condorcet have contributed a great 
deal to the development of this theory in that time6. The development of 
the theory is speeded up in this century by the works of Arrow (1963), 
Black (1957), Fishbum (1973) and Sen (1970). Advanced treatments of 
the theory are given in Kelly (1978, 1988), Sen (1977, 1986), Storcken 
(1989) and Suzumura (1983). 
4Cf. Shapley (1962, 1967, 1981). In Shapley (1981) the terms 'simple game' and 
'political structure' even are used interchangeably. 
5Cf. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953 Ch. X); De Swaan (1973, esp. Ch.4); 
Van Deernen (1987, 1989, 1990, 1990a), Peleg (1981), Van Roozendaal (1990). 
6Cf. Black (1957, Part Π); also see chapter 3. 
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In essence, social choice theory deals with the aggregation of individ­
ual preferences into a social preference that, in its tum, can be used to 
determine a social choice7. The term 'social' refers here to the fact that at 
least three agents are involved in the choice process and, hence, at least 
three indiviudal preferences are to be aggregated. 
Since coalition formation is considered as a choice process involving 
more than two persons, social choice theory will be important in this work. 
Coalition formation will be seen as a process in which the aggregation of 
players' coalitional preferences into a binary relation (social preference) on 
a set of winning coalitions is essential. The resulting aggregated relation 
determines a prediction set (a set of social choices). 
However, with respect to determining social choices with the aid of 
a social preference, there is a problem that first must be solved before 
using social choice theory to study coalition formation processes. Social 
choice theory mainly deals with the determination of best social choices. 
An alternative is socially best if it is socially preferred to every other 
alternative. Of course, if a socially best alternative exists, then it must 
be a social choice. The problem, however, is what the social choice 
must be when a socially best alternative does not exist. This problem 
occurs when the social preference yielded by an aggregation process is 
cyclic. When the social preference is reflexive, complete and acyclic, the 
problem will not occur8 (Sen 1970, Suzumura 1983). However, it is not 
guaranteed apriori that aggregation of coalitional preferences always leads 
to a reflexive, complete and acyclic relation. Thus, socially best coalitions 
need not exist. Therefore, it is necessary to develop theories that allow the 
selection of alternatives even when best alternatives do not exist These 
theories may then be used to predict sets of coalitions even when socially 
best coalitions do not exist. This leads to the formulation of our third 
'We are referring here to the relational approach in social choice theory. See chapter 
2 of this work. There is also a socalled functional approach in which social choices 
are detennined without referring to social preferences. Again cf. chapter 2, especially 
section 2.9. 
8
 The notions of cycle, acyclicity, completeness, reflexivity and others will be precisely 
defined and studied in chapter 2. To give a handhold, a relation R satisfies reflexivity if 
for all χ : xRx, completeness if for all x, y : xRy or yRx. R is cyclic if it contains a 
cycle of the form χχΡχ^Ρ... Px
n
Px\ where Ρ is strict social preference (if xRy, then 
not yRx). R satisfies acyclicity if it it is not cyclic. 
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problem: 
Problem 3 Let A be a nonempty and finite set of alternatives (winning 
coalitions). Let R be a relation on A that is obtained by aggregating 
individual preferences concerning A. What alternatives must be selected 
from A when R is cyclic? 
Analogously to game theory, theories that can deal with cyclic aggregated 
relations are called solution theories. The general problem of finding such 
theories belongs to the domain of social choice theory. This problem is 
as old as social choice theory itself. Indeed, it is not an easy problem to 
solve. However, it is a highly relevant problem since solution theories not 
only allow us to predict coalitions when best coalitions are not guaranteed. 
They also may tell us what to do when we meet e.g. cyclic majorities. As 
is well known, this latter problem was a great obsession for Condorcet9 
and is called the Condorcet paradox. Thus, theories that can handle cyclic 
social preferences may be able to dissolve the Condorcet paradox10. 
1.5 Summary of Purposes 
The purpose of this work is to solve the above mentioned problems. Thus, 
the first purpose is to fill up the 'blind spot' in the classification of coalition 
formation theories (see section 1.3.1). We will try to construct a theory 
that deals with coalition formation in games in which a typical player rules 
and in which policy plays a major role. Since we will define a player that 
is in the center of a policy order we will call this coalition theory the center 
player theory. It will be the counterpart of Peleg's policy-blind dominant 
player theory. 
However, we have a more ambitious purpose. Our main purpose is 
to work out the idea that coalition formation is a social choice process 
in which the choice behavior of each player is guided by his preference 
for coalitions. According to this idea, the players' coalitional preferences 
must be aggregated in such a way that an aggregation relation - a social 
preference - on a set of coalitions results that can be used as a basis for 
deriving a prediction set - a social choice set - of coalitions. 
'Cf. Black (1957, Part Π) and chapter 3 of this work. 
10Cf. chapter 3, section 3.1.3). 
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In order to realize this, it is necessary to realize another purpose first, 
namely the construction of a solution theory that is useful in generating 
prediction sets of coalitions from a possibly cyclic binary relation, obtained 
by aggregating players' preferences for coalitions. The fulfillment of this 
purpose is mainly important for the realization of our more ambitious pur-
pose. However, it also has value as such. It may help to solve problems 
that already exist a long time, especially the problem of the existence of 
cyclic majorities (the Condorcet paradox). 
We refer to the distinction between theoretical and experimental physics. 
In theoretical physics, theories are invented, mathematized, elaborated or 
refined. In experimental physics (aspects of) the theories are tested. We 
wish to make this distinction also for political science. Since in political 
science research the experiment is seldom used and observations often arise 
from political life, we prefer to speak of quasi-experimental research. So 
we distinguish purely theoretical political science from quasi-experimental 
political research. Theoretical political science already has some history. 
Pioneering works are Riker and Ordeshook (1973) and Ordershook (1986). 
In these works it is also called mathematical political science and positive 
political theory. 
Our work will be an exercise in theoretical or mathematical political 
science. We proceed in a purely theoretical way and want to leave the em-
pirical tests of the presented and elaborated theories to political researchers 
belonging to the quasi-experimental research tradition. In order to illus-
trate the working of the theories, we will use examples that mostly are 
taken from reality. However, these examples are only used for illustration 
purposes. 
1.6 Overview 
We summarize the subsequent chapters. 
Chapter 2. In order to study coalition formation processes as aggregation 
processes of coalitional preferences, we first have to study social 
choice theory. This will be done by making a clear distinction 
between the descriptive part and the solution part of the theory. 
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The basic concepts of the descriptive part will be presented in chapter 
2, sections 2 to 7. The concepts are social state (alternative, outcome 
etc.), agenda, individual (player, agent, actor), coalition, preference 
and choice, rational choice and social choice rule. 
In section 7, we make a start with the discussion of the solution 
part. There, the main concept is collective rationality. We will 
see that collective rationality implies the selection of socially best 
alternatives. We also discuss conditions that guarantee the existence 
of socially best alternatives. 
An important subject in social choice theory is the investigation of 
a set of conditions deemed desirable for an aggregation to satisfy. 
This will be dealt with in section 8. Famous in this respect is 
Arrow's theorem (Arrow 1963). Arrow formulates a number of -
in his view - reasonable conditions. Surprisingly enough, he shows 
that no aggregation process can satisfy simultaneously this set of 
reasonable conditions, that is, he shows that it is impossible that an 
aggregation process satisfies these conditions. We will discuss the 
Arrow conditions and Arrow's interesting theorem extensively. We 
also present a new proof of Arrow's theorem. 
In the last section of this chapter, we study two alternative conceptual 
frameworks in social choice theory, namely, the Kelly-Suzumura 
framework and the Fishbum framework. The essence of both frame-
works is that social choices are determined without using social 
preferences. They start just from the opposite position by trying to 
determine a social preference by observing social choice sets. 
Chapter 3. The study of social choice processes as presented in chapter 
2 is rather abstract. It deals with aggregation rules and processes in 
general, not with particular aggregation rules. We will study par-
ticular rules in chapter 3. We also will pay a lot of attention to 
the history of social choice theory, especially to pieces of work of 
Marquis de Condorcet that are, are far as we know, not cited in the 
standard literature of social choice. 
Section 1 of this chapter is devoted to the system of majority deci-
sion. We formulate an exact definition of it and discuss its relevance. 
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We present May's theorem that states necessary and sufficient con­
ditions for an aggregation rule to be the system of majority decision. 
The main problem with the system of majority decision is the pos­
sibility of the Condorcet paradox. This paradox exists if the aggre­
gation of individual preferences by the system of majority decision 
leads to a cyclic majority relation. We will spend a lot of energy to 
this paradox that is named after its discoverer Marquis de Condorcet 
(1743-1794). First we discuss the the solution of Condorcet to the 
paradox. Some documents written by Condorcet give another view 
on Condorcet's solution than suggested by Black (1957: 175). Then 
we present another solution to the paradox. We propose a theory 
called the theory of stable majorities that is based on the notion of 
majority dominance. According to this theory, alternative χ major­
ity dominates alternative y if there is a path хйМцйМхг... äMy 
from χ to y, where äM denotes strict majority11. A stable major-
ity solution is a set in which no two alternatives majority-dominate 
each other. Further, for each alternative у outside a stable majority 
solution there is an alternative χ in that majority solution such that 
ι majority-dominates y. We are able to prove, by using a theorem 
in chapter 4, that a stable majority solution is nonempty. The theory 
of stable majority solutions is an instance of a more general solution 
theory of generalized stable sets that will be presented and studied 
in chapter 4. 
In section 2 the plurality rule is studied. Again we will present 
material of Condorcet on this subject. 
In section 3 the Borda rule is presented and discussed. We formulate 
a definition that can be used to aggregate preferences with indiffer­
ence. Also some interesting results of Condorcet concerning this rule 
will be presented among which its violation of the condition of inde­
pendence of irrelevant alternatives. Condorcet also has discoverded 
the valuable insight that different rules may lead to different social 
choices for the same situations. He shows this by presenting several 
situations for which the majority choice disagrees with the Borda 
choice or the plurality choice, or for which the Borda choice agrees 
"That is, xäMy if the number of individuals that prefer χ to у is strictly greater than 
the number of people that prefer у to z. 
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with majority choice but disagrees with plurality choice. We will 
present a number of these situations designed by Condorcet. 
In section 4 we apply the majority idea as studied in section 1 to the 
Dutch electoral system. We show, by constructing a voting situation, 
that it is possible that a party A preferred by a majority of voters to 
party В still gets less seats in parliament than does B. We propose 
a design principle in order to avoid this curiosity. 
Chapter 4. In chapter 2 we made a start with discussing the solution part 
of social choice theory. As we have seen in that chapter, if a social 
preference is cyclic, then a best social choice cannot exists. The 
aim of this chapter is to formulate theories that specify the existence 
of social choices when a best social choice does not exist. In order 
to be able to do this, they all must be able to handle cyclic social 
preferences in some way or another. This chapter is important since 
the theories presented here are needed to find prediction sets for 
coalition theories that will be developed in later chapters. That is, 
this chapter must solve our problem 3. 
This chapter also will have a more mathematical character. We will 
use methods from digraph theory in order to formulate and prove 
results. The necessary mathematical concepts and techniques arc 
presented in section 1. 
In section 2, we present the first theory that is able to deal with cyclic 
social preferences. This theory says that an alternative χ must be 
a social choice if there is no alternative у such that у is strictly 
socially preferred to x. An alternative χ with this property is called 
maximal and the theory therefore is called the theory of maximal 
choices. This theory does not woric for every cyclic preference. We 
will give conditions for the existence of nonempty sets of maximal 
choices. 
Since the theory of maximal choices may fail in yielding a social 
choice, we study in section 2 another theory which is called the 
theory of generalized optimal choice sets. The origin of this the­
ory is Schwartz (1972, 1986). It appears to be equivalent with the 
theory of admissible sets of Kalai and Schmeidler (1976) and Kalai 
et.al. (1977) and with the theory of dynamic solutions of Shenoy 
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(1979, 1980). The concept of generalized optimal choice set is a 
generalization of the concept of set of maximal choices. 
Crucial in this theory is the notion of minimal undominated set A 
set of alternatives is undominated if for no χ in this set there is an 
alternative y outside this set such that y is socially strictly preferable 
to x. An undominated set is minimal if none of its proper subsets 
has this property. The generalized optimal choice set of a set Λ is 
the union of all minimal undominated subsets of A. The theory says 
that only choices from this set will be or must be a social choice. We 
give results of Schwartz that show that this theory can handle any 
cyclic social preference. Hence, it is able to yield a social choice 
set for every social preference obtained by aggregation of individual 
preferences. We also will present some new results for this theory 
among which the most important is the contraction theorem. 
A shortcoming of the theory of generalized optimal choice sets is that 
inside generalized optimal choice sets there may be dominance in the 
sense that one alternative in that set may be socially strictly preferred 
to another alternative in that set. That is, a generalized optimal 
choice set may not be internally stable. To avoid this shortcoming, 
a version of stable set theory is formulated in section 5 of this 
chapter. The origin of this theory is Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1953). A set of alternatives S is stable if for no χ and y in 5 
we have that χ is strictly socially preferred to y. It is externally 
stable if for each y outside S there is an χ inside S such that χ is 
socially strictly preferred to y. In this section we will discuss the 
relevance of stable set theory. We also discuss the nice sociological 
interpretation of these sets in terms of 'standards of behavior' as is 
done in Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953). Stable sets do not 
exist for every cyclic social preferences. We formulate some results 
concerning the nonemptiness of these sets. 
The properties of internal and external stability of stable sets are 
appealing. However, the possible emptiness of these sets is a serious 
shortcoming. To dissolve this shortcoming we formulate in section 
6 a new theory that will be called the theory of generalized stable 
sets. We give an informal description. A set of alternatives V 
is generalized internally stable if for no χ and y there is a path 
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хРх\Рхг...ХпРу from χ to у, where Ρ is the asymmetric part of 
a social preference R. V is called generalized externally stable if 
for each у not in V there is an χ in V such that there is a path 
xPx\Px2...XnPy from χ to у where Ρ is the asymmetric part of 
a social preference R. A set satisfying generalized external and 
generalized internal stability is called a generalized stable set. We 
prove an existence theorem that shows that generalized stable sets are 
always nonempty. Hence this theory can handle any cyclic social 
preference and thus is able to yield a social choice set for every 
social preference obtained by aggregating individual preferences. 
Its advantage to the theory of generalized optimal choice sets is 
that generalized stable sets satisfy generalized internal stability (and 
hence internal stability). 
In section 7 of this chapter we summarize the most important dif­
ferences and commonalities of the presented solution theories. With 
this section we stop our efforts to solve problem 3. The theory of 
sets of maximal choices and the theory of generalized stable sets 
will be used in the subsequent chapters, especially in chapter 6 and 
7. The theory of generalized stable sets also is used to formulate 
the theory of stable majority solutions discussed in chapter 3. 
Chapter 5. In this chapter we solve our problem 1. In section 2 the basic 
concepts of simple game theory are presented. In this section we 
also discuss Riker's minimum size theory in more detail. In section 
3 we study particular classes of simple games, namely weak games, 
oligarchic games and dictatorial games. 
In section 4, we briefly discuss the formulation of Arrow's theorem 
and some of its variations in terms of simple game theory. We 
want to accentuate that we do not have the aim to study how to 
represent social choice rules by simple games and, conversely, how 
to associate simple games with social choice rules. For this exercise 
we refer to Peleg (1983, 1984). 
In section 5 we present Peleg's theory of dominant players in detail. 
We will present an additional result and also a stronger hypothesis 
than formulated in Peleg (1981). In order to illustrate the working 
of this theory, we give a computation example. In this example we 
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use the game representation of the parliamentary system of Germany 
in 1987. 
Then, as the counterpart of Peleg's theory, we present the theory 
of center players. This will be done in section 6. In this theory, 
a particular player called center player plays a decisive role in the 
formation of political coalitions. This player owes his power to his 
position in a policy order. It is a player who can form winning 
coalitions with players on the left of him in that order, with players 
on the right of him in that order or with players on either sides of 
him. We give a sufficient condition for the existence of a center 
player in a simple game. We also formulate a result about the 
uniqueness of this player. With this theory we have made a start to 
solve problem 1. 
In section 7, we formulate Axelrod's conflict of interest. We prove 
a result that shows a connection between this theory and the theory 
of center players. 
In section 8 we refine the theory of center players by introducing 
the notion of balance of coalitions. This section will solve problem 
1. 
To illustrate the theory of center players including the theory of 
balanced coalitions we provide a computation example. This is 
done in section 9. In this example, the game representation of the 
Dutch parliament since its election of 6 September 1989 is used. It 
appears that the Dutch political party Christian -Democratic Appel 
is the center party in this game. 
Chapter 6 In this chapter we will solve the first part of problem 2. We 
present two theories in which the formation of coalitional preferences 
and their use in coalition formation processes are described and 
explained. 
As noticed in section 1.2 of this introductory chapter, the first theory 
that uses coalition preferences in order to predict sets of coalitions is 
De Swaan's policy distance theory. In section 2 of chapter 6, we will 
present a re-examination of both the open and closed version of this 
theory. According to both theories, a player will prefer a coalition 
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S to a coalition Τ if the distance between his policy position and 
the expected policy position of S is less than the distance between 
his policy position and the expected policy position of T. The 
behavioral assumption is that each player tries to be a member of a 
coalition with an expected policy position that is as close as possible 
to his own. It appears that both the open and closed version of policy 
distance theory are inconsistent. 
In section 3 we present a new theory called the power excess theory 
of coalition formation. Crucial in this theory is the notion of power 
excess. The power excess of a player i in a coalition S is the 
difference between the power of ι' and the power total of S - {i}. 
Power can be measured in several ways, for example by using one 
of the standard power indices or by using, simply, the weights of 
the players in the case of a weighted majority game. A player's 
preference concerning the possible winning coalitions accords with 
the power excess of that player in the several coalitions. If i has 
a larger power excess in coalition S than in coalition T, then he 
will prefer S to T. The behavioral assumption is that each player 
strives to form a coalition in which he has maximal power excess. 
We formulate a policy-blind version and a policy version of this 
theory. It appears that the policy-blind version is closely related 
with Riker's minimum size theory and that the policy version is 
related to an adjusted version of minimum size theory in which 
policy is used as an explaining variable. 
In this chapter we have solved the first part of problem 2. We 
have examined the merits of an already existing theory (policy dis­
tance theory) and we have formulated a new theory in which play­
ers'preferences concerning coalitions are essential. These players' 
preferences are used to determine prediction sets of coalitions. How­
ever, we did not yet solve the second part of problem 2. 
Chapter 7. In this chapter we solve part 2 of problem 2. We first define 
the notion of social choice game. This will be done in section 2. 
A social choice game is a simple game in which each player has 
a preference concerning a set of alternatives. More specifically, a 
social choice game is a simple game with the folllowing parameters: 
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1. a set of alternatives, 
2. a set of players, 
3. a set of preferences, one for each player, on the set of alterna-
tives, and 
4. a set of winning coalitions. 
The problem is to construct individual preferences on the set of 
winning coalitions by using the individual preferences on the set of 
alternatives. 
In order to do this we introduce in section 3 the notion of Hamming 
distance function. By using the operation of set difference between 
two preferences and by determining subsequently the cardinality of 
the thus obtained set difference, we obtain a measure of the dissim-
ilarity of two preferences. The function that assigns to each ordered 
pair of preferences the cardinality of the set difference of the prefer-
ences is called the Hamming function. We prove that this function 
is a metric. In this section we also introduce the notion of between-
ness of preferences and the notion of linear profile. We will prove 
that if the set of individual preferences constitutes a linear profile, a 
majority choice will exist. 
In section 4 we present the first coalition formation theory of this 
chapter. This theory, called conflict minimization theory, is based 
on the idea that each player strives to form a coalition with minimal 
conflict. In order to determine the size of conflict in a coalition a 
conflict index is introduced, specifically, a conflict index that uses 
information about the Hamming distances of the pairs of preferences 
at hand. This is the so-called Hamming conflict index. We then de-
velop the descriptive part and the solution part of this theory. It 
appears that conflict minimization theory leads to aggregated rela-
tions for which the set of maximal choices (the core) is not empty. 
In order to demonstrate the working of the theory, we present a 
computation example. 
In section 5 we present the second theory to solve our problem. 
This theory is called preference distance theory and is inspired by 
De Swaan's policy distance theory. Starting point of this theory is 
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that in each winning coalition a social preference will be produced 
concerning the set of alternatives. The production of the social pref-
erence in a coalition of course depends on the social choice rule 
used in that coalition. If each player knows the social choice rule to 
be used in a coalition, then each player can calculate the Hamming 
distance between his preference and the social preference of each 
coalition. He then is able to determine his preference concerning 
coalitions. That is, he will prefer a coalition with a social preference 
that is close to his own preference to a coalition with a social pref-
erence that is far away. Moreover, he will strive towards a coalition 
with a social preference on the set of alternatives that is as close as 
possible to his own preference on the set of alternatives. It appears 
that this theory not automatically leads to a relation for which the set 
of maximal choices is nonempty (for which a nonempty core exists). 
We formulate a sufficient condition for the existence of a nonempty 
core of coalitions. However, in order to guarantee a nonempty pre-
diction set of coalitions for any situation, we link this theory to the 
theory of generalized stable sets as developed in chapter 4. Finally, 
we present a computation example that shows the working of the 
preference distance theory of coalition formation 
By presenting two theories that both use individual preferences on 
a set of alternatives as determinants of individual preferences on a 
set of winning coalitions and by using these players' preferences 
on coalitions to predict sets of coalitions, we have solved our last 
problem. So we have reached the end of our journey in that chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
Fundamentals of Social 
Choice Theory 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter some basic concepts and results of social choice theory will 
be presented. These concepts and results will be used in the following 
chapters to study coalition formation processes. Our presentation of social 
choice theory follows that of Arrow (1963), Blair and Pollack (1982), and 
Sen (1970, 1977, 1986). Sen (1977, 1986) calls this format the relational 
approach and distinguishes it from, what he calls, the functional approach 
(see Kelly 1978, 1988; Fishbum 1973, Suzumura 1983). 
The basic concepts and related assumptions which will be discussed in 
this chapter are: social state, agenda, individual, preference, choice, ratio-
nality, preference profile, social choice system and collective rationality. 
Further, we present a formulation of one of the most important results in 
social choice theory, namely, Arrow's theorem. We provide a new and 
easy proof of this theorem. This proof will give a good illustration of the 
working and the range of Arrow's theorem. 
The relational approach as discussed by Sen (1970, 1977, 1986) has a 
clear structure. As it will be presented in this work, it consists of two parts, 
namely, a descriptive part and a solution part. The descriptive part starts 
with the notion of social choice problem. A social choice problem is a set 
of alternatives from which collectively a choice must be made. Further, 
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this part deals with the preferences and choice behavior of the concerned 
individuals, the nature of social choice rules and the social structuring of 
social choice problems as produced by these rules. The social structuring 
of a social choice problem is usually called a social preference. The 
second part, the part on solution, shows how a social choice may or will 
be produced. It explains or evaluates how a social choice problem may 
or will be solved using the information as produced in the descriptive 
part Both parts of the theory will be treated in this chapter. Sections 2 
through 7 of this chapter deal with the descriptive part. In section 7 a 
start is made of the discussion of the solution part We tum back to the 
solution part in chapter 4 where it will be studied more extensively. In 
section 8 the descriptive part and the solution part are brought together by 
presenting Arrow's theorem. First the relevant conditions in this theorem 
are described and discussed. Subsequently, our proof of the theorem is 
presented. Also the meaning of this theorem is shortly discussed. In the 
final section we discuss shortly the functional approach and compare it 
with the relational approach. 
2.2 Social States 
Starting point for the theory of social choice is a nonempty set of choice 
objects, called social states. This set will be denoted by X. In the sequel, 
X is called a social choice problem. The power set of X, that is, the set 
of all subsets of X, is denoted by V(X). Social states will be denoted by 
x, y. A social state is a primitive term of the theory, that is, a term that is 
not explicated by the theory. The theory takes it, so to say, for granted. 
The term 'social state' was introduced by Arrow in his path-breaking 
work Social Choice and Individual Values. According to Arrow, if the 
term had to be defined, then 
"the most precise definition of a social state would be a com-
plete description of the amount of each type of commodity 
in the hands of each individual, the amount of labor to be 
supplied by each individual, the amount of each productive 
resource invested in each type of productive activity, and the 
amounts of various types of collective activity, such as munic-
ipal services, diplomacy and its continuation by other means, 
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and the erection of statues for famous men." (Arrow 1963: 
17). 
In short, a definition of a social state would entail a complete description of 
a societal vector whose components are values of significant sociological, 
economical or political variables that characterize a societal situation. In 
this view, distinct social states correspond to distinct societal vectors. This 
distinction may be threefold: societal vectors may differ in the values of 
the components, they may have different components, or both. 
The view of social states as societal vectors leads to a handy and 
beautiful structuring of the social choice problem under scrutiny, that is, 
of X. The societal vectors can, then, be arranged into a matrix (see figure 
2.1). 
The social states are presented by the rows in this matrix. The columns 
f
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Figure 2.1: Matrix representation of a social choice problem 
contain the relevant variables that characterize a societal situation. The 
entries show the values of the respective variables in the corresponding 
social state. This societal decision matrix would be a nice mathematical 
description of X. In order to resolve the social choice problem a selection 
of a row from this matrix must be made. Several basic definitions and 
assumptions of the theory would be expressible in simple matrix theoretical 
terms. 
Unfortunately, the view on social states as societal vectors is not ex­
haustive. Many social choice problems cannot be described in terms of 
societal decision matrices. To pin the theory only to such matrices would 
therefore mean an apriori reduction of the set of possible fields of applica­
tion of the theory and thus of its relevance. Besides that, it neither fits the 
aim of the theory. As Arrow formulated it, the problem of social choice 
is how, under which plausible assumptions, a choice can be made (Arrow 
35 
1963: 103 e.f.). This means that the attention is on the social choice 
mechanism itself, not on the nature of the input of the mechanism, that 
is, on the nature of the social choice problem. The apriori matrix view is, 
therefore, not only too thin, it is also unnecessary. 
A social state can best be seen as anything that might be conceived of 
as a solution of a social choice problem and therefore as a choice object. 
This view does not refer to any particular model of a social state. It allows 
all the degrees of freedom needed to make an interpretation. To avoid an 
annoying use of the term 'social state', we also make use of the equivalent 
terms 'alternative' or Option' 
Actually, not every conceivable social state is feasible. Some social 
states will be politically unattainable, while others are economically too 
costly to consider. Still others do not fit into the cultural climate in which 
the decision making process takes place. Another number of social states 
will not be considered as solutions of decision-making or policy problems 
because they are, technically or ethically, not implementable. In fact, there 
are numerous reasons for a conceivable social state of being not feasible. 
Any finite collection of at least three feasible social states will be called 
an agenda. An agenda will be denoted by A. The set of possible agendas 
is denoted by Ω. Of course, Ω с ViX). 
The order of the alternatives on the agenda may be very relevant in 
producing a social choice. Different orders for the same agenda may 
produce different social choices. See for excellent illustrations of this 
fact, Straffin (1980). This fact is also well-known in political practice. 
Therefore, agenda formation processes are not only very interesting but 
also highly relevant. However, in this work we leave this theme aside, be 
it with some regret A treatment of this theme would not change our basic 
results on coalition formation and is therefore superfluous. We confine 
ourselves to the assumption that nonempty agendas with at least three but 
in any case a finite number of alternatives will be formed. 
2.3 Individuals and Coalitions 
Another basic set for the theory is the set of individuals. Again, an 'in­
dividual' is a primitive term. It refers to a decision-making unit that is 
clearly distinguishable from other units. Usually, it stands for human be-
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ings. However, it may refer to any living being capable of intentional 
action. We think hereby of dolphins and chimpansees. For a study of 
dolphin cognition see Schustermann et.al. (1986), especially the challeng­
ing hypotheses of Jerison about the dolphins'world in this work. For a 
study of the formation of coalition preferences in chimpansee colonies see 
De Waal (1981). A path-breaking and daring work on animal thinking, 
which is in our view a necessary condition for intentional choice, is Griffin 
(1984). The term 'individual' also may refer to a collective of individu­
als that together can be treated as one behavioral unit or one social actor 
without loss of relevant information. We think hereby of interest groups, 
political parties, etc. 
The set of individuals will be denoted by N. The individuals in this set 
are denoted by г', j , etc. It is assumed that N has at least three members 
and is finite unless stated otherwise. Further, it will always be assumed 
that N is given apriori, that is, it is fixed in advance. We do not work with 
variable populations in this monograph. The reason for this convention is 
not because the notion of variable populations is unimportant but because 
it does not touch upon our central research problem. 
A nonempty subset of N is called a coalition. A coalition will be 
denoted by S. The notion of coalition does not assume anything particular 
about cooperative behavior. A coalition is, as stated, a set of individuals, 
nothing more and nothing less. It is quite possible that two ore more 
individuals are considered as a coalition while they do not know each 
other, let alone that they have the ability to communicate face-to-face 
with each other. This general approach allows us to collect individuals 
together into a set that have some characteristic in common. It allows us, 
for example, to form the maximal set of individuals that have the same 
preference vis-a-vis a particular pair of social states. 
This approach differs in a fundamental aspect from the game-theoretical 
oriented coalition theories in political science (Van Deernen 1989, De 
Swaan 1973, 1985, Ordeshook 1986, Riker 1962, Riker and Ordeshook 
1973). In this tradition, a coalition is seen as "an agreement among two or 
more persons to control their actions (choices or strategies)" (Ordeshook 
1986: 302). In contrast to social choice theory, this approach starts from 
the assumption that cooperation is the essence of coalitions. 
The coalitions we want to study in this work are formed on a cooper­
ative basis and are, as such, the result of rational choices of intentionally 
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behaving individuals. In the subsequent chapters we will always consider 
coalitions from this cooperative point of view. Only in this chapter we 
keep in mind the more general notion of coalition as used in social choice 
theory. 
2.4 Preference and Choice 
Consider a social choice problem X. It contains options that might be 
conceived of as possible candidates for the solution of this problem. Each 
individual will appreciate these options according to his own value system. 
Some options will be more valued than others. Still others will be judged 
to be of the same value. This relative valuation is the essence of the notion 
of individual preference. In fact, it is a binary relation on the set X with 
some nice properties. These nice properties will be discussed below. 
Given a set of individual preferences, is it possible to derive a relation 
over the set of social states that may function, in a way of speaking, as a 
social value? In other words, is there a value that reflects in a more or less 
reasonable way the individual preferences and that has the same reasonable 
properties as these individual preferences? This is the basic question posed 
in Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values. In the same work Arrow 
also provides an answer in the form of a theorem, the so-called Arrow's 
impossibility theorem. This answer, which will be discussed later in this 
chapter, is very disturbing if not shocking. It belongs to the hard core of 
social choice theory. Just as in the individual case, these social values 
can be thought of as binary relations on X. We will call them social 
preferences after Arrow (1962) and Sen (1970, 1977, 1986). 
To formulate a general frame for preferences, we study in this section 
preferences without looking at their individual or collective status. Later, 
these concepts will be used both on the micro-level and on the macro-level. 
We do not study the notion of utility and its relation to social choice. For 
this see Bezembinder (1987). 
Formally, a preference on X is a binary relation on X, denoted by R. 
As is standard, we write xRy instead of (x, y) € R. 
Definition 2.1 Let Rbea preference on X. 
• xPy := xRy and ->{yRx); 
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• xly := xRy and yRx. 
Ρ is the asymmetrie part of R and is called strict preference. I is the 
symmetric part of R and is called indifference. Clearly, Ρ Π I = 0. 
A preference may or may not satisfy any of the following properties: 
Definition 2.2 A preference Ron X is 
1. reflexive := Vx G X : xRx; 
2. asymmetric :=Vx,y e X : ifxRy, then ->(yRx) 
3. antisymmetric := Ух,y € X: ifxRy and yRx, then x = y. 
4. symmetric := х,у 6 X: ifxRy, then yRx; 
5. complete := Vrr, y e X: xRy or yRx; 
6. transitive := Vz, y, ζ G A": if xRy and yRz, then xRz; 
7. quasi-transitive := Vx,y,z e X: ifxPy and yPz, then xPz; 
8. cyclic := there is an R-cycle in X where an Ä-cycle is a finite se-
quence x\,..., xm in X such that ххРхгРхъ · · · Xm-\PxmPx\· 
9. acyclic := R contains no R-cycles. 
In fact, preferences can satisfy several conditions simultaneously. The 
most used packages of conditions are given in the next definition: 
Definition 2.3 A preference Ron X is a 
1. partial order := R satisfies reflexivity, anti-symmetry and transitivity; 
2. weak order := R satisfies reflexivity, completeness and transitivity; 
3. linear order := R satisfies reflexivity, anti-symmetry, transitivity and 
completeness. 
The following sets of preferences are important: 
1. B(X) is the set of reflexive and complete preferences on X, 
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2. A(X) is the set of reflexive, complete and acyclic preferences on X, 
3. Q(X) is the set of reflexive, complete and quasi-transitive prefer­
ences on X, 
4. O(X) is the set of weak orders on X, and 
5. L(X) is the set of linear orders on X. 
It is evident that ЦХ) С 0(X) С Q(X) С A(X) С B(X). A nicely 
elaborated classification system for preferences satisfying specific packages 
of conditions can be found in Storcken (1989). 
Definition 2.4 Let R e Β(Χ}, AçnandxeA. 
1. χ is R-best for A := Vy € A : xRy; 
2. χ is R-maximal for A := ->3y € A : yPx. 
The set of .R-best social states for an agenda A will be denoted by β(Α, R). 
The set of Ä-maximal social states for A is denoted by /х(Л, R). 
Theorem 2.1 1. β(Α, R) С μ(Α, R) for every A € Sì and every R e 
B(X). 
2. /?04, R) = μ(Α, R) if Ris complete. 
Since the proof of this proposition is easy, we leave it to the reader. Also 
cf. Sen (1970) or Pattanaik (1971). 
The following fundamental result gives necessary and sufficient condi­
tions for the existence of a best social state. For a proof of this well-known 
result, see Sen (1970: 16) or Suzumura (1983: 32). 
Lemma 2.1 Let R be a preference on Χ. ß(Ay R) ^ 0 for every А ел if 
and only if R is reflexive, complete and acyclic. 
According to this lemma, if R is cyclic or if R is not complete, then for 
some agenda a best alternative does not exist 
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2.4.1 Choice 
A choice is the outcome of a behavioral act. This behavioral act consists 
of selecting alternatives from an agenda. A static description of choice 
behavior is provided by the notion of a choice function. 
Definition 2.5 A choice function is a function С : Ω -»· ViX) satisfying 
• С(Л) С A for every A e Ω; 
• С(Л) ^ 0 for every A en. 
In short, a choice function is a rule that describes how to each agenda a 
nonempty subset of that agenda is assigned. If С is a choice function and 
if Л is an agenda, then C(A) is called the choice set of A. 
The definition of a choice function does not imply that choices are 
produced on the base of information on preferences. The definition does 
not preclude the production of choices on the basis of, for example, chance 
mechanisms, religious codes, oracles or fortune tellers. 
2.4.2 Rational Choice 
Rationality is the selection of a best alternative (see Plott 1973, Schwartz 
1986, Suzumura 1983). This simple view on rationality consists of two 
components. The first is the value component This component has to do 
with determining what is best and is captured by means of the notion of 
preference. The second is the behavioral component. This component has 
to do with selecting an alternative and is summarized by the notion of a 
choice function. Thus, the notion of rationality is in essence a combination 
of the notion of preference and the notion of a choice function. 
Definition 2.6 A choice function С : Ω -+ V(X) is rational := there is a 
preference Ron X such that C(A) = β(Α,R)for every A G Ω. 
If so, we say that R rationalizes С The following result is a corollary of 
lemma 2.1: 
Theorem 2.2 A preference R rationalizes a choice function 
С : Ω -+ V(X) if R is reflexive, complete and acyclic. 
41 
Since transitivity implies quasi-transitivity which implies, in its turn, 
acyclicity, a preference R also rationalizes a choice function 
С : Ω —* ViX) if R is reflexive, complete and transitive or if R is 
reflexive, complete and quasi-transitive. In the first case we will speak of 
transitive rationality, in short: Τ-rationality. In the second case we speak 
of quasi-transitive rationality, in short: Q-rationality. 
Essential for the notion of rationality as presented so far is the existence 
of a best social state. Hence the importance of lemma 2.1. If there is no 
best social state, it is not possible to speak of rationality. A best social 
state will not exist if the relevant preference is incomplete or cyclic. The 
problem of how an individual might choose in this case is not solved by 
social choice theory or by any other rational choice theory. That is, the 
choice behavior of individuals having cyclic preferences is beyond the 
scope of any rational choice theory sofar. In contrast, the problem of how 
to choose collectively in the case of cyclic social preferences is actually 
one of the oldest problems in social choice theory. Already Marquis 
de Condorcet (1785, 1789, 1791) and Dodsgon (1867) have studied this 
problem. We return to the work of Marquis de Condorcet in chapter 3. 
2.5 Preference Profiles 
In the sequel it is assumed that each individual г e N has a preference 
on X that is complete and transitive. This assumption implies that each 
individual is T-rational. 
An η-tuple of preferences, one and only one for each individual, is 
called a preference profile. Formally: 
Definition 2.7 A preference profile is α mapping ρ : N —• 0(X). 
A preference p(i) G O(X) in a preference profile ρ will be denoted by R?. 
This can be read as 'the preference of individual i in profile p\ If the 
context is clear, we only write І2,·. The asymmetric and symmetric parts 
of an individual preference can be read in a similar way. The set of all 
possible preference profiles will be denoted by Π. Thus 
Π := (0(X))N. 
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In representing preference profiles, we often will use a compact nota-
tion. In this notation xy is written for xPy and (xy) for xly. Before each 
preference we put the frequency of individuals having that preference. We 
give an example: 
Example 2.5.1 
3 : xyzw 
2 : z(wy)x 
1 : (xyzw) 
In this profile three individuals have the linear order xyzw. Two individ-
uals have the weak order z(wy)x. These two individuals are indifferent 
with respect to w and y. One individual has the preference (xyzw). This 
individual is completely indifferent. 
We abstract away from the moral aspects and the possibly strategic 
use of individual preferences. What counts are the preferences as re-
ported by the individuals, not whether they are good or immoral, insincere 
or sophisticated. A pioneering work on the strategic use of preferences 
is Pattanaik (1978). Also consider Moulin (1983). For a more elabo-
rated game-theoretical approach to this theme, consider the work of Peleg 
(1984). 
In social choice theory it is usually assumed that individual prefer-
ences as reflected in a preference profile are exogeneously determined. 
Information about the way they are formed is not incorporated into the 
theory. This fact is critized by Elster (1983). He calls it the thin view on 
rationality and he argues that the model should also incorporate informa-
tion about preference formation processes. This critique is taken seriously 
in this work and it will be met partially. In the subsequent chapters we 
will present coalition theories that show how actors form their preferences 
with respect to coalitions. In Elster (1986) a number of other failures and 
limitations is given. 
Hindess (1988) also critizes the model of individual rational choice 
that is presented here as a starting point for social choice theory. His 
main point is that this model does not take into account the fact that any 
individual is imbedded in a social structure. Each individual is seen as 
an atom. Hindess' critique is very interesting. In our opinion, it is a 
serious attack on the rational choice model. The position and functioning 
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of an individual within a social structure is, probably, relevant with respect 
to the formation of his preference. A theory of preference and choice is, 
therefore, only adequate if it can explain the relation between the positional 
and the structural characteristics of a social network on the one side and 
the properties of individual preference on the other. The trouble with this 
point of view is that we do not know how such an adequate theory will 
look like. 
A third critique has a more psychological flavour. It says that the indi­
vidual rational choice model does not reckon with the personal history of 
the concerned individual. An individual preference and with that an indi­
vidual choice must, in some way or another, be related to the individual's 
life history. This view implies that another life history of an individual 
may have led to another preference and another choice behavior. There­
fore, to be adequate, a choice theory must deal with the history of an 
individual in explaining individual preference and choice. This critique 
deals with the static character of the rational choice model. To meet it 
means to construct dynamic models that explain the changing of tastes and 
values in terms of, say, psychological variables. 
2.6 Social Choice Rules 
The process of selecting an alternative (solution, social choice) from a 
social choice problem will be reconstructed in this work as a process con­
sisting of two stages. In the first stage, a rule or device assigns a preference 
to a preference profile. In the second stage, the assigned preference is used 
to produce a social choice. In this section we study the first stage. In the 
next section the second stage is studied. 
The preference assigned to a profile by a rule can be interpreted as a 
social value of the group concerned. It will therefore be called a social 
preference. The purpose of a social preference is to structure the social 
choice problem in order to make a social choice. In general, the nicer the 
properties of a social preference, the better the problem is structured and 
the easier it is to select a social choice. The preference-assigning rule or 
device is called a social choice rule, in short, SCR. 
Definition 2.8 1. F is a social choice rule (henceforward SCR) := F is 
a mapping from Π into B(X). 
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2. The image F(p) of a preference profile p e n under an SCR F is 
called a social preference. 
The collection of all possible SCRs is denoted by Φ. That is, 
φ := (Β(Χ))Π. 
The definition of an SCR is very general in its description of the 
properties of social preferences. It just says that a social preference, as 
the image of a preference profile under an SCR, is reflexive. A more 
restrictive SCR is obtained by using the set of reflexive, complete and 
acyclic relations on X as its range. 
Definition 2.9 F is a social decision function (henceforth SDF) := F is a 
mapping from Π into A(X). 
The set of all social decision functions is denoted by ФЗОР- That is, 
Ф5ОР:=(А(Х))П. 
The name 'social decision function' is taken from Sen (1970; also see Sen 
1977, 1986). However, Sen defines an SDF in a rather difficult way (cf. 
1970: 52). Our definition is equivalent to his but more simple. Clearly, 
an SDF is an SCS. 
A further restriction is obtained by demanding quasi-transitivity instead 
of acyclicity of social preferences. 
Definition 2.10 F is a quasi-transitive social choice rule (henceforth QS) 
:= F is a mapping from Π into Q(X). 
The collection of all QS is denoted by OQS- Formally: 
Фд5 := (QW)". 
It is easy to verify that every QS is an SDF. However, not every SDF is 
aQS. 
In his original work, Arrow demands, besides the conditions of com­
pleteness and reflexivity, the condition of transitivity of social preferences. 
This leads to the notion of a social welfare function. 
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Definition 2.11 F is a social welfare function (henceforward SWF) := F 
is a mapping from Π into 0(X). 
The set of all possible SWF is denoted by <t>swF· Formally: 
VSWF := (OW)". 
The name 'social welfare function' chosen by Arrow is unfortunate, since 
it might be confused with the notion of Bergson-Samuelson social welfare 
function as used in the so-called Paretian Welfare Economics (de Graaff 
1957, Samuelson 1967, 1977, Sen 1970, 1986). In Paretian Welfare Eco­
nomics, social welfare is considered as an increasing function of individual 
utility indices. An individual utility index [/, for an individual г is a real-
valued mapping with as domain a set of factors that are relevant for the 
welfare of г. A Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function is a real-valued 
function of the form 
W = W(U
u
U2,...,Un), 
where Ui is the utility index of individual i and dW/dUi > 0 for all г'. As 
such, a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function is a representation of 
a relation on a set of social states that is based on a value judgment. It 
is not a reconstruction of a mechanism that produces the value on which 
such a social welfare function must be based. And this is, according to 
Sen (1970, 1986), the fundamental difference with an Arrowian social 
welfare function. An Arrowian SWF is, as we have accentuated, a rule of 
producing social values, it is not a social value itself. It is a mechanism that 
produces reflexive, complete and transitive social preferences. In contrast, 
a Paretian social welfare function is a social preference, a representation 
of a social value that might, eventually, be produced by an Arrowian 
SWF. So, an Arrowian SWF is a rule, a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare 
function is an output produced by a rule. 
In another work. Arrow (1967: 68) calls an SCR a constitution. He 
already proposes this term in his famous work (Arrow 1963). However, 
there a constitution is only another term for a social welfare function (see 
Arrow o.c: 105). Sen (1970, 1977, 1986) and Suzumura (1983) use the 
term collective choice procedure. Fishbum (1973) calls an SCR a social 
choice function while Kelly (1988) uses the same term as we do. Clearly, 
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there is a diversity in nomenclature. 
Since O(X) С Q(X), we have <&SWF С QQS-
Since Q(X) С A(X), we have Фсз С Φ5οκ· 
Since A(X) С ßi-X"), we have <bsDF С Φ. 
Hence, because of transitivity of proper inclusion, we have 
&SWF С Фсз С <bsDF С Φ. 
This collection of nested sets of social choice rules will be called the Hi­
erarchical Class of Social Choice Rules. 
In the mathematical systems theory of Mesarovic and Takahara (1975), 
a system is defined as a relation between an input set and an output 
set. If an input-output relation has the characteristics of a function, then 
Mesarovic and Takahara call it a functional system. So, in this sense, an 
SCR is a functional system. The input set is the set of all possible pref­
erence profiles Π, the output set is the set of all reflexive and complete 
binary relations B(X). Seeing an SCR as a system reminds us that we 
must clearly distinguish between preference profiles (input), social prefer­
ences (output) and rules. Rules, in order to be systems, must be constant, 
i.e. may not vary in assigning output to input Consequently, rules must 
be evaluated independently from the content of social states and from the 
nature of individual preferences. 
In this study we preclude systems which use chance procedures. We do 
not wish to study choice properties of roulette wheels or dice. However, 
systems which involve magic, oracles, fortune telling, religious codes or 
something like that are allowed. 
Contrary to what is often thought, the interpretation of an SCR need 
not be limited to voting procedures. According to Nakamura (1975, 1979) 
and Plott (1975), an SCR may be seen as a rule to play a game. Further, 
an SCR may represent a representative system, an electoral system or 
a democratic system in the direct sense (see Fishbum 1973, Murakami 
1968, Mueller 1989). It also may represent a decision-making system in 
which violence and suppression are the ruling factors. See Fishbum (1973: 
210-212) for a study of suppression in a social choice theoretical context. 
This broad set of interpretation possibilities is the result of the abstraction 
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level of the social choice theoretical concepts and is one of the attractive 
properties of the theory. It allows both the general study of classes of 
social choice rules and the study of particular systems, e.g. the system of 
majority decision. 
2.7 Collective Rationality and Social Choice 
In the previous section we have discussed the first stage of a social choice 
process. We now tum to the second stage of a social choice process. In this 
stage, a choice set is specified for some agenda given the social preference 
information as produced in the first stage. That is, if F is an SCR, p e n 
a preference profile and A an agenda, then F(p) will be used in this stage 
to generate a choice set C(A) where С is a choice function. This choice 
set can be thought of as a solution for the social choice problem under 
scrutiny. (Hence the name 'solution part') and will be called social choice 
set. An element in a social choice set will be called a social choice. 
The question what kind of social choice sets should result from a social 
preference is at the hard core of social choice theory. Our answer to this 
question is closely related with our view on what a good solution is for a 
social choice problem. The first obvious candidate is the set of .F(p)-best 
options for an agenda A. This leads to the classical concept of collective 
rationality. 
Definition 2.12 An SCR F satisfies collective rationality (henceforward 
CR) := Vp G П Л G аЩА, Fip)) i 0]. 
Consequently, if F satisfies collective rationality, then С : Ω —• V(X) 
defined by C(A) = /3(A, F(p)) is a choice function. The following result 
is a consequence of lemma 2.1. 
Theorem 2.3 Let F be a SCR. F satisfies collective rationality if and only 
if F e Фзор-
Thus, an SCR satisfies CR if and only if it is a social decision function. 
Clearly, also Q-systems satisfy collective rationality. Since a SWF is a 
QS1, also a SWF satisfies collective rationality. Keeping in line with 
'Consider the hierarchical class of social choice rules. 
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section 4.2 of this chapter, we call a QS collective Q-rational and a SWF 
collective T-rational. 
Collective rationality is an important condition. It guarantees the ex-
istence of a best social choice and, hence, the possibility of selecting a 
social optimum. However, it has some serious shortcomings. First, this 
condition does not indicate what to choose in the case of cyclic social 
preferences. It indicates that there is no solution for a social choice prob-
lem in this case. It stops, so to say at optimality. If there is no best social 
choice, we cannot look any further with the notion of rationality. To cure 
this myopia, some alternatives have been formulated in the course of time 
(see Miller 1980, 1983; Banks 1985; Schwartz 1986; McKelvey 1986). In 
chapter 4 we present two extensions of the notion of collective rationality 
that both have a root in n-person game theory. There we also present our 
own contribution. These extensions will show what to select when a best 
alternative does not exist. 
Another drawback of the condition of collective rationality is that it is 
inconsistent with some sets of conditions that all appear to be rather rea-
sonable. This is expressed in a number of socalled impossibility theorems 
(cf. a.o. Kelly 1978, Schwartz 1986, Sen 1970, 1977, 1986, Storcken 
1989, Suzumura 1983). The most celebrated of these is Arrow's theorem. 
This theorem will be studied in the next section. 
In the previous section we noticed that an SCR is a system that must 
be clearly distinguished from its input set and output set. Consequently, 
the evaluation of a social choice must be clearly distinguished from the 
evaluation of the SCR producing that social choice. Neither the quality or 
content of social choices yielded by a SCR nor the quality of the individual 
preferences used as input for that SCR can be used to qualify that SCR. 
To be sure, it is quite possible that a very reasonable and fair SCR yields 
a rather criminal social choice. If, for example, a majority wants fascism, 
then the system of majority decision2 will generate fascism. This does not 
mean that for this reason the system of majority decision is a bad system. 
'Only' the social choice, then, is alarming, 'only' the preferences of a 
majority, then, are pathological. 
2See for a study of this rule the next chapter 
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2.8 Arrow's Impossibility Theorem 
An important task of social choice theory is to study relevant conditions 
that social choice systems may or should satisfy. The methodological 
status of these conditions is twofold. Firstly, these conditions can be in­
terpreted as ethical constraints imposed on social choice systems. The 
conditions, then, are used in a normative manner. Adherents of this nor­
mative view are, among others. Arrow (1963, 1977) and Kelly (1978). 
Secondly, the conditions can be considered as positive laws that govern 
the behavior of social choice systems. Pronounced followers of this be­
havioral view are, among others, Plott (1976) and Schwartz (1986). 
It is not necessary to choose already for a particular view. This is the 
advantage of the formal character of social choice theory. Sometimes it 
is useful to work with both views. For example, if we want to evaluate a 
real-life social choice system, then we must first investigate the conditions 
this system satisfies. After this we must compare the package of prevail­
ing conditions with a package of conditions we like a social choice system 
to satisfy. Then we can make an evaluation and, eventually, criticize the 
existing system. To give another example, if decision-makers want an­
other social choice procedure, then we may ask them for the conditions 
that the new system should satisfy. If the package of desired conditions is 
not internally inconsistent, we may design a system satisfying these con­
ditions. Once installized, the conditions, then, serve as laws that regulate 
the behavior of the system. 
Unrestricted Domain 
The first condition we deal with is Unrestricted Domain. 
Definition 2.13 (Unrestricted Domain) An SCR F satisfies unrestricted 
domain (henceforward UD) := the domain of F includes all logically pos­
sible individual preferences. 
Since we have taken Π as the domain of an SCR, this condition is math­
ematically redundant. However, in social choice theory, it is tradition to 
take it up and to discuss it 
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Arrow presents this condition in the second edition of his Social Choice 
and Individual Values (Arrow, 1963: 96). However, there is an important 
difference between our formulation and Arrow's one. Arrow formulates 
UD only for SWF's. Our formulation is concerned with social choice rules 
in general. 
This condition forbids that a social choice rule only works for specific 
preference profiles. It says that there are no restrictions for the input set 
of a social choice rule and hence no constraints to form an individual 
preference, provided, of course, all individual preferences are reflexive, 
complete and transitive. In this sense, this condition has to do with indi­
vidual freedom to form a preference. 
Sometimes it is argued that UD is too robust. Preferences do obey 
some regularities and it is possible that just these regularities allow one to 
avoid the difficulties typically encountered in social choice processes (i.e. 
the difficulties as appearing in impossibility theorems). Thus, it may be 
useful to restrict the domain of a social choice rule. Within this view, a 
frequently studied domain restriction is Single-Peakedness which roughly 
means that the social states "can be ordered along a line in such a way that, 
as we pass from left to right along the line, each individual's preference 
increases up to a peak or to an indifference plateau, and then decreases 
thereafter." (Fishbum 1973: 101). For a review of this and other domain 
restrictions, consider Sen (1986). 
Pareto Condition 
Another important condition is the Pareto condition. 
Definition 2.14 (Pareto Condition) An SCR F satisfies the Pareto condi­
tion (henceforward PC) :=for every preference profile ρ G Π and for every 
x,y E X: if for all i e Ν : xPfy, then xF(p)y and not yF(p)x. 
The Pareto condition says that if everyone strictly prefers χ to y, then χ 
also is or should be socially strictly prefered to y. This condition seems 
reasonable. To deny it would imply that there are possible situations in 
which everyone strictly prefers χ to y while y is socially preferred. If the 
agenda is {x, y}, this would mean that, if collective rationality is satisfied, 
y would be the social choice while everyone finds χ better. Another 
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argument for the Pareto condition is that it avoids needless concessions 
(cf. Coombs and Avrunin, 1987). 
An argument against the Pareto condition can be given by using Sen's 
socalled liberal paradox (Sen 1970: Ch.6 and 6*. Sen 1974). This fas­
cinating paradox shows that the Pareto condition is inconsistent with a 
weak condition of liberalism. This, what Sen calls, condition of minimal 
liberalism requires "that each individual is entirely decisive in the social 
choice over at least one pair of alternatives " (Sen 1970: 79). Sen's 
liberal paradox implies that the Pareto condition must be given up when 
requiring minimal liberalism. This and other related problems have been 
studied extensively in Wriglesworth (1985). A game-theoretical approach 
to the liberal paradox is given in Gardenfors (1985). 
Binary Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
The most controversial of all conditions in the theory of social choice 
is Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. The binary version of this 
condition says that if the individual preferences with respect to some pair 
of alternatives remain the same, then the social preference with respect to 
this pair of alternatives must remain the same, irrespective of the changes 
of the individual preferences with respect to other pairs of alternatives. 
Definition 2.15 (Binary Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) Let F 
be a SCR. F satisfies Binary Independence of brelevant Alternatives (hence­
forth IIA) :=for all p, q e Π and for all x, y € X, if for all i G Ν, 
Щп({х,у} х {х,у}) = Щп({х,у} χ {х,у}\ 
then 
F(p) Π ({χ, у} χ {χ, у}) = F(q) Π ({χ, у] χ {χ, у}). 
This is the binary version of ПА. It is also possible to use an agenda with 
three or more elements. We then get an n-ary version. This version says 
that if individual preferences with respect to the alternatives on this agenda 
remain the same, then the social preference with respect to the alternatives 
on this agenda must remain the same, irrespective of the changes of the 
individual preferences with respect to the alternatives outside this agenda. 
In following Blau (1972), Kelly (1978) proves that the binary version of 
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IIA is equivalent to the n-ary version whenever F is an SDF. See Kelly 
(1978: 31-32). Also see Sen (1986: 1096-1097). 
According to Plott (1976), IIA is a universal law. In his view there 
are neither real-life systems nor conceivable systems that violate this prin­
ciple. It is obeyed by all our "current societal models" (Plott 1976: 535). 
According to Schwartz (1986: 33), 
"Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and therewith Binary 
Independence are eminently reasonable assumptions to make 
in a realistic study of collective choice. I know of no real-
world collective-choice process that violates either condition." 
To see why it is very difficult to escape from ΠΑ, consider the negation of 
it. Then there are choice situations ρ and q and alternatives x, y G X such 
that Щ Π ({χ,y) x {χ, y}) = R4i П ({χ, у} χ {χ, у}) for all г' € Ν, while 
F(p)n({x,y} χ {χ,y}) yF(g)n({x,y} χ {χ, y}). But how to explain this 
difference? What alternatives other than χ and у might have caused this 
difference in the respective social preferences? According to Fishbum 
(1973: 7), the idea of allowing irrelevant alternatives "to influence the 
social choice introduces a potential ambiguity into the choice process that 
can at least be alleviated if not removed by insisting on the independence 
condition." However, the violation of the principle implies more than a 
"potential ambiguity". If IIA is not required, then not only preferences with 
respect to irrelevant alternatives but also every other variable operative in 
this world and everything else we can conceive of might influence the 
production of a social preference and with that the outcome of a social 
choice process. In this case, it is very difficult to say anything meaningful 
about social choice processes. 
Nondictatorship 
The essence of decision-making is power. How must power be distributed 
among the individuals and coalitions? This problem is not easy. If power 
is concentrated in the hands of a few, then it is likely that some problems 
will occur with respect to the acceptability of the social choices and with 
that with the implementation of these. If power is dissipated too much, 
then decision deadlocks may result already by a low degree of divergence 
of individual preferences. 
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The most concentrated form of decision-making power is dictatorship. 
A dictator has the power to dictate the social preference, irrespective of 
the preferences of the other individuals. Clearly, dictatorship is in contra­
diction with any notion about democracy. The condition that forbids the 
existence of a dictator is called the Nondictatorship condition. In chapter 
5 of this work we study other concentrations of decision-making power. 
Definition 2.16 (Nondictatorship) A SCR F satisfies Nondictatorship (hence­
forward ND) := there is no i e N such that for every p e n and for every 
x, y e X: ifxPfy, then xF(p)y and not yF(p)x. 
We are now ready to formulate the first fundamental law of political 
science. 
Theorem 2.4 (Arrow's Impossibility Theorem) There is no F £ &SWF 
satisfying UD, IIA, PC and ND. 
We give a simple proof that illustrates the working of the conditions in an 
illuminating way3. Alternative proofs can be found, among others, in Ar­
row (1963), Sen (1970), Fishbum (1973), Hansson (1975), Kelly (1978), 
Schwartz (1986) and Storcken (1989). 
Proof of Arrow's theorem We first prove the theorem to be true for three 
alternatives and two individuals who both have linear orders as preferences 
with respect to these three alternatives. We also restrict the range of social 
welfare functions to the set of possible linear orders on this set of three 
alternatives. We denote the three alternatives with a,byc. The two indi­
viduals are, say, Romeo and Julia. Because of UD we must consider all 
3! χ 3! = 36 possible preference profiles. For this consider the following 6 
by 6 matrix. 
3The inspiration of this proof is found in the second proof method of the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem as presented in the excellent work of Schmeidler and Sonnenschein 
(1978). 
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Romeo 
abc 
bac 
cba 
acb 
bea 
cab 
abc 
abc 
bc (PC) 
ab (12) 
abc(T) 
bc(4) 
ab (12) 
abc (T) 
ab (PC) 
bc(4) 
abc (T) 
bc (PC) 
ab (12) 
abc (T) 
ab (PC) 
bc(4) 
abc (5) 
bac 
ac (PC) 
bc (PC) 
bac (1) 
bac 
ba (PC) 
ac(6) 
bac (T) 
ba(2) 
ac (PC) 
bac (3) 
ba (PC) 
ac(6) 
bac (T) 
ba(2) 
ac(6) 
bac (T) 
cba 
ba(2) 
cb (10) 
cba (T) 
ba (PC) 
cb (10) 
cba (T) 
cba 
ba(2) 
cb (PC) 
cba (7) 
ba (PC) 
cb (10) 
cba (T) 
ba(2) 
cb (CP) 
cba (T) 
Julia 
acb 
ac(PC) 
cb (10) 
acb (T) 
ac (PC) 
cb (10) 
acb (11) 
ac(6) 
cb (PC) 
acb (T) 
acb 
ac(6) 
cb (10) 
acb (T) 
ac(6) 
cb (PC) 
acb (T) 
bea 
bc (PC) 
ca(8) 
bea (T) 
bc (PC) 
ca(8) 
bea (T) 
ca (PC) 
bc(4) 
bea (T) 
bc(4) 
ca(8) 
bea (T) 
bea 
ca (PC) 
be (4) 
bea (Τ) 
cab 
ab (PC) 
ca (8) 
cab (9) 
ca (8) 
ab (12) 
cab (T) 
ca (PC) 
ab (12) 
cab (T) 
ab (PC) 
ca(8) 
cab (T) 
ca (PC) 
ab (12) 
cab (T) 
cab 
Table 2.1: Romeo-Julia matrix for Arrow's theorem 
55 
The rows consist of the possible preferences of Romeo. The columns 
consist of the possible preferences of Julia. For these reasons we call it 
the Romeo-Julia matrix. We first explain some letters and numbers in this 
matrix: 
• Τ stands for 'Transitivity'. This property can be used because we are 
dealing with social welfare functions. 
• (n) where η is a natural number, means that the corresponding result 
depends on the result that corresponds with the preceding number 
n - 1 . 
• We remember that IIA stands for Independence of Irrelevant Alter­
natives and PC for the Pareto Condition. 
The explanation of the succeeding numbers in the matrix is as follows: 
(1): in the entry (abc, bac), we have ac because of PC and be because of 
PC. Remains ab or ba. Suppose ba which is the preference of Julia. Then 
bac because ofT. 
(2): ba because of(l) and HA. 
(3): bac because ofT. 
(4): be because of(3) and IIA. 
(5): abc because ofT. 
(6): ac because of (5) and IIA. 
(7): cba because ofT. 
(8): ca because of (7) and IIA. 
(9): cab because ofT. 
(10): cb because of (9) and IIA. 
(11): acb because ofT. 
(12): ab because of (II) and IIA. 
Now looking in each entry of the matrix, we see that each social preference 
is the preference of Julia. Hence for this case, Julia is the dictator and, 
therefore, the theorem is true for X = {a, 6, c} and N = {Romeo, Julia}. 
Note that if we had decided in the entry (abc, bac) of the matrix to use ab 
instead ofba, then Romeo would have been the dictator. 
Now we prove that Julia remains a dictator when expanding the set 
of alternatives. Let X" be a nonempty finite set of alternatives such that 
AT" Π X = 0. 
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Step 1. Pick an arbitrary alternative from X", say u, and substitute an 
alternative from {а, о, с} by и, say с. Then by looking at the matrix 
with с substituted by и it is easy to verify that Julia is a dictator 
for {a, 6, u}. The same is true for {a,u, c} and {u,b,c}. But then 
Julia is able to determine the social preference between any pair from 
{a, b, c, u} because of IIA. Hence Julia remains a dictator. Note that 
it is allowed in this step to use indifferent pairs. 
Step 2. Take another alternative from X", say v^u. First substitute one 
of the alternatives in {a, b, с, u} by v, say с Then look at the matri­
ces that correspond with the possible triple sets of alternatives from 
{a, b, v, и}. In the same way as in the preceding step, the matrices 
show that Julia can determine the social preference for each of these 
triple sets. But then Julia is also a dictator with respect to {a, 6, v, u) 
(see step 1). The same is true when substituting a, b, or и in the set 
{a, 6, c, u} by v. Because of IIA, Julia can then determine the social 
preference for each pair of alternatives form {a, b, с, u, v}. 
Step m. Proceeding in this way we can exhaust the set X in m steps where 
m =| X | . Julia remains a dictator. 
Now let us make Julia happier by replicating Romeo a number of times, 
say η times. Since we have η Romeos, we now have η Romeo-Julia matri­
ces, each of which shows that Julia is a dictator. That is, Julia is a dictator 
for each Romeo with respect to X = {a, b, c). By using the arguments of the 
preceding steps, Julia remains a dictator for each Romeo when expanding 
X = {a, ò, c} with a nonempty finite set X" such that X" П X = 0. 
Does Julia therefore dictate all Romeos? Yes, she does. For let us suppose 
that she does not. Then there are χ and y such that xPjUHay but not χ 
is socially strictly preferred to y. Because of the Pareto condition, there 
must then be a Romeo with yRnomeo1· But then, Julia does not dictate 
this Romeo which is in contradiction with the fact that she dictates each of 
them. Indeed, sweet Julia swallows them all. •. 
What does Arrow's theorem exactly mean? Consider the hierarchical 
class of social choice systems as presented in section 6 of this chapter. 
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Arrow's theorem is a characterization of the class of social welfare func­
tions, that is, of <&SWF· More precisely, the theorem is concerned with 
the existence of a subset of the set of SWFs in a negative way. It says 
that the subset of SWFs satisfying UD, PC, IIA and ND is empty. So, 
Arrow's theorem characterizes the most restrictive class of social choice 
rules. It says nothing about QSs and other systems which are not SWFs. 
In fact, there are QSs that belong to Фдз — &SWF and that satisfy the 
Arrow conditions. An example is the Pareto rule. See Sen (1970: Ch.5). 
The definition of this rule is as follows: 
Definition 2.17 A social choice rule F is called the Pareto extension rule 
:= for every χ and y and for every ρ e Π: 
1. xF(p)y when xR^yfor all i G Ν, 
2. xF(p)y and yF(p)x otherwise. 
It is easy to check that the Pareto extension rule is a QS but not an SWF. 
It is also easy to verify that this rule satisfies UD, IIA, PC and ND. 
Arrow's theorem has a particular methodological status. It expresses 
the logical impossibility of an SWF with the Arrow conditions. Since the 
set of empirically possible worlds (realities) is a proper subset of the set of 
logically possible worlds, that what is logically impossible, cannot exist in 
reality. Hence you need not look for an SWF with the required properties 
in the real world unless you do not believe in first order predicate logic. 
In this sense, Arrow's theorem is empirically irrefutable. It only can be 
tackled, perhaps, by using some deviant logic. 
In the course of time several variations of Arrow's theorem have been 
presented (see Blair and Pollack 1982; Kelly 1978; Schwartz 1986; Sen 
1970, 1977, 1986; Storcken 1989; Suzumura 1983). Most of these varia­
tions show an interplay between collective rationality and concentration of 
decision-making power (cf. Van Deernen 1988). In chapter 5 we shortly 
return to some of these variations. 
2.9 Social Choice: The Functional Approach 
The input set for an SCR is the set Π, the output set is B(X). In social 
choice theory, another framework is in use to study social choice. Sen 
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(1977,1986) calls this framework the functional approach to social choice. 
In this subsection we compare this approach with the relational approach 
as used in this work. 
In the functional approach, social choices are studied directly in terms 
of choice functions without referring to social preferences. This approach 
is mainly the result of seeking escape routes to Arrow's impossibility the­
orem (cf. Sen 1977a: 166-7). The approach is used in the standard works 
of Kelly (1978, 1988) and Suzumura (1983). Fishbum uses a variation of 
it in his excellent The Theory of Social Choice. We shortly study this ap­
proach (including Fishbum's approach) and compare it with the relational 
approach. 
Let Γ denote the set of all choice functions from Ω to V{X). 
Definition 2.18 G is a Kelly-Suzumura social choice rule (henceforward 
KS-SCR) := G : Π -» Г. 
In other words, a KS-SCR is a function that assigns a choice function to 
each preference profile. The final set of an agenda A produced by a choice 
function as a value of a preference profile is called the social choice set 
of A. A choice function associated to a preference profile ρ e Π by a 
KS-SCR G will be denoted by Cj?. That is: C^ := G(p). 
The input set of a KS-SCR is, just as in the case of a relational SCR, 
the set Π. The output, however, is not a binary relation (social preference) 
but a choice function that has the set of agendas as argument. The final 
result is a nonempty social choice set for each agenda. 
Using now the concept of rational (social) choice as developed in 
section 4 and 7 of this chapter, the conditions of collective rationality can 
be defined in the following adjusted way: 
Definition 2.19 Let G be a KS-SCR. 
• G is collective rational := Cp is rational for each pen. 
• G is collective Q-rational := C^ is Q-rational for each p e n . 
• G is collective T-rational := C^ is T-rational for each p e n . 
For the definition of the several rational choice functions consider section 
4 above. 
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The most important difference between the relational approach and 
the functional approach as formulated by Kelly, Suzumura and others is 
the place and use of the notion of a social preference. In the relational 
approach a social preference is needed to yield a social choice. A best 
social choice is produced if a social preference satisfies a package of 
conditions that are sufficient and sometimes necessary to generate a rational 
choice function. The essence, however, is: first a preference, then a choice. 
A social preference is needed to reveal a choice. The functional approach 
is a reversed world. In this approach a social preference is not a starting 
point but a possible endpoint that may be revealed if some conditions of 
choice are satisfied. The essence in this approach is: first a choice, then 
a preference. A series of choices may reveal, under some conditions, a 
social preference. The conditions under which a social preference may be 
revealed by a series of choices has been a major theme in the functional 
approach. For summarizing studies of these conditions see Bordes (1975, 
1979), Kelly (1978), Schwartz (1986), Sen (1977, 1986) or Suzumura 
(1983). 
Fishbum (1973) uses a variation of the Kelly-Suzumura framework. 
He takes as input set of an SCR the cartesian product of Ω and Π and as 
output set V(X). An SCR as defined by Fishbum will be called a Fishburn 
social choice rule, in short, an F-SCR. 
Definition 2.20 Η is a Fishbum social choice rule (henceforward F-SCR) 
:= Η : Ω χ Π -» V(X) such that for every (A,p) e Ω χ Π, 
7. Я(Л,р)СЛ 
2. Я(Л,р)^0. 
An element in the range of an F-SCR is called, of course, a social choice 
set. So an F-SCR maps an agenda together with a preference profile 
straight out into a social choice set. Hence, an F-SCR is a choice function 
with a different argument as the choice functions defined in section 4.1. 
We formulate the conditions of collective rationality for F-SCRs as 
follows: 
Definition 2.21 Ut Η be an F-SCR. 
• Η is collective rational := there is a binary relation R such that 
H(A,p) = β(Α, R)for every (Л,р) e Ω χ П. 
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• H is collective Q-rational := there is a quasi-transitive binary relation 
R such that Η(Α,ρ) = β(Α, R) for every (Α,ρ) e Ω x П. 
• Η is collective T-rational := there is a transitive binary relation R 
such that H(A,p) = β(Α, R)for every (A,p) G Ω χ П. 
If an F-SCR is rational, then the underlying binary relation must be reflex­
ive, complete and at least acyclic4. The similarity with the Kelly-Suzumura 
approach is obvious. Also for the Fishburn-framework a social preference 
must be revealed by choices. The differences are, firstly, that Fishbum 
uses the cartesian product of Ω and Π as the input set while Kelly and 
Suzumura use Ω as the input set, and, secondly, that Fishbum uses V(X) 
as the output set, while Kelly and Suzumura use Γ. However, the effect is 
the same. Either system produces the same choices for the same prefer­
ence profiles and agendas. In this sense, they are equivalent (see Sen 1977: 
166). The Fishbum-variation surely is flexible and elegant. Anyway, it is 
the most compact conceptual framework. 
We choose for the relational approach for two reasons: 
1. It is relatively the most simple to work with. 
2. It ressembles the game-theoretical approach to collective decision­
making processes. 
According to Shubik (1982: 127): 
A theory of games can be regarded as composed of two parts, 
a descriptive theory and a solution theory. The descriptive 
part concerns the representation of the players and their pref­
erences, the rules and strategic possibilities, and the outcomes 
and payoffs. The solution part concerns the end results of 
rationally motivated activities by the players. 
A same distinction is made in Shapley (1962, 1967). This distinction be­
tween a descriptive part and a solution part runs parallel with the two stages 
of social choice processes as distinghuised in this chapter. The first stage 
can be considered as the descriptive part. This part entails a description 
4This is only true if H{A,p)j$ tac all A and p. Hence, this clause in the definition 
of an F-SCR. 
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of a social choice problem, of a preference profile and of a social choice 
rule. The second stage of producing a social choice (a solution of the 
social choice problem) on the basis of information of a social preference 
can be considered as the solution part. In this part, a social preference has 
the same function as a dominance relation in a game-theoretical solution 
theory. 
In this chapter we presented some of the basic concepts of social choice 
theory. In the next chapter we illustrate the working of these concepts with 
the aid of some well known social choice rules. 
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Chapter 3 
Examples of Social Choice 
Rules 
In this chapter, we discuss some examples of social choice rules, namely, 
the system of majority decision, the Borda rule and the plurality rule. 
Further, we propose an extension of the system of majority decision and 
briefly discuss the Dutch electoral system. 
In our discussion of the system of majority decision, the Borda rule 
and plurality rule we will use works of Marquis de Condorcet that are, we 
think, hitherto unknown in the field of social choice theory. An excellent 
presentation of the history of the theory of social choice and, especially, the 
contribution of Marquis de Condorcet to this theory, can be found in the 
second part of Black's The theory of committees and elections. However, 
Black mainly concentrates upon Essai sur l'Application de l'Analyse à la 
Probabilité des Décisions Rendues à la Pluralité des Voix (Paris 1785). In a 
recent work Condorcet's Theory of Voting by H.P. Young (1988), the Essai 
sur l'Application is also taken as a point of departure. Young summarizes, 
again, the proposals made by de Condorcet in this work, especially, just 
as Black, the proposal with respect to the solution of the problem of 
cyclic majorities. Instead of Condorcet's Essai sur l'Application, we will 
concentrate in this chapter on Condorcet's less known, if not unknown 
works Essai sur la constitution et les fonctions des assemblées provinciales. 
Première partie (1788), 5мг la forme des élections and the journal paper 
5мг les élections that appeared in Journal d'instruction sociale (Saturday, 
July 1st 1789). With this we hope to give a valuable completion of the 
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historical part of Black's exellent work. 
3.1 The System of Majority Decision 
The system of majority decision has much been studied. In order to be 
able to compare this system with other ones, we give an exact definition 
of it: 
Definition 3.1 (System of Majority Decision) An SCR F is called the Sys-
tem of Majority Decision (henceforward SMD) :=for every i , y € X and 
for every ρ e Π, 
xF(p)y <*| {i e ΛΓI xR?y} |> | {i G Ν | уЩх} | . 
If F is the SMD, then we write xM(p)y instead ofxF(p)y and we will call 
M(p) the majority relation for p. 
For convenience, we write M instead of Μ (ρ) when ρ is given. 
The set of M(p)-btst elements is named after the French social scien­
tist, mathematician and philosopher Marquis de Condorcet (1743 - 1794) 
who has studied SMD extensively. 
Definition 3.2 (Majority Choice) 1. Let ρ e η and Λ G Ω. The set 
Con(A,p) := {x e A \ Vy G A : xM(p)y} 
is called the Condorcet set of A and p. 
2. An alternative χ G Con(A,p) is called a majority choice. 
Marquis de Condorcet already knows that SMD could lead to a cyclic 
majority relation. The following profile illustrates this. It can be found in 
De Condorcet (1789: 410): 
Preference Profile 3.1 
23 : xyz 
2 : yxz 
17 : yzx 
10 : zxy 
8 : zyx 
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Using the SMD we get the cycle xMy, yMz and zMx for this situation. 
Hence, there is no majority choice. Since a majority choice is an M-best 
element by definition, this shows that SMD is not an SDF and hence, by 
theorem 2.3, it violates collective rationality. The emptiness of the Con-
dorcet set for a situation is often called, after its discoverer, the Condorcet 
paradox. We will take over this terminology. 
Usually, the Condorcet paradox is demonstrated with preference pro-
files in which each individual has a linearly ordered preference. We give 
a situation with individual indifference: 
Preference Profile 3.2 
1 : x(yz)w 
1 : w(xy)z 
1 : z(wx)y 
1 : y(zw)x 
Again, applying SMD we get a majority relation for which the Condorcet 
set is empty. 
The emptiness of the Condorcet set has puzzled many social choice 
theorists including Condorcet himself1. It is seen as a failure that, in some 
way or another, has to be circumvented. Therefore, a number of efforts 
have been made to construct social choice systems that stay as close as 
possible to the SMD. These socalled Condorcet systems all produce a 
majority choice if it exists. Otherwise, they produce still a social choice, 
each system in its own way. A review of the most important Condorcet 
systems can be found in Fishbum (1977). Here we discuss the contribution 
of Marquis de Condorcet to this problem. Further we propose another 
extension of the system of majority decision-making that is based on a 
solution theoiy presented in chapter 4 of this work. But first we investigate 
the importance of SMD. 
'Another paradox related with the system of majority decision is the socalled Os-
trogorski paradox. This interesting paradox has received considerable less attention in 
social choice theoiy. For a study of this paradox, consider Bezembinder and Van Acker 
1985. 
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3.1.1 Relevance of the System of Majority Decision 
A very important reason to search for systems based on SMD is that SMD 
satisfies a number of properties that come close to the ideal of democracy. 
We give a brief account of some of these conditions. 
Definition 33 (Anonymity) An SCR F G Φ satisfies anonymity :=for all 
ρ € Π and for any permutation σ on N = {1,2,..., n}: 
F(R\, Кг,..., Rn) = F(R
a
(y), ikp), ·. ·, Ra^n))· 
This condition is really democratic in nature. It says that it does not matter 
who carries the preference. What counts is someone's preference, nothing 
else. The power positions of the individuals are perfectly symmetric. Other 
personal characteristics of the individuals do not count in determining a 
social choice. Anonymity prevents inequal treatment of individuals. It 
raises a barrier against any form of discrimination. 
Let σ be a permutation on X and let σ(Χ) = {σ(χ) : χ G X}. Let­
ting i? be a preference on X, we let i ^ denote the same preference on 
σ(Χ). That is, if, for example, (i, y) G R and if σ(χ) = a and a(y) = b, 
then (a, b) G R". The next condition, again, expresses a fundamental 
democratic requirement. 
Definition 3.4 (Neutrality) An SCR F G Φ satisfies neutrality := for all 
ρ G Π and for any permutation σ on X: 
(.F(R\,Ri,...,R
n
)y = F(Af,iÇ,...,i?^). 
This condition says that all alternatives are or should be treated in a sym-
metric or equal way. The labeling of the alternatives may not influence 
the making of a social preference and with that the production of a social 
choice. So this condition prohibits, for example, any favour of the status 
quo. Any opinion counts, whatever its content. 
Anonymity and neutrality are conditions that every democratic social 
choice system must satisfy. Both are informational constraints that guar-
antee the equal treatment of preferences and opinions. Neither preferential 
information nor information about opinions may be lost All information 
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is equally worthy. These requirements are therefore, for example, incom­
patible with the condition that only the opinions and preferences of the 
experts (those who know) count, that is, with technocracy. 
Both anonymity and neutrality are standard conditions in the theory of 
social choice since the works of Arrow (1963), May (1952) and Sen (1970). 
The conjunction of these conditions is called the symmetry condition. 
Definition 3.5 (Symmetry) An SCR F G Φ satisfies symmetry := F satis­
fies anonymity and neutrality. 
The following condition has to do with the direction of the adjustment 
of a social preference after a change in someone's preference has occurred. 
Definition 3.6 (Positive Reponsiveness) An SCR F satisfies positive re­
sponsiveness :=for all p, q e Π and for all x, y G X: if 
1. Vi G NKxPfy =• xP?y) Λ (xlfy => xRfy)] and 
2. 3k G N[(xlpky Л хРЦу) V (yP'x Л х В Д , 
then xF(p)y => (xF(q)y Л ->yF(q)x). 
This difficult definition is a formalization of the one given in Sen (1970: 
72). It says that if an alternative χ is raised vis-a-vis an alternative у in 
someone's preference and χ goes down in no one's preference vis-a-vis 
y, then χ must also be raised vis-a-vis у in the social preference. Again, 
this is a fundamental requirement for democracy (for the requirement of 
responsiveness of democracies in general cf. Pennock 1979). To see the 
working of this condition, consider its negation. That is, suppose χ raises 
in someone's preference and it goes down in no one's preference and sup­
pose it remains on the same place or it goes down in the social preference. 
The system yielding this social preference could be accused of some form 
of inertia. It cannot register changes in preference profiles and adapt its 
output in accordance with these changes. Presumably, this will not be 
very conducive for the stability and durability of the concerned system. 
The individuals may lose their faith and even revolt when they discover 
that their preference changes are not reflected in the output of that system. 
Typical examples of social choice systems that violate this condition are 
systems that involve a religious code, magic, a chance mechanism, etc. 
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But, as we shall see later on, also the frequently used plurality rule violates 
this condition. 
It is not difficult to see that SMD satisfies symmetry and positive 
responsiveness. May (1952) proves that these conditions are also sufficient 
for a social choice system to be the SMD. 
Theorem 3.1 (May) An SCR F ΕΦ is the system of majority decision if 
and only if F satisfies symmetry and positive responsiveness. 
The proof of this theorem can be found in May (1952), Sen (1970), Suzu-
mura (1983) or Kelly (1988). This theorem neatly characterizes SMD. It 
shows that SMD is uniquely determined by the three conditions that are 
both sufficient and necessary for a social choice rule to be a democracy. 
Of course, SMD satisfies more standard conditions. To mention a few, it 
satisfies IIA, PC, UD and ND. These conditions are discussed in section 8 
of the previous chapter. Note that some of these conditions are derivable 
from the set of necessary and sufficient conditions as mentioned in May's 
theorem. Also note that SMD is not an SWF, since M(p) need not be 
transitive. 
3.1.2 С on d orce t's Solution to the Condorcet Paradox 
According to Black (1957, Part II: 175) there are at least three possible 
interpretations of De Condorcet's solution to the problem of the absence 
of a majority choice. Black chooses the following interpretation: 
It would be most in accordance with the spirit of Condorcet's 
previous analysis, I think, to discard all candidates except 
those with the minimum number of majorities against them 
and then to deem the largest size of minority to be a majority, 
and so on, until one candidate had only actual or deemed 
majorities against each of the others. 
Now, the system that Black describes is mathematically a beautiful one. A 
definition of it is given in Fishbum (1977). To be in line with the forgoing 
definitions, we adapt Fishbum's in the following way. Define for every 
z, y € X and for all ρ e Π, 
np(x,y):=\{ieN\xR?y}\. 
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Thus Пр(х, у) is the number of individuals that prefer χ to y. 
Definition 3.7 (Black-Condorcet System) Let x, у € Χ, ρ en and 
c(x,p) := πιιη
υ
€
χ/{
χ
}η
ρ
(χ, у). 
An SCR F e Φ is the Black-Condorcet system, henceforward BCS, :=/or 
all ρ en and for all x,y e X: 
xF{p)y & c(x,p) > c(î/,p). 
If F is the BCS, then we write xBC{p)y instead ofxF(p)y. BC(p) is called 
the Black-Condorcet relation for p. 
Fishbum (1977), who works within the functional approach (see chapter 
2, section 9 of this work), calls the defined system the Condorcet function. 
However, since we think that Condorcet had something else in mind, we 
prefer to call this nice system the Black-Condorcet system. 
Definition 3.8 (Black-Condorcet Choice) Let F e Φ be the BCS and 
consider a preference profile ρ and an agenda A. 
BC{A,p) := {x e A | Vy € A : c(x,p) > c(y,p)}. 
The set ВС(А,р) is called the Black-Condorcet set and an χ e BC(A,p) 
is called a Black-Condorcet choice, shortly, а ВС choice. 
Since the Black-Condorcet relation is reflexive, complete and transitive 
(and hence acyclic) for every ρ e Π, BC(A,p) j 0 for eveiy Л € Ω and 
every p e n . That is, for every preference profile there exists а ВС choice. 
To illustrate the working of this system, we develop a special method. 
To every preference profile ρ we can associate a matrix Ар = (а/
т
) with 
/ ^ m and where alm :=| {i G JV | хіЩхт} \ . Consider now the following 
situation: 
Preference Profile 3.3 
4 : 11X2X3X4X5 
3 : 3:5X4X1X3X2 
2 : Х2Х3Х524Я1 
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The matrix for this profile is: 
XI 
X2 
x3 
X4 
X5 
Xl 
— 
2 
2 
5 
5 
Xl 
7 
— 
3 
3 
3 
а;з 
7 
6 
— 
3 
3 
X4 
4 
6 
6 
— 
5 
xs 
4 
6 
6 
4 
— 
To determine the ВС choice, select from each row the lowest value and, 
then, select the row(s) in which this lowest value is largest The finally 
selected row(s) are the ВС choices. In the example, the lowest values for 
each row are, respectively, 4, 2, 2, 3, 3. From this, 4 is the largest and, 
hence i i is the ВС choice. This working procedure clearly shows that the 
BCS is a maximin method (cf. Fishbum 1977). It selects the maximum 
of the minimum row value. This method also shows why the BCS always 
selects a majority choice if it exists. A majority choice will always have 
the maximin value. 
The question is whether Condorcet had really this ingenious system in 
mind. In his journal paper of 1793 Condorcet writes: 
"Dans le cas d'une élection entre trois candidats, il est possible 
que les trois jugemens de la majorité sur ces concurrents com-
parés deux à deux, ne puissent subsister ensemble, quoique le 
résultat des jugements de chaque votant ne renferme aucune 
contradiction Alors il faut abandonner la proposition qui 
a une moindre majorité, et s'en tenir aux deux autres. 
With respect to the general case, Condorcet makes no difference: "Si ces 
jugemens ne peuvent subsister ensemble, on abandonneroit ceux qui ont 
obtenu la majorité la plus foible" (Condorcet 1789: 482). In his other 
main work, Condorcet gives an example of how to proceed in the case of 
a paradox. 
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Paul 
Pierre 
Jacques 
Pierre 
Paul 
Jacques 
Jacques 
Pierre 
Paul 
Pierre 
Preference Profile 3.4 (Condorcet 1789) 
23 : Pierre 
2 : Paul 
17 : Paul 
10 : Jacques 
8 : Jacques 
According to this profile, Pierre has a 33 to 27 majority over Paul, Jacques 
has a 35 to 25 majority over Pierre and Paul has a 42 to 18 majority over 
Jacques. Hence there is no majority candidate. With respect to this result 
Condorcet (1788: 411) writes: 
" En effet, si nous en examinons le résultat de plus près, nous 
trouverons que, puisqu'il faut rejeter une proposition adoptée 
par la pluralité, il est plus naturel d'abandonner celle qui a 
la moindre pluralité; Nous rejeterons donc ici la première, et 
nous aurons un résultat en faveur de Paul." 
This picture gives more room for interpretation. Since Pierre has the 
smallest majority vis-a-vis Paul, this majority pair must be rejected. What 
remains are that Jacques has a majority over Pierre and that Paul has a 
majority over Jacques. From these remaining pairs we may, apparently, 
deduce the fact that Paul is the ultimate majority candidate. In our opin-
ion, what Condorcet does here is eliminating the pairs with the smallest 
majorities in the case of cycles and taking subsequently the transitive clo-
sure over the remaining pairs. If the result is хМу, y Μ ζ and zMx, and 
zMχ has the smallest majority, then we may abandon zMx and take the 
transitive closure over xMy and yMz. This leads to the choice of x. If 
not, then it is difficult to explain why Paul should be chosen. But if this 
is true, then Condorcet had something else in mind as what Black asserts. 
To see this, consider the following profile: 
Preference Profile 3.5 
2 : adbc 
2 : abdc 
2 : chad 
1 : bdca 
3 : cbda 
1 : deba 
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For this situation we have: a 6 to 5 majority of a over d; a 7 to 4 majority 
of b over a, a 8 to 3 majority of 6 over d; a 7 to 4 majority of с over а; а 
6 to 5 majority of с over 6 and a 6 to 5 majority of d over с According to 
the ВС system, either 6 or с is the social choice. However, if we eliminate 
the pairs with the smallest majorities, namely aMd, cMb and dMc, and 
we take, subsequendy, the transitive closure over the rest of the majority 
relation, then we get only 6 as the social choice. 
However, we hasten to say that our opinion is as speculative as Black's 
one. Also in his other works, Condorcet gives too little information to be 
on sure grounds. The only thing we can say without too much risk is that 
Condorcet remains fragmentary and brief with respect to the problem of 
the absence of a majority choice (see Black 1957: 176). 
3.1.3 Theory of Stable Majority Solutions 
Most Condorcet systems are constructed on the basis of two design prin­
ciples. Firstly, they must satisfy collective rationality and, secondly, they 
must produce a majority choice if it exists. However, if the first princi­
ple is used, then Arrow's theorem predicts that one of the conditions of 
UD, ПА, PC or ND will be violated2. For example, the BCS as discussed 
above, violates ПА. To see this consider profile 3 as treated in the previous 
subsection. According to the associated matrix, с(а;з) = 2 and cfo) = 3. 
Hence хіВСхг. Now consider the following situation: 
Preference Profile 3.6 
4 : x$x2XiX\X5 
3 : X2X5X1X4X3 
2 : 13X4X2^ 5^ 1 
The position of X3 vis-a-vis the position of X4 has remained the same 
in each preference in comparison with profile 3. Hence, if ПА is valid, 
we may expect X4BCX3. However, look at the associated matrix of the 
2Consider section 9 of the previous chapter for the definitions of the mentioned 
conditions. 
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changed situation: 
X\ 
X2 
1 3 
I 4 
Z5 
Xl 
— 
9 
6 
6 
5 
X2 
0 
— 
6 
2 
0 
X3 
3 
3 
— 
3 
3 
X4 
3 
7 
6 
— 
3 
zs 
4 
9 
6 
6 
— 
Now: с(хз) = 6 and cfo) = 2. Hence х^ВСц. This violates the condition 
of IIA. This is the price Arrow's theorem tells us to pay. 
However, another design policy is possible. The basic principle in 
this policy is to take the SMD and the majority relations it produces, as 
the point of departure. We keep, so to say, the system untouched. With 
this we uphold the nice properties of this system. What we do instead is 
designing a method that shows how to deal with cyclic majority relations. 
This method must operate in such a way that it selects a majority choice if it 
exists. Of course, this implies that every condition of collective rationality 
as defined in section 7 of chapter 2 must be dropped. This is the price to 
be paid in this design policy. We present such a method. This method is 
an application of the theory of generalized stable sets as presented in the 
next chapter (also cf. Van Deernen 1988, 1990b). 
Let Л be an agenda and let M{p) be the majority relation for the 
preference profile p. Let δΜ(ρ) denote3 the asymmetric part of M(p), that 
is, xäM(p)y if xM(p)y but not yM(p)x. Suppose 1, х\
у
...,:r
n
,y G A. A 
majority path from χ to y, is a sequence 
xäM (p)xi, xiäM (p)x2, · · •, xnäM(p)y. 
An alternative χ € Ais said to be majority-dominant vis-a-vis an alterna-
tive y e A if there is a majority path from χ to y. This will be denoted 
by xDMy. 
Definition 3.9 Let A be an agenda and let M(p) be the majority relation 
for ρ e П. A set ω(Α, M(p)) С Ais a stable majority solution := 
l.fornox^ye ω(Α,M(p)): xDMy, 
3Storcken (1989: 36) uses the symbol α to denote the asymmetric part of a relation. 
Thus, aR denotes the asymmetric part of the relation R. We take over Storcken's notation 
here. 
73 
2. for every y g A — ω(Α, M(p)) there is an χ Ε ω(Α, Μ(ρ)) such that 
xDMy. 
The first condition expresses the property of internal stability of и;(Л, M(p))* 
It says that no alternative in a stable majority solution dominates another 
alternative in the stable majority solution. For no element in a stable ma­
jority solution there is a path that goes to another element in that solution. 
The second condition expresses the property of external stability of a ma­
jority solution. It says that for every social state у not in ω(Α, Μ (ρ)) there 
is a social state χ in ω(Α, Μ (ρ)) such that there is a majority path that goes 
from χ to y. However, it is not precluded that there is a path going from 
an y e A — ω(Α, M(p)) to an χ G ω(Λ,Μ(ρ)). Inside a stable majority 
solution there is no majority dominance. The next theorem shows that 
there will be a stable majority solution when the asymmetric part of Μ (ρ) 
is not empty. This theorem is a consequence of the existence theorem 
4.16 (with Ρ = ñM(p)) in the next chapter. 
Theorem 3.2 Let A be an agenda. For every ρ G Π, if äM(p) restricted 
to A is nonempty, then there exists a nonempty stable majority solution of 
A. 
Hence, this method can deal with any possible cyclic majority relation. In 
general there will be several stable majority solutions for a profile. If there 
are majority choices, then it can be proven that a stable majority solution 
will contain these alternatives. 
Theorem 3.3 IfCon(A, M(p)) i 0, then Соп(Л, M(p)) С ω(Α, M(p)). 
This theorem is a consequence of theorem 4.17 as presented in the next 
chapter. 
How to find the stable majority solutions of a preference profile? This 
can be done by using theorem 4.15 in the next chapter. The working of 
this theorem requires some knowledge of terms and techniques adopted 
from digraph theory. Consider chapter 4, section 2 for these terms and 
techniques. According to theorem 4.15, first the contraction of the majority 
relation of the profile under scrutiny must be formed. Then the theorem 
4Cf. Vbn Neumann and Morgenstern 1953 for the notion of internal stable sets; also 
see chapter 4 of this study. 
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says to collect from each maximal vertex set of this contraction one and 
only one alternative. The set of alternatives formed in this way is a stable 
majority solution according to theorem 4.15. 
To illustrate the working of the method, consider the following strict 
majority relation: 
xiñMxz, хгаМхз, χιαΜχι,χιαΜχ*. 
X4ÜMxs,X5aMx6, XbäMxA, 
χηηΜχι, χηαΜχί, XiäMxy, хсаМхт, xçâMxs-
The vertex sets of the strong components are: 
S\ = {х\,Х2,Хз}, 
Si = {£4,Я5,Яб}, 
Ss = {l7,X8,X9}· 
The sets we need, are S\ and 5з. Thus, any {x, y) with χ G 5Ί and у 6 S3 
is a stable majority solution. To experiment, let us take х$Ъ.Мх^ instead 
of χ^αΜχζ. The vertex sets of the strong components now are: 
Si = {χι,3:2,^3}, 
S2 = {X4, Х$,ХЬ, ΧΊ,Χί, Χ9}· 
The set needed to determine a stable majority solution is now Si. Thus, 
any {x} with χ 6 Si is a stable majority solution. 
To give another illustration, consider the famous voting paradox: 
Preference Profile 3.7 
1 : xyz 
1 : zxy 
1 : yzx 
This leads to the majority relation xMy, yMz, zMx. It is easily verified 
that the algorithm leads to the stable majority sets {x}, {y} and {г}. 
Other solutions to the Condorcet paradox that are based on the same de­
sign principles as the theory of stable majority solutions are possible. The 
most important is the theory of generalized optimal choice as presented in 
Kalai and Schmeidler (1976), Schwartz (1986) and Shenoy (1979, 1980). 
This theory has several other names: theory of admissable solutions (Kalai 
and Schmeidler 1976), Generalized Optimal-CHoice Axiom or GOCHA 
(Schwartz 1986), the theory of dynamic solutions (Shenoy 1979, 1980). 
It will be studied extensively in the next chapter. There we also present 
the main differences of this theory with our theory of generalized stable 
solutions on which the theory of stable majority solutions is based. 
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Theories like the theory of stable majority solutions show that there 
may be reasonable outcomes even in the absence of a social optimum. 
Even if best social choices are absent, there might be social choices that 
are good enough to be acceptable as a possible outcome of a social choice 
process. Sets of such acceptable social states are called 'standards of 
behavior' by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953, Ch.1.4). In the next 
chapter we will discuss these standards of behavior more deeply. 
3.2 The Plurality Rule 
Sofar we have studied the system of majority decision. Another important 
rule is the plurality rule. 
Definition 3.10 (Plurality Rule) Let χ e Χ, ρ en and define 
*(*,р) := | { і€І | - . З у е Х : у Р 1 Г * } | . 
An SCR F e Φ is called the Plurality Rule (henceforeward PR) :=for every 
x, y G X and for every ρ G Π: 
xF(j>)y & і(х,р) > t(y,p). 
If F is the PR, then we write xPl(p)y instead of xF(p)y. Pl(p) will be 
called the plurality relation for p. 
According to this definition, an alternative χ is socially preferred to y if 
the number of individuals that put χ in the first place is at least as great 
as the number of individuals that put y in the first place. 
Definition 3.11 (Plurality Choice) Let F e Φ be the PR and let pen. 
Then, if A en, 
ΡΚΑ,ρ) := {χ e A I Vy e A : t(x,p) > %,p)}. 
The set Pl(A,p) is called the plurality choice set for A and p. An χ e 
Pl(A,p) is called a plurality choice. 
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Hence, a plurality choice for an agenda is an alternative on that agenda for 
which there is no other alternative with more first places in the individual 
preferences. It is not difficult to see that P/(A, p) is nonempty for every 
Λ G Ω and every ρ € П. 
The PR is frequently used in practice. Variations of it can be found 
in many electoral systems. Despite its frequent use, this system has some 
serious shortcomings. First, it violates positive responsiveness. Therefore, 
this system cannot adjust a social preference and with that a social choice 
to comply with changes of individual preferences in society. This conflicts 
with any notion of democracy. Second, a plurality choice is not neces­
sarily a majority choice. This was discovered, indeed, by Condorcet. To 
illustrate, Condorcet gives the following preference profile: 
Preference Profile 3.8 (Condorcet 1789: 335) 
10 : xzy 
8 : yzx 
7 : zyx 
The plurality rule selects χ as the social choice. However, since yMx, zMy 
and zMx, ζ is the majority choice. Condorcet concludes: 
On voit donc par cet example, comment, dans la méthode 
ordinaire d'élire, le jugement des électeurs n'est pas complet, 
et comment, par cette raison, le résultat d'une élection faite 
sous cette forme peut exprimer un vœréellement contraire à 
celui de la pluralité. 
With "la pluralité" Condorcet means majority. Our terminology is more 
standard nowadays (see for example Fishbum 1973, Gärdenfors 1973, 
Kelly 1988). In those days of Condorcet, the PR was already so much in 
used that he calls it la méthode ordinaire. 
Condorcet goes further. He gives an example in which the majority 
choice gets a zero plurality score. 
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Preference Profile 3.9 (Condorcet 1789: 403-4) 
18: 
5 : 
16: 
3 : 
13: 
5 : 
Pierre 
Pierre 
Paul 
Paul 
Jacques 
Jacques 
Jean 
Jean 
Jean 
Jean 
Jean 
Jean 
Jacques 
Paul 
Jacques 
Pierre 
Paul 
Pierre 
Paul 
Jacques 
Pierre 
Jacques 
Pierre 
Paul 
For this situation, Pierre is the plurality choice. However, Jean has a 
majority vis-a-vis every other candidate. But, clearly, Jean has plurality 
score 0. Because of this, Condorcet did not have much confidence in the 
plurality rule. Therefore he started to investigate an alternative system 
called the Borda rule. 
3.3 The Borda Rule 
The Borda Rule is proposed by the French academician Jean-Charles de 
Borda (1733-1799). Borda's original formulation of the rule was intended 
for individual preferences that are linear orders. In essence, his method 
works as follows (cf. Black 1957: 157-8): 
1. If there are m alternatives, then assign the number m to the first 
place alternative in a linear order, the number m — 1 to the second 
place alternative in the same linear order, the number m — 2 to the 
next alternative in that order, etc. The last alternative (the least 
preferred) receives the number 1. 
2. The total score of an alternative in a preference profile is the sum of 
the numbers as assigned to that alternative in the several individual 
preferences. 
3. Take as a social choice the alternative with a total score that is at 
least as great as the total score of every other alternative. 
In order to be able to deal with ties in individual preferences, this method 
must be adjusted. A logical adjustment is to assign the numbers to the 
alternatives such that the assigned numbers agree with the assignment for 
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some linear order as described previously. The final number assigned to 
an alternative χ in a weak order is then the average of the numbers of the 
alternatives that are indifferent to χ (cf. Fishbum 1973: 164). Thus, in the 
weak order x(yz)w, χ gets a score of 4, y and ζ get both (3 + 2)/2 = 2.5 
and w gets 1. By summing the scores of χ in each weak ordering in a 
preference profile p, we obtain the socalled Borda-score of χ in profile p. 
Since the Borda-score of each alternative can be determined in this way, it 
is possible to compare mutually these Borda-scores. We declare χ socially 
preferred to y if χ has a larger Borda-score than y. Note that the Borda 
social preference obtained in this way is reflexive, complete and transitive. 
For example, if we have 
Preference Profile 3.10 
i : x(yz)w 
j : w(zx)y 
then the Borda-scores of x, y, z, w equal, respectively, 4 + 2.5 = 6.5, 2.5 + 
1 =3.5, 2.5 + 2.5 = 5 and 1 + 4 = 5. So the Borda social preference for 
this profile is x(zw)y. Let us call the procedure that leads to this result the 
classical Borda-rule. 
Let rt(x,p) denote the score of χ in the weak order Äf obtained by 
means of the above sketched procedure. Let b,(x,p) := art(x,p) — с be 
a linear transformation for each χ with a > 0, с > 0 and а, с constant. 
Since 
bt(x,p) > b,(y,p) <& (art(x,p) -c)> {arXy,p) - c)„ we have 
k(x,p) > bt(y,p) e> r,(x,p) > r,(t/,p). 
Taking Σ,
€
ΛΓ bt(x,p) for every x, it is easily verified that the Borda social 
preference as obtained for a preference profile by the classical procedure is 
not changed if b,(x,p) = аг,(х,р) — с for every χ and every г. To illustrate 
this, consider the same profile as above. Then we obtain f or с = 5 and 
a = 2, bt(x,p) = 8 - 5 = 3 , bt(y,p) = 5 - 5 = 0 , 6,(z,p) = 5 — 5 = 0 and 
b,(w,p) = 2 — 5 = —3. For j , we obtain δ,(χ,ρ) = 5 — 5 = 0 , b3{y,p) = 
2 — 5 = —3, 6^(г,р) = 5 — 5 = 0 and b^w^p) = 3. So, the Borda score of 
x equals 3 + 0 = 3, of у equals 0 + - 3 = —3, of ζ equals 0 + 0 = 0, and 
of w equals —3 + 3 = 0. This yields the Borda social preference x(zw)y 
which is the same as obtained by the classical Borda-rule. This shows 
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that the following definition of the Borda-rule is equivalent to the classical 
Borda-procedure. A similar definition is presented in Fishbum (1973) and 
Gärdenfors (1973). 
Definition 3.12 (Borda Rule) Let χ e X and ρ G П. We define: 
1. Μχ,ρ) := I {y G Χ Ι хЩу) \ - \ {у G X \ уЩх} |, and 
2. Ь(х,р) := Eigjv Ьі(х,р). 
An SCR F ΕΦ is called the Borda Rule (in short BR) :=for all ρ EU and 
allx,yeX: 
xF(p)y <t» b(x,p) > 6(y,p). 
If Fis the BR, then we write xB(p)y instead ofxF(p)y. B(p) will be called 
the Borda relation of p. 
Thus, in determining the score of an alternative x, we not only count the 
number of alternatives that succeed a; in a preference, but also the number 
of alternatives that precede χ in that preference. The total score of an 
alternative is, just as in the original procedure, the sum of the scores of 
that alternative in the individual preferences. 
Definition 3.13 Let F e Φ be the BR and let p e n . Then for every Л G Ω, 
Bo(A,p) := {χ G A I Vy G A : xB(p)y}. 
To illustrate this system, consider the following profile (Sen 1970: 39): 
Preference Profile 3.11 
1 : xyz 
2 : zxy 
We have one individual, say ¿, with xyz. Hence &,(x) = 2 - 0 = 2, b,(t/) = 
1 — 1=0 and bi(z) = 0 — 2 = —2. We have two individuals, say j and k, 
such that zxy. Then bj(z) = bk(z) = 2 - 0 = 2, bj(x) = bk(x) = 1 - 1 = 0 and 
bjiy) = bk(y) = 0 — 2 = —2. Adding the scores of the several alternatives 
gives: 
6(x) = b¿(x) + bj(x) + Ъ
к
(х) = 2. 
Ь(у) = Ь{(у) + Ьа(у) + Ьк(у) = -4. 
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6(*) = Μ ζ ) + 6,-(*) + 6*(ζ) = 2. 
Note that Borda's original method would give χ a score of 7, y a score of 
4 and ζ a score of 7. Thus, the ordering according to this method is the 
same as the ordering according to the method as proposed in the definition. 
Condorcet, who called Borda "un géomètre célebre", has probably 
discovered the fact that SMD, PR and BR could yield different outcomes 
for the same preference profile. This is a remarkable discovery. It is the 
precursor of the general insight that different social choice rules may lead 
to different outcomes for the same preference profiles. We discuss some 
of the profiles given by De Condorcet that illustrate his discovery. 
For the following situation the Borda choice and the majority choice 
agree but the plurality choice deviates. We use x, y and ζ instead of 
Condorcet's Pierre, Jacques and Paul. 
Preference Profile 3.12 (De Condorcet 1789: 402-3) 
18 : xyz 
5 : xzy 
16 : zyx 
3 : zxy 
13 : yzx 
5 : yxz 
The Borda scores of the alternatives are calculated with the aid of the 
original method. Of course, only this method was known to Condorcet. 
We get i»(i) = 23 χ 3 + 8 χ 2 + 29 χ 1 = 114. In the same way we get 
6(z) = 116 and b(y) = 130 (cf. Condorcet 1788: 405). Hence, y is the 
Borda choice. SMD gives: zMx, yMz and yMx. Hence, у is also the 
majority choice. But χ is the plurality choice. However, this profile did 
not increase Condorcet's confidence in the Borda system. He knew that 
the system could give a result that is not in agreement with the 'will of 
the majority'(le voeu de la pluralité). To illustrate this, he gives, among 
others, the following profile: 
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Preference Profile 3.13 (Condorcet (1789)) 
9 
3 
4 
6 
4 
4 
xyz 
xzy 
yxz 
yzx 
zxy 
zyx 
The majority choice is x. The plurality system also gives χ as the social 
choice. However, the Borda scores are: 
U,x) = 12 χ 3 + 8 χ 2 + 10 χ 1 = 62. 
6(2/)= 10 χ 3 + 13 χ 2 + 7 χ 1=63. 
b(z) = 8 χ 3 + 9 χ 2 + 13 χ 1=55. 
Hence, y is the Borda choice. 
Condorcet also presents a preference profile for which the Borda choice 
and the plurality choice agree but for which the majority choice deviates. 
Preference Profile 3.14 (Condorcet 1789: 405) 
30 : xyz 
1 : xzy 
29: yxz 
10 : yzx 
10 : zxy 
1 : zyx 
SMD gives: xMy, xMz and yMz. Hence χ is the majority choice. The 
plurality choice is y. The Borda scores are: 
ò(x) = 31 χ 3 + 3 9 x 2 + 1 1 χ 1 = 182. 
6(y) = 3 9 x 3 + 31 x 2 + l l χ 1 = 190. 
Κζ) = 1 1 χ 3 + 11χ 2 + 5 9 x 1 = 114. 
Hence, y is the Borda choice. 
It is very interesting to see why Condorcet rejects the Borda rule. It is 
not only because this rule can fail in yielding a majority choice. A very 
surprising argument is given in the following passage that is concerned 
with profile 14. In this passage, Pierre refers to χ in the profile, Paul to 
y and Jacques to ζ (cf. Condorcet 1789: 408-409): 
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"Mais, dira-t-on, comment se peut-il que, tout paraisant d'ailleurs 
égal entre Pierre and Paul, si ce n'est que Pierre a eu trente-une 
fois la première place, et trente-neuf fois la seconde, tandis 
que Paul a eu trente-neuf fois la première, et trente-une la sec-
onde, il n'en résulte pas évidemment un advantage en faveur 
de Paul? Le voici. Parmi les trente-neuf voix qui plaçaient 
Pierre à la seconde place, il y en avait dix qui le préféraient à 
Paul, et vingt-neuf qui le préféraient à Jacques. Mais, parmi 
les trente-une voix qui plaçaient Paul à cette seconde place il 
n'y en avait qu'une qui le préférât à Pierre. Or l'on a con-
fondu, dans cette méthode d' évaluer les suffrages, les voix qui 
donaient la préférence à Pierre sur Paul , ou réciproquement 
avec celles qui donnaient la préférence à l'un ou à l'autre sur 
Jacques; on les a fait entrer de même dans les jugement qu'on 
voulait porter entre Pierre et Paul, et il a dû en résulter une 
cireur, puisque l'on faisait entrer dans ce jugement un élément 
qui ne devait pas y entrer, c'est- à-dire, la préférence donnée 
sur Jacques à Pierre ou à Paul." 
What Condorcet shows here is that preferences between other alternatives 
as χ and y are relevant in deciding the Borda scores of χ and y. In other 
words, what he proves in this passage is the fact that the Borda system 
violates the IIA condition. In his view this is even the main cause of the 
failure of the Borda rule (Condorcet 1789: 409). He concludes: 
"La méthode ordinaire (the plurality rule, AvD) trompe parce 
qu'on y fait abstraction de jugements qui devraient être comptés; 
la nouvelle méthode (the Borda rule, AvD), trompe parce qu'on 
a égard à des jugements qui ne devraient pas être comptés." 
The Borda rule is a scoring or positional system. The position of the 
alternatives in each preference counts in determining the social preference. 
Young (1974) gives necessary and sufficient conditions for a social choice 
rule to be the Borda rule. The main drawbacks of this rule already has been 
given by Marquis de Condorcet. Firstly, it may fail in yielding a majority 
choice when such a choice exists. This is a serious drawback. It is very 
difficult to find reasons in a democracy that legitimate social choices which 
are not accepted by majorities. Secondly, the BR violates the condition of 
83 
ΠΑ. This was, as we have tried to show, already discovered by Condorcet. 
This violation introduces an element of arbitrariness in yielding social 
preferences and social choices. 
3.4 The Dutch Electoral System 
In this section we show that the Dutch electoral system is not in agreement 
with the idea of majority as presented and studied in section 1 of this 
chapter. Especially, we shall prove that in the Netherlands it is possible 
that a political party that has a majority over every other political party 
may get the smallest number of seats in parliament. Conversely, it is 
shown that a party which has no majority over any of the other parties 
may get the largest number of seats. 
The Dutch electoral system is based on the plurality rale. Each voter 
gives only one vote for the candidate of the party (s)he prefers most. The 
division of the seats in parliament is as much as possible in proportion 
with the number of votes a party gets. In this section we shall avoid 
mathematical formulations of this system. For a careful mathematical 
study of apportionment systems in general, consider Balinski and Young 
(1982, Appendix A). 
Consider the following division of seats in the second chambre of 
the Dutch parliamentary system: GL (Green left): 6 seats; PvdA (Social 
Democrats): 49 seats; D66 (Left Liberals): 12 seats; CDA (Christian 
Democrats): 54 seats; W D (Conservative Liberals): 22 seats; SR (Small 
Right parties): 7. This is the division of seats since the election of 6 
September 1989. Suppose empirical research has revealed that this division 
of seats is the result of the following distribution of the voters' preference 
orders of the political parties: 
Preference Profile 3.15 
36%: 
33%: 
15%: 
8%: 
5%: 
4%: 
CDA 
PvdA 
VVD 
D66 
SR 
GL 
GL 
GL 
GL 
GL 
GL 
SR 
SR 
SR 
SR 
SR 
D66 
D66 
D66 
D66 
D66 
WD 
WD 
WD 
WD 
WD 
PvdA 
CDA 
PvdA 
PvdA 
PvdA 
CDA 
CDA 
PvdA 
CDA 
CDA 
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We have rounded the percentages. As agreed5, let xäMy denote that party 
χ has a strict majority over party y. Let us put the size of the majority 
between parentheses. The distribution matrix leads to the following result: 
1. GL âM CDA (65-36); GL äM PvdA (68-33); GL ЙМ VVD (SO­
IS); GL äM D66 (93-8); GL äM SR (96-5). 
2. SR äM CDA (65-36); SR äM PvdA (68-33); SR äM W D (86-15); 
SR äM D66 (93-8). 
3. D66 äM CDA (65-36); D66 äM PvdA (68-33); D66 äM W D 
(86-15). 
4. W D äM CDA (65-36); W D äM PvdA (68-33). 
5. PvdA äM CDA (57-44). 
Hence, the majority relation is 
GL äM SR äM D66 äM W D äM PvdA äM CDA. This is exactly 
the converse of the social preference relation as expressed by the original 
division of seats yielded by the Dutch system. That is, 
1. GL has a strict majority over every other party. However, it has the 
smallest number of seats; 
2. SR has a strict majority over every other party except GL. However, 
SR has less seats than every other party over which SR has a strict 
majority. SR has more seats than GL that has a strict majority over 
SR. 
3. D66 has a strict majority over VVD, PvdA and CDA. However, D66 
has less seats than each of these parties. However, it has more seats 
than the parties that have a strict majority over D66. 
4. W D has a strict majority over PvdA and CDA. However, W D 
has less seats than each of these two parties. In contrast, W D has 
more seats than the parties that have a strict majority over W D . 
5Cf. section 3.1 for the definition of the system of majority decision and the notation 
M; cf. section 3.1.4 for the notation äM. 
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5. PvdA has a strict majority over CDA. However, CDA has more 
seats. 
6. Every party has a strict majority over CDA. However, CDA has the 
largest number of seats. 
This is a disturbing result. It shows that in Dutch politics a minority may 
rule over a majority. Anyway, it shows that the Dutch electoral system is 
not in agreement with the idea of majority decision-making as studied in 
section 1 of this chapter and as has been studied for centuries now in the 
theory of social choice6. 
Of course, preference profile 3.15 looks exceptional. However, pref­
erence profiles in which a party ζ that is preferred by a strict majority to 
party y still gets less seats than y are easy to construct Apparently, in 
Dutch politics, the chance that a party χ with a strict majority over party 
y gets a smaller number of seats than party y must not be underestimated. 
Probability calculations may show that such 'misrepresentations' are rather 
the rule than the exception. 
Moreover, it may be argued that it is better to play on safety. A chance 
is a chance, whatever its size. What really counts is that the Dutch system 
does not preclude the possibility. It is therefore better to design a system 
that is based on an idea that precludes such possibilities. In order to meet 
these critical notes, the following design principle may be relevant. Since 
this design principle preserves the idea of majority decision making as 
studied in section 1 of this chapter, we call it the majority principle for 
electoral systems. 
Design Principle 1 (Majority Principle for Electoral Systems) Party χ 
must obtain at least as much seats as party y if and only if a majority of 
the electorate prefers χ to y. 
Clearly, this design principle might completely disturb the contemporary 
Dutch political scene. For example, this principle would not give the 
present-day government coalition {CDA, PvdA} a majority when prefer­
ence profile 15 would be actual. 
6Cf. Black 1957, esp. Part Π; also cf. section 1.3 for the contribution of the French 
social scientist and mathematician Marquis de Condorcet (1743 - 1794) who started the 
systematical study of majority decision-making. 
86 
The proposed design principle could lead to cyclic majorities. This is, 
as we have tried to show in this chapter, an ever returning problem since its 
discovery by Marquis De Condorcet in the eighteenth century. However, 
with the theory of stable majority solutions as presented in section 3.1.3, 
it is possible to deal with majority cycles. In the next chapter we turn 
to the solution part of social choice processes in general. We shall see 
in that chapter that the theory of stable majorities is but a version of a 
general theory of solutions for social choice problems. There, we also 
shall discover other possibilities to deal with cycles. 
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Chapter 4 
General Solutions for Social 
Choice Problems 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we study the solution part of social choice processes in a 
more extensive way. The aim is to solve problem 3 as formulated in the 
introductory chapter. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the fact that cycles may 
occur among possible social choices is already discovered and studied by 
Marquis de Condorcet in the eightteenth century (Condorcet 1785, 1788, 
1789). However, Condorcet, who speaks of 'contradiction' instead of 
'cycle', is mainly preoccupied with the system of majority decision. 
Arrow's impossibility theorem as presented and studied in chapter 2 
not only deals with the system of majority decision, but with any social 
choice rale whatsoever. With respect to cycles Arrow is rigorous. He sim-
ply forbids cycles to occur by requmng that a social choice rule should 
always produce a transitive social preference. For Arrow this requirement 
is equivalent to the condition of collective rationality. However, the re-
quirement of transitivity of social preferences has a clear price. Arrow's 
impossibility theorem (Arrow 1963, 1967, 1977; Kelly 1977, 1989; Sen 
1970, 1977, 1986; Schwartz 1986, Suzumura 1983) shows that transitivity 
of social preference is inconsistent with the condition of nondictatorship 
given some other reasonable conditions of a social choice rule (cf. chapter 
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2). 
A way to kill Arrow's dragon is to weaken the condition of transitive 
collective rationality. The first step coming then to mind is to require that 
only the asymmetric part of a social preference should be transitive (quasi-
transitivity). Unfortunately, this leads to the existence of an oligarchy, 
that is, a coalition that has dictatorial decision-making power (cf. Gibbard 
1969, Sen 1970, Suzumura 1983, Schwartz 1986). Also see chapter 5.4 
for the socalled oligarchy theorem. A further-going step is to require that 
a social preference should be acyclic. However, also this step preserves 
the essence of Arrow's theorem. Acyclicity leads to the existence of a 
vetoer given some other reasonable conditions (Mas Collel 1972, Blau 
and Deb 1977, Blair and Pollak 1982, Schwartz 1986, Sen 1977, 1986). 
Also see chapter 5.4. If Arrow is right in concluding his famous work that 
"[c]ollective rationality in the social choice mechanism is . . . an important 
attribute of a genuinely democratic system capable of full adaptation to 
varying environments" (Arrow 1963: 120), then, apparently, there must 
be a persistent and undemocratic concentration of decision making power 
in such a democratic system. 
The following step is to give up even acyclicity of social preferences. 
However, this has an unpleasant implication. With this we must give up 
the requirement that social choices be best1, since in the case of cycles 
a best social choice need not exist. The crucial question is then what to 
count as a social choice. What sets of alternatives may be considered 
as reasonable solutions of social choice problems when best choices are 
absent? To answer this question, alternative theories of collective ratio-
nality are needed that are able to deal systematically with cyclic social 
preferences. The main task of these solution theories is to specify what 
sets of social states may be seen as reasonable solutions of social choice 
problems when best social states do not exist. A desirable feature would 
be that these theories point to best social choices when these exist. They 
then are in line with the classical notion of collective rationality. 
In the course of time a number of such solution theories have been 
proposed. We mention, among others, the concept of uncovered set (Miller 
1980, 1983, McKelvey 1986, Cox 1987) and the equivalent notion of 
Fishbum set (Fishbum 1977); the notion of a Banks set which is a subset 
'Cf. definition 2.4 in section 4 of chapter 2. 
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of the uncovered set (Banks 1985); the theory of GOCHA (Generalized 
Optimal CHoice Axiom) of Schwartz (1971, 1986) and the equivalent 
theories of dynamic solutions (Shenoy 1979, 1990) and admissible sets 
(Kalai and Schmeidler 1976, Kalai et.al. 1977); the related theory of 
GETCHA (Generalized Top-Choice Assumption) of Schwartz (1986); the 
theory of SOCON (Solution CONdition) of Schwartz (1986); the notion 
of Copeland winner (Grofman (1987) etc. We do not claim this list to be 
complete. Most of these solution theories are studied for multi-dimensional 
choice spaces and with means of geometric methods. A rather informal 
review of most of these solution theories is given in Krehbiel (1988). 
Also see Schofield et.al. (1988). In both works the solution theories are 
discussed in relation with spatial models of social choice. 
In this chapter we propose a theory that has a clear connection with 
the Von Neumann-Morgenstem theory of stable sets (Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern 1953). This latter theory has a long tradition in game theory. 
See Lucas (1977) for a review of the basic concepts of this theory and for 
an excellent discussion of the state of knowledge at that time concerning 
the existence of stable sets within game theory. The main shortcoming 
of Von Neumann-Morgenstem stable sets is that it can fail to yield a 
solution in the case of odd cycles. Our theory is designed to meet this 
shortcoming. It is able to yield a solution for any possible cyclic social 
preference. Another pleasant feature is that it is 'core-inclusive'. That 
is, if the set of best social choices is not empty, then the solution set 
as proposed will contain this set. Since our theory is a generalization of 
the Von Neumann-Morgenstem stable set theory, we call it the theory of 
generalized stable sets. 
In this chapter, we will also investigate the relationship of the theory 
of generalized stable sets with the theory of generalized optimal choices 
of Schwartz (1972, 1986), Shenoy (1978, 1979, 1980), Kalai et.al. (1976), 
and Kalai and Schmeidler (1977). There are two reasons for this investi-
gation. First, the theory of generalized optimal choices can be interpreted 
as a generalization of the game-theoretical core concept. Hence both the 
theory of generalized stable sets and the theory of generalized optimal 
choice are generalizations of solution theories that have a long and well 
established tradition in game theory. This also gives the second reason. 
In game theory, it is well known that the core of a game is contained in 
each Von Neumann-Morgenstem stable set of that game. It is worthwhile 
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to discover whether this connection also holds for the generalized versions 
of the core and stable sets as presented in this chapter. 
We use digraph theoretical methods instead of geometric ones. We 
think that the digraph theoretical orientation leads to results that might not 
be discovered by using geometric methods. In section 2 we discuss some 
elementary notions and techniques of digraph theory (Berge 1985, Behzad 
et.al. 1979, Harary et.al. 1965). The main technique introduced here is 
the contraction of a relation. This technique will be used to prove some of 
the results with respect to generalized stable sets. Further, it will play an 
important role in a theorem with respect to generalized optimal choice sets 
(the contraction theorem). In section 3 we present the theory of maximal 
choices. See for a definition of maximal choices chapter 2, section 4. We 
present this theory as a preparation for the theory of generalized optimal 
choices. As we shall see, also the theory of maximal choices can deal with 
cycles. However, these cycles are of a rather particular kind. In section 4 
the theory of generalized optimal choices will be presented. In addition to 
the work of Schwartz (1986), Shenoy (1979, 1980), Kalai and Schmeidler 
(1976) and Kalai et.al. (1977), we will present some new results among 
which the contraction theorem is the most important In section 5 we deal 
with the theory of Von Neumann-Morgenstem stable sets. This theory is 
presented as a preparation for the theory of generalized stable sets. In 
section 6, we finally present our theory of generalized stable sets. We 
prove that generalized stable sets are nonempty when the asymmetric part 
of R is nonempty. We also give a characterization of generalized stable 
sets by using the contraction technique. Finally, in the last section of 
this chapter we summarize the main commonalities and differences of the 
discussed theories, including the theory of maximal choices. 
4.2 Mathematical Preliminaries 
A digraph D = (V, U) is a finite and nonempty set V together with an 
asymmetric binary relation U on V. The set V is called the vertex set 
and the set U the arc set. Each element in V is called a vertex or point. 
An element in U is called an arc or, also, a directed edge. Instead of 
(x, y) G U we write xUy. 
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If xUy, then y is called a successor of χ while χ is called a predecessor 
of y. A subgraph S - (Π^,Τ) of Ζ) is a graph where W Ç. V and 
Τ = U Π (Ж χ Ж). What follows applies to a digraph D = (V, U). Let 
x, xi, X2,..., x
m
, у e V. A pafA from χ to у in a digraph D = (V, Í7) is a 
finite sequence of distinct points (χ, xi, X2,..., x
m
, y) such that 
xUxi,xiUx2.-.XmUy· A semipath from χ to у is a finite sequence of 
distinct points (χ, χι, X2,..., Xm,y) such that 
xUxi V xiUx,xiUx2 V X2Í/xi,...,xTOí/y V yUxm. A path from χ to у 
becomes a cyc/e when the ordered pair yllx is added2. A complete cycle 
is a cycle that contains every element of V. The following definition is 
important. The finite sequence (xj, хг,..., x
m
) is a top cycle in D = (V, £/) 
• (xi,хг,. · . , xTO) is a cycle in D, 
• there is no χ G V—{x\, хг,..., x
m
} and there is no y G {χι, хг,.. · , χ 
such that xUy. 
Obviously, a complete cycle is a top cycle. A digraph D = (V, U) is 
• acyclic := D does not contain any cycle. 
The following lemma is useful. For a proof consider Bezhad et.al. (1979: 
329). 
Lemma 4.1 Every acyclic digraph has at least one vertex that has no pre­
decessors and at least one vertex that has no successors. 
Since this lemma will be extensively used, we give a proof. 
Proof. Let (V, U) be an acyclic digraph and suppose (V, U) has no maximal 
elements, i.e. -i5x-iBy[y[/x], i.e. Vx3y[yUx]. But then (V,U) contains a 
cycle, which is in contradiction with the fact that (V, U) is acyclic. O. 
The transitive closure UT of U is the set 
UT := {(x, y) € V χ V | there is a path from χ toy or χ = y}. 
2See chapter 2.4. 
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UT is the intersection of all transitive relations on V that contain U (cf. 
Suzumura 1983: 12). U is transitive if and only if U = UT. 
Two distinct vertices x, y in V are 
Φ 2-connected := xi7Ty Λ yUTx; 
• 1-connected := xi7Ty V yUTx\ 
¿-Connectivity between two elements χ and y will be denoted by χ С on* y 
where ¿ = 1,2. A digraph D = (V, U) is 
• strongly connected := for all x,y e V : xCon2y·, 
• connected := for all x,y G V: xConxy·, 
Clearly, a digraph D = (V, U) is strongly connected if and only if UT is 
complete and symmetric. It is connected if and only if UT is complete. 
Con2 is reflexive, symmetric and transitive and thus an equivalence 
relation on V. It partitions D into subgraphs that are all strongly connected. 
The strongly connected subgraphs of D are called the strong components 
of D denoted by S*. The vertex set of a strong component S* is denoted 
by V*. The symbol Ξ stands for the partition of V induced by the vertex 
sets of the strong components3. Obviously, a strong component of D is 
maximal in the sense that no proper subgraph of it is strongly connected. 
As a subgraph, it either consists of one vertex or it contains a complete 
cycle. To illustrate the notion of a strong component consider the following 
digraph (see Schwartz 1986: 142): 
• ^ = {z,ï/,2,M,s}, 
• U = {(χ, у), (у, ζ), (г, x), (u, θ), (a, f), (ί, u), (χ, ί), U, s), (y, η)}. 
See figure 4.1. This digraph is connected since every pair of vertices is 1-
connected. However, it is not strongly connected since for example χ and s 
are not 2-connected. The strong components are ({x, y, z}, {(x, y), (y, z), (z, x)}) 
and ({u,s,<}, {(u,s),(s,0,(*,u)})· The vertex sets of these strong com­
ponents constitute the partition {{x,y,z},{it,s,i}} of V. 
3In mathematical terms: Ξ is the quotient set of V modulo Con2. 
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Figure 4.1: Digraph 1 
The contraction Dcon of D is the digraph (Ξ, Ucon) where 
u
con
 := {(K*, vp Ε Ξ χ Ξ 13(x,y) e f/[x G ν;* л y e vp). 
Intuitively, the contraction of a digraph is the collapsing of each strong 
component into one single point enriched with a relation among the result­
ing points. Two points are related with each other if and only if there is an 
arc in the original digraph with its first vertex in one point and the second 
vertex in the other one. The contraction of the digraph in figure 4.1 is the 
digraph with as vertex set the points Vf = {χ, y, ζ} and Ц* = {«> 5> 0 ^ 
with as arc set {(Vi*, Vp}. See figure 4.2. (Vi*,^*)is an arc in the con­
traction, because there is an arc in the original digraph going from a vertex 
in Vi to a vertex in V^ *. Note that if one of the arcs (x, t), (y, u) or (z, s) is 
reversed, the resulting digraph gets strongly connected and collapses into 
one single point. 
The following lemma will be used in the sequel: 
Lemma 4.2 Let D be a digraph. Then 
1. the contraction of D is always acyclic; 
2. the contraction ofD is i-connected ifD is i-connected, where ¿ = 1,2. 
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ν: ο γ* 
Figure 4.2: Contraction of digraph 1 
The proof of this elementary lemma is not difficult and can be found in 
Dehzad et.al. 1979: 327-8 or Harary etal. 1965: 62-3. 
Further, note that the contraction of a digraph D = (V, U) is asymmet­
ric. That is, for i ij, if ( ι? , Vp G tf«"·, then not (V}*, V;*) G Ucon. Oth­
erwise, V* U Vj would form a strong component and thus (V^ *, Vf) & U"™ 
which is a contradiction. Also note that the contraction of a quasi-transitive 
digraph is transitive. 
In the theory of social choice the set V in the digraph D = (V, U) is 
commonly considered as a set of alternatives while the relation U serves 
as a strict preference relation on V. In the sequel, we pick up again the 
terminology as introduced in chapter 2 and 3. So, throughout this chapter 
we assume the existence of a social choice problem X and we will interpret 
V as an A e Ω and U as a strict preference Ρ restricted to A. In addition, 
we will assume in this chapter that Ρ J 0 In order to remember that we 
are dealing with strict preferences restricted to an agenda, we prefer to 
call a digraph D = (A, P) a preference structure. 
4.3 Maximal Social Choices 
The notion of maximal choice set has already been defined in chapter 2, 
section 4. It has an equivalent in the game theoretical concept of a core 
(see Ordeshook 1986, Owen 1982 or Shubik 1982). Sometimes, it is also 
called the generalized Condorcet set (Blair etal. 1976). 
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For completeness we give the definition again. Consider an agenda A 
and a preference R over X. An χ G Λ is maximal for A given R if yPx 
for no y e Л, where Ρ is the asymmetric part of R. The set of maximal 
elements of A is denoted by μ(Λ,.η). Clearly, if R is complete, then 
μ(Α, Д) = /?(Л, Л) where /?(А, Л) is the set of Я-best elements of A (see 
chapter 2, section 4). The main difference between iî-best elements and 
iî-maximal elements comes into the picture when giving up completeness. 
To see this, consider {x, y, z, w\ and the disconnected preference yPwPz. 
Since χ is preferred by no alternative, it belongs to the maximal set. 
However, the set of ß-best choices is empty. 
A maximal element for a relation Ρ is, in digraph-theoretical terms, 
an element that has no P-precedessors. Hence, according to lemma 4.1, a 
preference has a nonempty set of maximal choices if it is acyclic. How­
ever, μ(Λ, Ρ) need not be empty if (A, P) contains a cycle. Acyclicity is 
not a necessary condition. To see this, consider the agenda {х,у,2,ш} 
with the connected relation {xPyPzPwPy}. Since there is no element 
that is preferred to x, it follows that χ belongs to the set of maximal 
choices. 
The next result gives a necessary and sufficient condition for the ex­
istence of a maximal choice. Consider a preference structure (A, P). Let 
(Ξ, p c o n ) denote the contraction of (A, P). We define: 
Definition 4.1 
μ(Ξ, Ρ - " ) := {V· G Ξ Ι - d l ? 6 =li Ij Λ (V/, V?) G Ρ""]}· 
That is, μ(Ξ, p c o n ) is the set of the vertex sets of the strong components 
in Ρ that are maximal in P c o n . 
Theorem 4.1 (Existence Theorem) Let D = (A, P) be a preference struc­
ture. χ is a maximal element of D if and only if {x} is a maximal element 
of the contraction of D. 
Proof. Let χ be a maximal element. Then x ¡tas no predecessors in Ρ and 
hence the only strong component that contains χ is {x}. Since there are no 
arcs going towards χ in the original structure, there can be no arcs going 
towards {x} in Pcon. Hence {x} G μ(Ξ,P"m) and \{x}\= 1. 
Conversely, suppose {x} G μ(Ξ, P c o n ) . Then there is no V* G Ξ such 
that (V*, {x}) G Pcon. Since every y e A must be an element of a strong 
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component of Ρ, there is no у У χ 6 A such that уРх. •. 
According to this simple result, a preference structure has a maximal el­
ement if and only if the contraction of this structure contains a maximal 
point that consists of exactly one vertex. Perhaps more important are the 
following implications of the existence theorem: 
Corollary 4.1 Let (A, P) be a preference structure. Then 
1. μ{Α, Ρ) = 0 if and only if for each VC € μ(Ξ, Pcon), \ V? \ i 1. 
2. μ{Α, Ρ) = 0 if Ρ is strongly connected. 
In the second part of this corollary the fact is used that an agenda Л е й 
contains at least three elements (cf. chapter 2.2). Since the proof is easy, 
we do not give it here. Note that strong connectedness of а (Л, P) is 
not a necessary condition for the emptiness of the set of maximal so­
cial choices. Indeed, the relation xPyPzPxPw is not strongly connected 
(since e.g. (i, w) is not 2-connected) but the set of maximal elements is 
empty. 
In general, there may be χ e A — //(Л, Ρ) for which there are no 
у € μ(Α,Ρ) such that yPx. The core solution in n-person cooperative 
game theory also has this property (see a.o. Shubik 1982: 157). Clearly, 
if x, у € ^(Л, Ρ), then neither xPy nor yPx. This property of maximal 
sets is called internal stability. A stable set also has this property (cf. 
section 5 of this chapter). 
Theorem 4.1 and its corollary 4.1 say that maximal social choices exist 
when there are no top cycles in a social preference. The absence of top 
cycles in a social preference as a desirable condition for social choice 
processes is already discussed by In 't Veld (1975). He argues that the 
transitive collective rationality requirement of Arrow is too severe. In his 
view, the absence of top cycles in a social choice preference suffices for 
generating a social choice. In 't Veld gives the following example (1975, 
64): αΡδ, aPc, aPd, bPc, cPd, dPb where f is a strict social preference. 
Since a is strictly preferred to every other alternative, it is, according to 
In 't Veld, a satisfactory winner. The fact that b, с and d are involved in a 
cycle does not influence this result. Note that for this example, a is also 
best. 
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According to theorem 4.1 and corollary 4.1, maximal social choices do 
not exist when each V^·* G μ(Ξ, pcon) contains at least two elements, thus, 
when there is a top cycle in a social preference. The question then is what 
to do in this case. In the next section we study a theory that provides an 
answer. 
4.4 The Theory of Generalized Optimal Choices 
The origin of this theory can be found in Schwartz (1971, 1986). The 
theory is equivalent to the theory of dynamic solutions of Shenoy (1977, 
1979, 1980), and to the theory of admissible sets of Kalai and Schmeidler 
(1976) and Kalai et.al. (1977). 
Crucial in the theory of generalized optimal choices is the notion of 
minimal undominated set. A set of possible social choices is undominated 
if there is no alternative outside this set that is socially strictly preferable 
to an alternative inside the set. An undominated set is minimal if none of 
its proper subsets has this property. The generalized optimal choice set of 
a set is the union of the minimal undominated subsets of that set. 
Definition 4.2 Let (A, P) be a preference structure and В Ç A. 
1. В is an undominated set of A :=for no χ e В there is ay G A — В 
such that yPx, 
2. В is a minimal undominated set := 
(a) В is an undominated set and 
(b) There is no В* С В, В* j 0, such that B* is undominated. 
The first condition says that for no element in an undominated set В there 
is an alternative outside В that is more preferable. However, this does not 
mean that for every alternative χ G A — В there is a y G В such that yPx. 
In this sense an undominated set satisfies, just like a maximal choice set, 
the property of external incomplete stability (cf. the preceding section). 
Also note that it is allowed that, eventually, an element χ in В is pre­
ferred to another element у in B. The second requirement is a minimality 
property. To illustrate, consider figure 3 below (also see Schwartz 1986: 
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142). ìnthisng\iKX = {x,y,w,z,x\,y\,zi,wiìy2ìX2,Z2ìiV2}. The sub-
set {zi, yi, ζχ} of X is undominated since for no u € {χι, j/i, zi} there is a 
ν G X — {χι, yi, ζχ} such that υΡϋ. However, {xi, yi, zi} is also minimal 
undominated, since it does not contain a nonempty proper subset which is 
undominated. 
Schwartz (1986: 145) proves the following important result about min­
imal undominated sets: 
Theorem 4.2 (Schwartz) Let (A, P) be a preference structure. Let В be 
a minimal undominated set of A. Then (Β, Ρ Π {Β χ Β)) is either a top 
cycle in Ρ or a singleton set consisting of a maximal element. 
Definition 4.3 Let (A, P) be a preference structure. A nonempty subset 
σ(Α,Ρ) of A is the generalized optimal choice set, henceforward GOCS, 
ofA:= 
ст(Л, Ρ) = {J{B Ç A | В is a minimal undominated subset of A}. 
Since, according to theorem 4.2, a minimal undominated set either is a top 
cycle or consists of one single maximal element, the GOCS is the union 
of top cycles and maximal elements in a structure (A, P) (cf. Schwartz 
1986: 145). 
The next theorem contains another equivalent formulation of a GOCS. 
This theorem is, again, formulated by Schwartz (1986: 146). In this 
theorem, ä(PT) denotes the asymmetric part of the transitive closure of P. 
Hence, xä(PT)y means that there is a chain from χ to y but not from y to 
x. 
Theorem 4.3 (Schwartz) Let (A, P) be a preference structure. Then 
σ(Α, Ρ) = {χ e A | ^Зу E A : yä(PT)x}. 
This theorem shows the relation between the notion of a set of maximal 
choices and the notion of GOCHS. A set of maximal choices consists of 
elements which are maximal according to Ρ while a GOCS consists of 
elements which are maximal according to â(PT). Clearly, 
Theorem 4.4 Let (A, P) be a preference structure. 
μ{Α
ί
Ρ)^σ{Α
ί
Ρ). 
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Proof Let χ be maximal. Then there is noy G A such that yPx and hence 
{x} isa minimal undominatedset. ü. 
If χ G σ(Α, Ρ) then it is possible that there is a y 6 σ(Α, Ρ) such that yPx. 
Hence, σ(Α, Ρ) С μ(Α
ί
 Ρ) is not true in general. This result shows that 
the theory of GOCS is an extension of the classical notion of collective 
rationality as social maximality. 
The next result gives another characterization of a GOCS. This theo­
rem, again, is formulated by Thomas Schwartz (1986: 154). 
Theorem 4.5 (Schwartz) Let (A, P) be a preference structure. Thena(A,P) 
is a GOCS of A if and only if it satisfies the following conditions: 
1. for no χ ζ σ(Α, Ρ) there is ay £ Α- σ(Α, Ρ) such that yPx; 
2. there is no В С σ(Α, Ρ) that is minimally undominated in the sub­
structure (σ(Α, Ρ), R η (σ(Α, Ρ) χ σ(Α, Ρ))); 
3. if Β is an undominated set of A, then there is an χ e В such that 
χ G σ(Α, Ρ). 
Ргорегу 1 is strong. It says that there is no у outside the GOCS that is 
better than some alternative χ inside the GOCS. This also implies that 
there is no chain starting from а у outside GOCS and terminating at an χ 
inside GOCS. 
In general, there may be alternatives y G Л for which there are no 
χ G σ(Α, Ρ) such that xPy. To see this consider the preference 
xiPx2, хг-Рхз, хэ-Рхі, χιΡχ4, χ^Ρχ$. For this case the GOCS is {xi, хг, хз}. 
There is no χ G {хі,Х2,а;з} such that xPxs. However, the following the­
orem shows that the GOCS can 'reach' every element outside the GOCS 
via a chain. Remember that δ(Ρτ) is the asymmetric part of PT. 
Theorem 4.6 Let (Л, P) be a preference structure and σ(Λ, Ρ) its GOCS. 
Then for every y G A — а(Л, Ρ) there is an χ e σ(Α, Ρ) such that xä(PT)y. 
In the proof of this theorem, we need the existence theorem (theorem 4.8). 
We therefore postpone it for later. 
The next theorem is obtained by using the contraction technique (see 
the mathematical preliminaries for this chapter). It shows what relation is 
maximized by the theory of GOCS. Remember that μ(Ξ, pcon) is the set 
of vertex sets that are maximal in Pcon (see definition 4.1 in section 4.3). 
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Theorem 4.7 (Contraction Theorem) Let {A, Ρ) be a preference struc­
ture and (Ξ, pcon) Us contraction. Then: 
σ{Α,Ρ) = {}μ{Έ.
ί
Ρ«>η). 
Proof. Let В be a minimal undominated subset of A. Since, according to 
theorem 42, В either consists of a top cycle or is a singleton for which 
there is no alternative that is more preferable, В G Ξ. Since there is no 
y e А-В such that yPxfor some χζΒ, {VC, В) G Pconfor no V? G Ξ. 
Hence В is maximal in Pcon. Hence σ(Α, Ρ) С 1}μ(Ξ, Рсоп). 
Let V; be maximal in Pcon. Then for no Vf e Ξ with Vf i V?, 
(V^ *, V;*) G Pcon and therefore there is no χ G A- V* such that xPyfor 
some y €V*. Hence, V* is an undominated set. We now have to prove the 
minimality property of V* as an undominated set. Two cases: 
Case 1: V* is a singleton. Then V* is minimal undominated in A. 
Case 2: V* is the vertex set of a top cycle in Ρ that is complete with respect 
to V;*. Let W С V;* and W i 0.. Then there is an χ e V* - W and a 
y G W such that xPy. So W is not undominated in A. •. 
According to this theorem, the GOCS for a structure (Л, P) is the union 
of the strong components in Ρ that are maximal in P™4. Hence, what 
the theory of GOCS maximizes is the contraction of a social preference. 
To illustrate this point consider the following social preference given by 
Schwartz (1986: 142). 
• xPy, yPz, zPw, wPx, wPy and zPx; 
• xiPyi, yiPzi and ζιΡχι; 
• хгРуг, угРиъ, iviPzi and ггРуг', 
• wPw\, yiPyi, yiPw\ and z\Pw\. 
See figure 4.3. The contraction of the digraph in figure 4.3 is 
{ г. зг. у. д і ? } , 
{ОТ, Ц·), <ν2·, ν;), <ν2·, ν;χ (y;, ν3·), < у, ν4*)}, where 
V\ = {«»У,г»«»}, Vf = {χι,ΐ/ι,ζι}, Vf = {toi}, 
Vf = {Î/2,U>2, Z2} and Vf = {хг}- See figure 4.4. The set of maximal 
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Figure 4.3: Digraph 2. 
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Figure 4.4: Contraction of digraph 2. 
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elements of this contraction is {Vj*, V^ *, Vs). According to theorem 4.7, 
the GOCS is the union of F,*, VJ" and Ц*, that is, {x, y, z, w, x\, y\, z\, хг). 
Note that the maximal elements of the contraction are exactly the minimal 
undominated subsets of the social preference. 
Since a contracted relation is always acyclic (lemma 4.2) and since 
every acyclic relation has a nonempty set of maximal elements (lemma 
4.1), we immediately have: 
Theorem 4.8 (Existence Theorem) For every preference structure (Л, P) 
the GOCS is nonempty. 
Proof. According to lemma 42, the contraction Pcon is acyclic. Hence 
μ(Ξ, Pcon) i 0. Hence U μ(Ξ, Pcon) І 0· By theorem 4.7, a(S, P) i 0. •. 
An alternative proof of the existence theorem is given in Schwartz (1986). 
We are now ready to prove theorem 4.6: 
Proof of theorem 4.6. In this proof we use the existence theorem 4.8. 
Let у e A — <7(Л, Ρ). Then у belongs to no minimal undominated set and 
therefore there must be an ц e A such that x\Py. If ц belongs to no 
minimal undominated set, there must be an хг β Л such that хгРх\. If 
хг belongs to no minimal undominated set, there must be an хз € Л such 
that хгРхг. Proceeding in this way, since A is finite, there must be an 
x
n
 G Л such that x
n
Px
n
_\ and x
n
 Ε σ(Α,Ρ). Because of theorem 4.8, 
а(А,Р) j 0. IfyPxn, then у 6 σ(Α,Ρ). Contradiction. Hence xäPTy.. 
D. 
The next result is easily derived from the contraction theorem: 
Corollary 4.2 Let (Л, P) be a preference structure. Then а(Л, Ρ) = Л if 
and only if (A, P) is strongly connected. 
Hence, in the case of complete cycles the theory of GOCS loses its power 
to discriminate. 
A GOCS satisfies external stability with respect to PT (cf. theorem 
4.6). It even satisfies a stronger property: if σ(Α, Ρ) is the GOCS for 
(Л, P), then there are no y e A — <т(Л, Ρ) such that з/Ртх for some 
χ G σ(Α, Ρ). This last property is called strong external stability. In this 
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respect, a social choice process that produces elements from a GOCS as a 
social choice will never produce a social choice for which there is a better 
one outside the solution. 
However, a GOCS does not satisfy the property of internal stability. 
That is, it is possible that there are x, y G σ(5, Ρ) such that yPTx. If this 
is the case, we also must have yPTx. So, a social choice process that 
produces only elements from a GOCS may yield a solution for a social 
choice problem that is 'instable'. This instability is, so to say, neatly kept 
within that solution itself. The alternative that dominates the outcome, 
the produced social choice, is also in the solution. It may have been an 
outcome itself. However, it remains that a GOCS may contain alternatives 
that are involved in a cycle and, therefore, it may lead to a social choice 
process that does not terminate. The process then goes, so to say, 'round 
and round in cycles'. 
We will formulate an alternative solution theory that yields solutions 
characterized by inner stability. This avoids going 'round and round in 
cycles'. The theory is a generalization of a well known solution theory 
from η-person cooperative game theory. We first study this solution theory 
before presenting its generalization. 
4.5 Von Neumann-Morgenstern Theory of Sta­
ble Sets 
This section is based on Van Deernen (1990b) The origin of the theory 
of Von Neumann-Morgenstem stable sets can be found in their celebrated 
work Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1953). See also Luce and 
Raiffa 1957. Von Neumann and Morgenstern call this theory the theory 
of solutions. In order to avoid confusion with other solution concepts, we 
will use the term 'stable set' (cf. Shubik 1982). What we do here is to 
reformulate the game-theoretical theory of stable sets in a way that suits 
our aims. 
In social choice theoretical terms, a subset В of a set A is a stable set 
if no alternative in В is socially strictly preferred to another alternative in 
В and if, in addition, for every alternative outside В there is an alternative 
inside В that is strictly preferred to this outside alternative. 
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Definition 4.4 Let (Λ, Ρ) be a preference structure. A nonempty V Ç A 
is a stable set of A := 
1. for all x,y G V: not xPy. 
2. for all y &V there is an χ € V such that xPy. 
The first property is internal stability. As we have seen, also sets of 
maximal choices satisfy this property. It says that no element in a stable 
set is socially strictly preferred to another element in this stable set. The 
second property is external stability. It says that for every χ outside a 
stable set there is a y in this stable set that is strictly preferred to x. 
However, the stable set solution concept does not preclude the possibility 
that there is a y £ V such that yPx for some χ e V. Hence, with respect 
to P, it does not satisfy the property of strong external stability. 
Theorem 4.9 Let (A, P) be a preference structure and V bea stable set of 
A. Then V is maximal with respect to internal stability and minimal with 
respect to external stability. 
Proof. If V is not maximal with respect to internal stability, then there 
must be an M Ç A such that V С M and M satisfies internal stability. 
Take an χ e M - V. Then, since V satisfies external stability, there must 
be ay e V such that yPx. But then M does not satisfy internal stability. 
Contradiction. 
If V is not minimal with respect to external stability, then there must be a 
proper subset MofV that has the same property. Consider an χ e V - M. 
Since M satisfies external stability, there must be ay G M such that yPx. 
But then V does not satisfy internal stability. Contradiction. G. 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern give a subtle interpretation of stable sets. 
In their view, a stable set is a characterization of what may be acceptable 
or established as a "standard of behavior" in society (Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern 1953: 41). Internal stability, then, expresses the fact that the 
standard of behavior has an inner consistency. It guarantees the absence 
of "inner contradictions". External stability has another function. It gives 
a reason to correct deviant behavior, that is, to correct behavior that is not 
conformable to the "standard of behavior" (1953: 41). Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern conclude (1953: 42): 
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Thus our solutions S correspond to such "standards of be­
havior" as have an inner stability: once they are generally 
accepted they overrule everything else and no part of them 
can be overruled within the limits of the accepted standards. 
This nice interpretation of Von Neumann and Morgenstern also shows why 
generalized optimal choice sets may not be acceptable. In their terms, such 
sets lack inner consistency. They may lead to collective behavior that is 
not free from contradicion. 
In general, a stable set is not unique. A sufficient condition for its 
uniqueness is already given by Von Neumann and Morgemstem themselves 
(1953: section 65.8) 
Theorem 4.10 (Von Neumann and Morgenstern) Let (A, P) be a pref­
erence structure. If Ρ is acyclic, then there is a unique stable set. 
The power of the theory of stable sets lies in the fact that it can han­
dle cycles. To see this consider the agenda {ж, у, г, ω} with the cycle 
xPyPzPwPx. A social choice rule satisfying one of the classical ratio­
nality conditions has nothing to tell about this structure. Further, the theory 
of maximal choices also fails. There are no maximal elements However, 
the stable sets are {x,2} and {y,w} since both sets are internally and 
externally stable. 
The multiplicity of stable sets as solutions for a social choice problem4 
leads to a problem. Which stable set, which standard of behavior should 
be chosen by a society when a multiplicity of them are available? Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern do not claim to solve this problem. They 
are primarily interested in "where the equilibrium of forces lies" (Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern 1953: 42), not in what equilibrium actually will 
be arrived at. Neither do we claim to solve this problem. In general, we 
think that a multiplicity of solutions for social choice problems may reflect 
the complicated equilibrium forces which operate in human societies. It 
is also quite possible that in a dynamic context some stable sets may be 
excluded because, for example, they do not lie on suitable or historically 
acceptable equilibrium paths. Societies may 'grow' to particular stable 
sets as acceptable standards of behavior because of their history and the 
4See chapter 2, section 2 for the notion of social choice problem. 
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dynamics of the operative systems of norms and values. So, societal 
dynamics may help to reduce the multiplicity of solutions of its social 
choice problems. 
The theory of stable sets has a serious shortcoming. Consider the 
agenda {x, y, z} with the cycle xPyPzPx. For this preference structure 
there are no Ä-stable sets. The same is true for a structure like 
{χι,:Γ2,Ζ3,Χ4,£5} with cycle XIPX2PX3PXAPXSPX\. Let us call a cycle 
х\РхгР · ·. Px
n
Px\ odd if η is odd. If a cycle is not odd, then it is called 
even. It appears that the theory of stable sets can only deal with even 
cycles. As the following result shows, it cannot deal with complete odd 
cycles. 
Theorem 4.11 Let A = {х\,хг,...,х
п
} be an agenda with η odd. Then 
A has no stable set if there is a unique cycle 
xiPxzPxiP... Px
n
Pxi. 
The proof of this theorem can be found in (Harary et. al. 1965: 177-8). It 
must be noticed that the conditions in this theorem are rather demanding. 
The cycle must be complete, i.e., every element in A must be in the 
cycle; the cycle must be unique and, finally, η must be odd. Note that 
the uniqueness and completeness of the cycle imply that (A, P) is strongly 
connected. 
The following result is positive in nature. It shows that the theory of 
stable sets has no problems with even cycles. This theorem stems from 
Richardson (1953). It applies to any (Л, P), irrespective of its connected­
ness degree. 
Theorem 4.12 (Existence Theorem (Richardson)) Let (A, P) be a pref­
erence structure. Then (Л, P) has a stable set if Ρ has no odd cycles. 
Somewhat stronger results can be found in Duchet (1987) and Galeana-
Sanchez (1984). The necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee 
the existence of a stable set for an arbritary preference structure (Λ, P) are 
still unknown. 
Within the framework of η-person cooperative game theory, it can be 
shown that the core of a game is contained in each stable set of that game 
(Luce and Raiffa 1957, Shubik 1982). This is also true for the version 
presented here 
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Theorem 4.13 Let (Л, Ρ) be a preference structure. If V is a stable set of 
A, then 
μ{Α,Ρ)<ζν. 
Proof. Let χ be maximal and suppose there is a V such that χ gV. Then, 
by external stability, there must be а у in V such that yPx. But then χ is 
not maximal. Contradiction. D. 
There may be preference structures with a nonempty set of maximal el­
ements and no stable sets. To see this, consider the strict preference 
ххРхгРхгРхлРхіРхг· There is no stable set for this structure. The 
set of maximal elements is {x\}. Note that {11} also happens to be the 
GOCS. 
A social choice process that always produces an element of a stable 
set as a social choice produces in fact a result that is conformable to some 
accepted standard of behavior. With the property of external stability it 
also is possible to correct for collective behavior that deviates from the 
accepted standard. However, the main flaw of stable sets and, hence, 
of social choice processes that produce stable sets as solutions, appears 
to be the handling of odd cycles. For this kind of structures, the Von 
Neumann-Morgenstem theory of stable sets may fail. 
4.6 Generalized Stable Sets 
This section is based on Van Deernen (1990a). The theory of stable sets 
has the asymmetric part of a social preference as its point of departure. In 
contrast, the theory of generalized stable sets will have the transitive clo­
sure of the asymmetric part of a social preference as its point of departure. 
In this section we shall see that this apparently little difference has rather 
great consequences. 
Definition 4S Let (A, P) be a preference structure. A nonempty subset V 
of A is a Generalized Stable Set, henceforward GESTS, of A := 
1. for all x, y G V : not xPTy, 
2. for every y e A — V there is an χ E V such that xPTy. 
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The first condition is Generalized Internal Stability. It says that at no 
element in a GESTS there starts a path toward another element in that 
GESTS. Note that this also implies that there are no x,y in a GESTS 
such that xPy. The second condition is Generalized External Stability. 
It says that for every χ outside a GESTS there starts a path from some 
y inside that GESTS that terminates at x. In general, however, it is not 
precluded that there is a path starting from an element outside a GESTS 
and terminating at an element inside a GESTS. Inside a GESTS, however, 
there are no paths. 
Theorem 4.14 Let (Л, P) be a preference structure. Then every GESTS 
of A is maximal with respect to generalized internal stability and minimal 
with respect to generalized external stability. 
Proof. Let V be a GESTS of A. IfVis not maximal with repect to gen­
eralized internal stability, there must be a nonempty M D V such that M 
is generalized internally stable. Take an χ e M — V. Since V satisfies 
generalized external stability, there must be ay G V such that yPTx. But 
then M does not satisfy generalized internal stability. Contradiction. 
If V is not minimal with repect to generalized external stability, then it 
must contain a nonempty M that has this property. Consider an χ €V—M. 
Since M satisfies generalized external stability, there must be ay e M such 
that yPTx. But then V does not satisfy generalized internal stability. Con-
tradiction. • . 
Also generalized stable sets can be interpreted as accepted standards of 
behavior. The condition of generalized internal stability now applies to 
a generalized notion of domination, namely, to the transitive closure of 
the asymmetric part of a social preference. This includes the asymmetric 
part of a social preference. In this form it also works as a consistency 
condition in the sense that it leads to collective behavior that is free of 
inner contradictions (cf. Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953: 41). In 
this respect the theory fundamentally differs from the theory of GOCS. As 
we have seen, the alternatives inside a GOCS may be part of a cycle. In 
terms of the behavioral interpretation of Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
this means that this theory allows that an alternative that complies with 
an accepted standard of behavior can be dominated by an alternative that 
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Figure 4.5: Digraph 3. 
also complies with that standard of behavior. In this sense, a GOCS may 
lack internal consistency. 
The condition of generalized external stability also operates as a kind 
of correction procedure. With this property it is possible to correct noncon-
formable behavior, i.e. behavior that deviates from the standard. A less 
convincing point of this correction procedure is that it does not preclude 
the possibility that an alternative that is not conformable to the accepted 
standard can dominate an alternative that is conformable to that standard. 
In this aspect, the theory of GOCS is stronger. This theory precludes the 
possibility that a disconformable alternative with respect to some accepted 
standard of behavior dominates a conformable alternative. 
To give an illustration of the working of the theory of GESTS, consider 
the agenda {x,y,z} and the cycle xPyPzPx. The GOCS for this set is 
{x,y, z). There is no stable set. The GESTS are {x}, {y} or {z}. A 
more intricate example is the following one: 
• x\Px2, хгРхз, хъРх\, 
• xiPxs, xsPxe* хбРхл, 
• X2PX5, хуРхв, χηΡχ*. 
See figure 4.5. For this case, the set of maximal elements is {n}. The 
GOCS is {χχ,χί,χ-ί,χη}. The GESTS-solutíons are {χχ,χη}, {ΧΖ,ΧΊ} and 
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{хз,п}. 
As this example shows, a GESTS will generally not be unique. It is not 
difficult to prove that acyclicity, again, is sufficient for uniqueness. 
The following result is fundamental. It gives a characterization of a 
GESTS: 
Theorem 4.15 Let (A, P) be a preference structure and (Ξ, Pcon) its con­
traction. Let μ(Ξ,Pcon) = {νΐ·,ν£·,...,ν,·} and let χι,Χ2,···,χι € A. 
Then {x\ ,x2,...,xi} is a generalized stable set of A if and only if x\ G 
vr,x2eF2v..,x, ev,*. 
Proof. Let VV, 14*,..., V* be the maximal elements in Pcon and let x\ e 
\,хг E г",...,!; 6 *^. We have to prove that {χι,χ2,...,χι} is a 
GESTS. Let i¿,Xj € {х\,Х2,..>,хі} and suppose XiPTXj. Since x, 6 V* 
and Xj G V? this means that there must be a chain from V* to V? in Pcon. 
But then Vf cannot be maximal. Hence not xtPrXj. In the same way 
we can prove that not XjPTXi. Hence {ij, X2,..., χι} satisfies generalized 
internal stability. 
Let χ # {xi,...,ar;}. If χ is in a maximal vertex set V* of pconl 
then V* must contain the elements of a top cycle. Then x1PTx. Note 
that χ,Ρχ ι'ί not precluded. Suppose now that χ is in a vertex set Xofa 
strong component that is not maximal in P c o n . Then there is a vertex set 
Y of a strong component such that (У, X) 6 Pcon. But then there exists 
ay e Y and a ζ e X such that yPz by definition of Pcon. Then yPTz 
and zPTx and hence yPTx by transitivity of PT. If Y is not maximal in 
Pcon, then there must be a vertex set Y\ of a strong component such that 
(Fi, Y) G P c o n . Then there must beayi e Y\ such that y\PTy. IfY\ is not 
maximal in p c o n , there must be a vertex set Yiofa strong component such 
that (5i, УІ) G Pcon. But then there must be а уг G Y2 such that угРту\. 
Proceeding in this way we must finally reach a maximal V* since Pcon is 
acyclic by lemma 42 and every acyclic digraph has a maximal element by 
lemma 4.1. Then we have 
XiPTy
n
PTy
n
-\PT...PTyPTx. Since PT is transitive, this implies x,PTx. 
Hence {xi, X2,..., χ/} satisfies generalized external stability. 
Conversely, let W be a GESTS of A and let χ G W be a member of 
the vertex set V* of a strong component in P. We have to prove that V* 
is maximal in Pcon. Suppose therefore that V* is not maximal. Then there 
must be a vertex set Y\ of a strong component in Ρ such that (Уі, V*) G P c o n 
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ν; Χ ν; 
Figure 4.6: Contraction of digraph 3. 
and hence there must be a y\ £ Y\ such that y\PTx. Proceeding in this 
way we must find a maximal vertex set Y
n
 of a strong component of Ρ since 
P c < m is acyclic by lemma 42. and by lemma 4.1 every acyclic digraph has 
a maximal element. But then y
n
PTx for some y
n
 e Yn- Then y
n
 g W. 
Hence there is an и £ W such that uPTyn. Since ynPTx we must have 
uPTx by transitivity of PT. But this violates the condition of generalized 
internal stability, since x, и e W. Hence V* is maximal in Pcon. 
Let x, y G W with x^ybe members of respectively the maximal vertex 
sets VC and Vf of Pcon. We have to prove that V? i V¡. Therefore let 
VC = Vf. Since x^y, χ and y are members of the top cycle that contains 
every element of V*. But then W cannot be generalized internally stable. 
Contradiction. Hence V? jV*. •. 
If a preference Ρ is strongly connected, its contraction consists of 
one point exactly. Hence, according to theorem 4.15, a GESTS exists of 
precisely one social state in this case. In this respect, the theory of GESTS 
differs from the theory of GOCS. According to corollary 4.2, the latter 
theory loses its discriminatory power in the case of strongly connected 
preferences. 
To illustrate theorem 4.15, consider the contraction of the social prefer­
ence in figure 4.5. See figure 4.6. The vertex sets of the strong components 
are V* = {χι,χι,Χί}, Vf = {х4,Х5,Хб} and Ц* = {xy}. The arc set of 
the contraction is Pcon = {(Ц·,^·),^·,^*)}. The maximal vertex sets 
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are Vi* and Ц*. According to theorem 4.15, a GESTS consists of one and 
only one element from Vf and one and only one element from Vf. Hence 
{χι,χη} is a GESTS since ц G Vf and χη G Vf. 
The following implications of theorem 4.15 are stated without proof. 
Corollary 4.3 Let (A, P) be a preference structure. 
1. Each alternative in a GESTS of A is contained in a top cycle; 
2. The number of elements in a GESTS of A equals the number of strong 
components of (Л, P) that are maximal in pcon; 
3. The possible GESTSs of (A, P) all have the same cardinal number. 
The next theorem deals with the existence of generalized stable sets. 
Theorem 4.16 (Existence Theorem) Let (A, P) be a preference structure. 
Then there exists a GESTS of A. 
Proof. Let (Ξ,Ρ00") be the contraction of(A,P). By lemma 42, Pcon is 
acyclic and hence by lemma 4.1 μ(Ξ, Ρ00") J 0. Hence, by theorem 4.15, 
there is a generalized stable set. ü. 
This theorem also proves theorem 3.2 (see chapter 3). It also shows 
that the theory of generalized stable sets can handle, just like the theory 
of GOCS, every kind of cycle. In this respect, it improves the theory of 
stable sets. 
Let Г(Л, Ρ) denote the set of generalized stable sets of (A, P). The 
following result connects the theory of generalized stable sets to the theory 
of maximal social choices and, furthermore, to the theory of generalized 
optimal choice sets. 
Theorem 4.17 Let (Д, P) be a preference structure. 
μ(Α,Ρ) = [)Γ(Α,Ρ), 
<т(А,Р) = иПА,Р). 
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Proof. 1). Let χ e μ(Α, Ρ) and suppose there is a GESTS V such that 
χ g V. Since V satisfies generalized external stability, there must be a 
y 6 V such that yPTx. But then there must be a ζ e A such that zPx. 
Hence χ is not maximal. Contradiction. Hence μ(Α, Ρ) С П г ( ^ Ρ)· 
Conversely, let χ e f)r(A,R). Suppose {χ} is not maximal in Pcon. 
Then there is a Y such that YPcon{x} and hence there exists a y e Y 
such that yPTx. For each S e Г, y £ S. Otherwise there is an S with 
y e S which violates generalized internal stability. Then for each S € Γ 
there is a ζ 6 S such that z
s
PTy by generalized external stability. By 
transitivity of PT, zsPTx, which violates generalized internal stability. 
Hence {x} is maximal in Pcon. By theorem 4.1, χ e μ(Α,Ρ). Hence 
Γ\Γ(Α,Ρ)£μ(Α
ί
Ιί). 
2). By theorem 4.15 Ur(A, Ρ) = 1)μ(Ξ, Pcon) where (Ξ, Pcon) is the con­
traction of {A, P). By theorem 4.7 \}μ{Έ., Pcon) = σ(Α, Ρ). О. 
This theorem proves theorem 3.3 (see chapter 3). Another consequence 
of it is: 
Corollary 4.4 Let (Л, P) be a preference structure. Then for every GESTS 
VofA:, 
V С σ(Λ, Ρ). 
In n-person game theory the core of a game is contained in each stable set 
of that game. This corollary shows a reversed world. It is not the case that 
a generalized stable solution contains the generalized optimal choice set 
but just the opposite. Thus, the theory of generalized stable sets may yield 
more restrictive solutions than the theory of generalized optimal choice 
sets. 
An alternative in a GESTS may be dominated by an alternative outside 
this GESTS. However, a social choice that is in a GESTS is characterized 
by internal stability. Within a GESTS there are no χ and у that dominate 
each other. In this respect, a social choice process producing a GESTS as 
a solution differs from a social choice process producing a GOCHS. 
The theory of GESTS is a generalization of the theory of stable sets. 
It is able to produce a nonempty social choice set for every possible pref­
erence structure, irrespective of its cycle structure. According to theorem 
4.17, it is an extension of the classical notion of collective rationality as 
maximality. 
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4.7 Comparison 
In this section we summarize the most important differences and common­
alities of the presented solution theories. We first compare the properties 
of maximal choice sets, undominated sets and stable sets. After this we 
compare the generalized theories. 
The differences and commonalities of maximal sets, minimal undom­
inated sets and stable sets can be summarized as follows: 
1. Sets of maximal choices and stable sets satisfy internal stability with 
respect to P. This means that no χ in a stable set is strictly preferred 
to a y in that stable set. The same is true for sets of maximal choices. 
A minimal undominated set does not satisfy internal stability. 
2. Minimal undominated sets and sets of maximal choices do not satisfy 
external stability with respect to P. There may be an ι outside a 
set of maximal choices or outside a minimal undominated set for 
which there is no y in the maximal or minimal undominated set 
such that yPx. However, there is no y outside a maximal or minimal 
undominated set that is strictly preferred to an χ inside a maximal 
or minimal undominated set, respectively. In contrast, stable sets 
satisfy external stability. For every χ outside a stable set there is 
a y inside that stable set such that yPx. However, there may be χ 
outside a stable set that are strictly preferred to a y inside a stable 
set. 
3. Sets of maximal elements do not exist in the case of complete cycles. 
The theory of stable sets cannot handle odd cycles. In contrast, 
minimal undominated sets always exist, even in the case of odd 
cycles. 
4. All three theories are extensions of the classical theory of collective 
rationality. That is, if a maximal social choice exists, then each set 
under scrutiny will contain it. 
We summarize the main differences and commonalities of the theories 
of GESTS and GOCS: 
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1. A GESTS satisfies generalized internal stability. This means that 
for no elements x,y in a GESTS there is a path starting from χ and 
terminating at y. This also implies that inside a GESTS no element 
is strictly preferred to another element in that solution. In contrast, 
the theory of GOCS does not satisfy generalized internal stability. 
This theory allows that an χ in the GOCS is dominated by a y in 
the GOCS. This also implies that in the GOCS there might be χ and 
y such that xPy. 
2. GOCS satisfies strong external stability, i.e., no χ outside the GOCS 
dominates an y inside the GOCS. This also implies that there is no 
χ outside the GOCS that is strictly socially preferred to a y inside 
the GOCS. In contrast, a GESTS does not satisfy strong external 
stability. That is, it is allowed that an outside alternative dominates 
an inside alternative. As a consequence, it is possible that there is 
an χ outside a GESTS that is strictly socially preferred to an element 
y inside a GESTS. 
3. The GOCS for an agenda is unique. In contrast, there might be a 
multiplicity of GESTS s for an agenda. 
Both theories have at least two common characteristics. 
1. They both can handle all types of cycle structures. This is their main 
victory over i) the theory of best choice that is completely blind in 
the case of cyclic social preferences whatsoever, ii) the theory of 
maximal social choice that is blind in the case of complete cycles 
and iii) the theory of stable sets that may be blind in the case of odd 
cycles. 
2. Both encompass the classical notion of collective rationality as max-
imality. See theorems 4.4 and 4.17. 
The price of extending the classical notion of collective rationality 
appears from the first two items of this comparison between the theory of 
generalized stable sets and the theory of generalized optimal choice sets. 
Both theories encompass an aspect of instability in the sense of allowing an 
outcome to be dominated and hence to be strictly socially preferred. The 
theory of generalized optimal choice sets puts, so to say, this instability 
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inside the solution itself. The alternative that may dominate a possible 
outcome is also in the solution. In contrast, the theory of generalized 
stable sets leaves the instability outside the solution. Outside a solution 
there may be a social state that is a dominant one. The choice of one of 
these theories is in fact the choice of one of these forms of instability. 
In chapter 3, we presented the theory of stable majority solutions. 
This majority theory is based on the theory of generalized stable sets as 
presented in this section. In chapter 7 the theory of generalized stable 
sets will be used to produce predictions about coalition formation in social 
choice situations. In general we prefer the theory of generalized stable sets 
to the theory of generalized optimal choice sets because of its property of 
generalized internal stability. In fact, the violation of this condition by the 
theory of generalized optimal choice sets was an important reason for us 
to construct the theory of generalized stable sets. 
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Chapter 5 
Coalition Formation in 
Simple Games 
5.1 Introduction 
So far we studied the procedural aspects of social choice processes. We 
discussed aggregation porcedures - social choice rules - in general and 
some packages of properties these aggregation procedures may satisfy (or 
not). We also studied some particular aggregation procedures, especially 
the system of majority decision. In this chapter we look at social choice 
processes in another way. As indicated in the introduction, the essence 
of politics is winning. Winning or losing - to enforce a social choice that 
is in accordance with one's preference in some degree or to be forced to 
accept a social choice that not to some extent at all accords with one's 
preference - will now be at the center of our attention. 
Games in which winning and losing are basic notions are called simple 
games. Shapley (1967: 248), who has made a great contribution toward 
the development of the theory of simple games, describes a simple game 
as "an idealized power structure, a voting system, a legislature, or indeed 
any constituted procedure for arriving at group decisions." In his paper of 
(1981), Shapley even uses the terms 'political system' and 'simple game' 
interchangeably. 
It is possible to associate a simple game with a social choice rule 
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Conversely, a simple game may be represented by a social choice rule . 
Leaving this aside, however, in this chapter we are primarily interested in 
the formation of winning coalitions, that is, in coalitions that can enforce a 
social choice, and not so much in procedural aspects. So, we now abstract 
away from the nature of the rales for making social choices. The only 
assumption is that they exist and form an environment for winning and 
losing. 
This abstract approch enables us to formulate coalition theories that are 
independent of the properties of aggregation. The coalition theories thus 
formulated apply to any simple game and not only to, e.g., the majority 
game. In chapter 8, when dealing with coalition formation in social choice 
games, we will explicitly use the notion of social choice rule again. Of 
course, the other concepts of social choice theory as presented in chapter 
2 and 4 will be used again. 
The aim of this chapter is to solve the first problem as stated in the in-
troduction. We first study simple game theory and formulate some already 
existing political coalition theories as minimum size principle and conflict 
of interest theory (Axelrod 1970, De Swaan 1973) in terms of simple game 
theory. Further, we present Peleg's theory of dominated simple games and 
its associated coalition theory (Peleg 1981, Van Deernen 1989) as well as 
our theory of centralized policy games with the related theory of balanced 
coalitions (Van Deernen 1990, 1990a). 
In section 2 of this chapter we present the basic concepts of simple 
game theory as provided in Shapley (1962, 1967, 1981) and Van Deernen 
(1989, 1990, 1991). In this section we also present and discuss Riker's 
minimum size theory (Riker 1962, Riker and Ordeshook 1973). In sec-
tion 3 several types of simple games are studied, namely, veto-games, 
oligarchic games and dictatorial games. After this, we formulate some 
theorems that express Arrow's impossibility theorem and some of its vari-
ations in terms of simple game theory. In section 4, we pursue our study of 
extensions of simple game theory. In the then subsequent sections 5-7 the 
most important classical coalition theories and some new coalition theories 
will be presented. The first is the theory of dominated simple games. This 
theory is presented in Peleg (1981) and is further studied in Van Deernen 
'Cf. Peleg (1984) for association and representation techniques of simple games and 
social choice rules. Peleg uses, by the way, the functional approach (see chapter 2). 
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(1989). After this we present our theory of centralized policy games. A 
first and tentative formulation of this theory can be found in Van Deernen 
(1987). A more elaborated version is in Van Deernen (1991). After this 
we present Axelrod's conflict of interest theory. We will formulate a con­
nection with the theory of centralized policy games. After this, in section 
8, the theory of balanced coalitions is presented. This theory deals with 
coalition formation in centralized policy games. 
5.2 Basic concepts 
The theory of simple games has its origin in the celebrated work on game 
theory by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947: Ch. X). They develop 
the theory within the general framework of n-person cooperative games. 
Within this framework, games are described in terms of a characteristic 
function (consider Luce and Raifa 1957, Riker and Ordeshook 1973, Shu-
bik 1982, Ordeshook 1986) and are therefore called games in characteristic 
function form2. 
The theory is further developed and refined by Shapley (1962, 1967). 
However, in contrast with Von Neumann and Morgenstern, Shapley uses 
set-theoretical concepts without referring to the notion of characteristic 
function. Besides its relative simplicity and elegance, this has the ad­
vantage that it can be presented rather independently from the general 
cooperative framework (Shapley 1962: 59). For these reasons, we choose 
for the Shapley approach. 
Like in chapter 2, we let N denote a nonempty and finite set of in­
dividuals. In this and following chapters, we will call members of N 
players or, sometimes, actors. As stated in chapter 2, any subset of N is 
2A characteric function ν is a function ν : V(N) —* Re where Re is the set of reals. 
This function satisfies two axioms: 
1. v({i}) = 0 for every i e Ν. 
2. v(SöT)> v(S) + v(T)if 5ПГ = 0. 
The last axiom is the superadditivity condition. It expresses an incentive to cooperate. 
A cooperative game in charatcristic function form is defined to be an ordered pair (N, v) 
where N is the set of players and where ν is a characteristic function. If ν : V(N) —* 
{0,1}, then the game (N, v) is called simple. A coalition 5 with v(S) = 1, then, is called 
winning and a coalition Τ with v(T) = 0 is called losing. 
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called a coalition. Coalitions will be denoted by S, T. If i 6 S, then the 
subcoalition S — {г} will be called the internal opposition for i in S. The 
complement of a coalition S, that is, the set of all players not in S, will 
be denoted with Sc. This set will be called the external opposition for S. 
Game theory starts from the assumption of rational players. This means 
that a player always will choose the best option available. For the notion 
of 'rationality' and 'best option', consider again chapter 2. 
Let ViN) denote the power set of N, that is, the set of all coalitions 
of TV. 
Definition 5.1 G is a simple game := G = (Ν, W) where W Ç V(N) such 
that 
1. Monotonicity: if S с Τ and S € W, then Τ G W, 
2. Non-triviality: W ψ 0 and 0 £ W. 
In a simple game G = (ΛΓ, W)t a coalition 5 G W is said to be winning. A 
coalition that is not winning is called losing. The fìrst axiom expresses the 
fact that a winning coalition cannot change into a losing one by gathering 
up more members. This axiom is intuitively acceptable3. The second 
axiom precludes trivial games. 
Let L denote the set of losing coalitions, that is, let 
L = V(N) - W. 
Definition 5.2 A simple game G = (І , W) is 
1. proper := S € W implies Sc e L, 
2. strong := S G L implies Sc G W, 
3. decisive := G is proper and strong. 
In words, a simple game is proper if the complement of any winning 
coalition is losing. A characterizing feature of proper simple games is that 
any pair of winning coalitions have some members in common: 
3This axiom corresponds with the property of superadditivity of characteristic func-
tions as is used in the original framework of \fcm Neumann and Morgenstern. 
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Theorem 5.1 A simple game G = (iV, W) is proper if and only ifSDT^Cl 
for all S,TeW. 
Proof. 
1) Suppose G is proper and S, Τ € W but S П Τ = 0. Then Τ С Se and 
hence - since Τ e W - also Sc G W by monotonicity. Since G is proper, 
(Sc)c = S is losing, which contradicts the hypothesis that S e W.. 
2) Suppose SnTjIbfor every S, Τ G W but G is not proper. Then there 
is an S G W such that Sc <£ L and hence Sc 6 W. But then S Π Sc = 0. 
Contradiction. •. 
A game is strong if the complement of any losing coalition is winning. 
A losing coalition whose complement is also losing is called a blocking 
coalition. Such a coalition is not effective in forcing a decision (since it 
is losing). However, it can prevent the formation of a winning coalition 
and with that it can obstruct the decision-making process. A strong simple 
game is a game in which no blocking coalitions can occur. Therefore no 
obstruction with respect to the decision-making process can take place in 
such a game. 
Decisive games are the counterpart of the socalled constant-sum games 
in the general cooperative framework. In fact, Von Neumann and Morgen­
stern (1947 chapter X) define and study only this class of simple games. 
Riker's minimum size principle is also formulated for this kind of games4 
(cf. De Swaan 1973). This aspect of Riker's theory is criticized in Grof-
man (1984). Also see De Swaan (1973). 
A minimal winning coalition is a winning coalition of which every 
proper subcoalition is losing. 
Definition 5.3 Let G = (І , W)bea simple game and let S be a coalition. 
S is minimal winning := S G W and (Τ с S =^ Τ G L). 
That is, take out one or more players from a minimal winning coalition and 
the remaining coalition will lose. The set of minimal winning coalitions 
"Remarkable enough Riker did not recognize that he was deriving his size principle 
in the context of simple game theory (cf. Riker 1962: Appendix I; Riker and Ordeshook 
1973: chapter 7). With respect to these games he remarks that they are "probably rare in 
nature" and that "little of practical value is likely to result from studying them" (Riker 
1962: 260). 
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is denoted by Wmin. As a consequence of definition 5.3: 
цгты = [S€W\ there is no Τ £ Wsuch that Τ С S}. 
In words, minimal winning coalitions are the minimal elements of W with 
respect to proper set inclusion. Because of monotonicity, knowledge of 
Wmtn is sufficient to specify the whole game. 
A weighted majority game is a simple game in which to each player 
a weight is assigned representing the voting strenght or decision-making 
power of this player. A coalition wins in a weighted majority game if 
the sum of the weights of the members in this coalition exceeds a certain 
prescribed number called the threshold or quota of the game. Formally: 
Definition 5.4 Let G = (Ν, Mí) be a simple game where 7V = { l , 2 , . . . , n } . 
G is a weighted majority game := there exist a quota q > 0 and weights 
Wi > 0, » G Ν, such that 
S G W о £ > д. 
«es 
The sum w(S) := Σ.65 wi | 5 called the size of coalition S. A weighted 
majority game G = (І , W) with quota q and weights u>t, i G Ν, will be 
denoted by the η + 1-tuple 
[q;wi,tV2,...,w
n
]. 
The first political coalition formation theory is formulated by Riker 
(1962) and deals, in fact5, with coalitions in weighted majority games 
with a prescribed size. 
Definition 5.5 Let [q; wi, us,..., ад
п
] be the representation of a weighted 
majority game. A coalition S С N is of minimum size := 
1. SeW, 
2. w(S) < w(T)for all TeW. 
5Cf. De Swaan (1973). 
124 
In words, a coalition is of minimum size if it is winning and if its size does 
not exceed the size of any other winning coalition. Riker's principle of 
minimum size states that in decisive games only minimum size coalitions 
will be formed (Riker 1962, Riker and Ordeshook 1973). In Van Deernen 
(1989: 325), the basic ideas of Riker's principle are formulated as follows: 
1. In decision-making situations the payoffs or gains of forming a coali­
tion are divided proportionally to the weights of the members of that 
coalition. 
2. Players are rational, that is, they strive for the highest gain possible. 
With the aid of these ideas the formation of minimum size coalitions is 
easy to explain. If the bribe will be divided proportionally among the 
members of a coalition, then each member's share will be maximal if that 
coalition is of minimum size. In chapter 6, we will more subtily explain 
Riker's principle by power excess theory. 
The set of minimum size coalitions will be denoted by W"". 
Theorem 5.2 
W3ize с Wmin. 
Proof, if S G W3ize, then there is no Τ G W such that Τ С S. Otherwise, 
S cannot be of minimum size. Hence, S G Ж"1"1. • 
Any decision-making situation or process in which power is unequally 
distributed and winning essential can be modelled as a weighted majority 
game. Examples are parliamentaiy voting situations, cabinet formation in 
a multi-party system, the formation of a policy program in political par­
ties, stock holder meetings, authority and obedience relations in the family. 
For an excellent study of power in weighted majority games including a 
number of interesting applications, consider Lucas (1983). 
A symmetric game is a simple game in which winning or losing only 
depends on the number of players in a coalition. Such a game can be 
represented as a weighted majority game [q\ 1,1,..., 1]. Note that for this 
kind of simple games, we must have Wslze = Wmm. 
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5.3 Weak, Oligarchic and Dictatorial Games 
In this section we introduce and study some particular classes of simple 
games. 
Definition 5.6 Let G = (Ν, W) be a simple game. A player i € N is a 
dummy in G := 
That is, i is a dummy if i does not belong to any minimal winning coalition. 
A dummy is a powerless player. Such a player can neither turn a losing 
coalition into a winning one, nor tum a winning coalition into a losing 
one. He is superfluous either for winning or losing. Dummies are readily 
found among the small parties in a multi-party system. 
Definition 5.7 Let G = (Ν, W) be a simple game. A player i e N is a 
veto player := 
In other words, i is a veto player if i belongs to every minimal win­
ning coalition. A veto player is a rather powerful player. Because of 
monotonicity (definition 5.1), a veto player must be a member of every 
winning coalition. A coalition cannot win without a veto player. Hence, 
such a player can obstruct the decision-making process by staying outside 
any possible winning combination. Clearly, a veto player on its own is a 
blocking solo-coalition and any losing coalition that contains a veto player 
is also blocking. Hence, the complement of a losing coalition with the 
veto player also must be losing. So, a simple game with a veto player can 
never be strong. 
Definition 5.8 A simple game G = (Ν, W) is called weak := there exists 
ani e N such that г is a veto-player. 
The following result is evident It explicates the structure of the set of 
winning coalitions in a weak game. 
Theorem 5.3 G = (Ν, W) is a weak simple game if and only if 
1. 0 £W and W i%, 
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2. if S € W and S С Τ, then TeW, 
3. n ^ ^ 0 . 
A collection of sets with the properties as mentioned in this theorem is 
sometimes called a prefilter (cf. Brown 1976). 
Definition 5.9 Let G = (N,W)be a simple game. The coalition f\ Wmin 
is an oligarchy in G := 
f) Wmin G w. 
In other words, a coalition is an oligarchy if it is the intersection of the set 
of minimal winning coalitions and if this intersection itself is also winning. 
Clearly, an oligarchy is a minimal winning coalition. More important, each 
member of an oligarchy is a veto player by definition. A simple game with 
an oligarchy will be called an oligarchic game. The following theorem 
deals with the structure of oligarchic games. 
Theorem 5.4 G = (Ν, W) is an oligarchic game if and only 
1. ID^WandW^Ç), 
2. if S CT and S € W, then TeW, 
3. ifS,T£ W, then S Π Τ e W. 
A collection of sets with the properties as mentioned in this theorem is 
also called a filter (cf. Brown 1976, Hansson 1975, Kelly 1978). For a 
mathematical study of filters see van Dalen et.al. (1975: 263-266). 
Proof of Theorem 5.4. We only prove 3). Let G be an oligarchic game. 
Then Π W С (S Π Τ) for every 5, Τ e W. Since fi W G W and since G is 
monotonie, S Π Τ G W for every 5, Τ G W. 
Conversely, let S ПТ G W for every S,Τ G W. Since П\ is a finite 
intersection of elements ofW, fW G W. By 1), fW ^ 0. •. 
The study of oligarchies is very old. In fact, Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) 
in his The Politics already spent a lot of energy to this phenomenon. 
Theorem 5.4 shows the power structure behind oligarchies. 
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Definition 5.10 Let G = (TV, W) be a simple game. A player i e N is a 
dictator := 
{{i}} = Wmin. 
That is, i is a dictator if {i} is the only minimal winning coalition. Of 
course, there can be only one dictator. Note the difference between a veto 
player and a dictator. A veto player cannot win on his own. In contrast, 
a dictator need no other players to form a winning coalition. Every other 
player is a dummy. There is no incentive to form coalitions. A simple 
game with a dictator is called a dictatorial game. 
Theorem 5.5 G = (iV, W) is a dictatorial game if and only 
1. fbgWandWjQ, 
2. ifScTandSeW.thenTe W, 
3. ifS,Te W, thenSPiTeW 
4. SeWorSce Wfor every S С N. 
A collection of sets that satisfies properties l)-4) as mentioned in this the­
orem is called an ultrafilter (cf. Brown 1976, Hansson 1975, Kelly 1978). 
This theorem shows the power structure of a dictatorial game. 
Proof of Theorem 5.5. 
a). Let G be dictatorial and let г be the dictator. We only prove 3) and 4). 
Proof of 3). Since i is a dictator, {i} Ç S for every S G W. Hence, for 
every S,T e W : S ПТ D {i}. Thus S ПТ e W for every S, Τ e W. 
Proof of 4). Let S be a coalition. Then either S e W or S e L. Let 
S G W. Then, since i is a dictator, i G S and hence i £ Sc. Therefore 
Sc G L. Now, let S G L. Then, since i is a dictator, i 0 5" and, hence, 
i G Sc. But then Sc G W. 
b). Let W satisfy the properties l)-4). We prove: there is an i e N such 
that f\W= {i} and {i} G W. Repeated application of3) gives f] W G W. 
Because of 1), Π W i 0. Let » G Π W" and let j e N such that j i i. 
If j G ПИЛ then {i,j} Ç fìW" and hence, since it is impossible that 
{»»¿} £ {«'} when i ih (О £ W · Then> because of 4), N - {¿} G W. But 
then i g Г\\ . Contradiction. Hence j g f\W and therefore f]W = {i}. 
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Clearly, Wmin = {{i}}. • 
5.4 Simple Games and Social Choice 
We may formulate Arrow's theorem and some related results in terms of 
simple game theory. We present some results to that effect. The first 
theorem is an adjusted version of Arrow's theorem. First we need another 
definition. 
Definition 5.11 Let F G Φ. A coalition S Ç N is winning under F :=for 
all x, y e X and for every p e n , 
г G SlxPfy] =• (xF(p)y Λ ^yF(p)x). 
The set of winning coalitions under F will be denoted by Wp. 
Theorem 5.6 Let F e <&SWF ond suppose F satisfies Unrestricted Do­
main, Pareto condition and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Then 
the ordered pair (JV, W?) is a dictatorial game. 
A proof of this theorem can be found in Hansson (1975) and in Kelly 
(1978, chapter 8). 
The following result is the socalled oligarchy theorem. The first version 
of this result is given by Gibbard. 
Theorem 5.7 Let F e Фсз and suppose F satisfies Unrestricted Domain, 
Pareto condition and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Then the 
ordered pair (N, WF) is an oligarchic game. 
A proof of this theorem can be found in Suzumura (1983) and in Schwartz 
(1986). 
The last result that expresses an interplay between concentration of 
decision-making power and collective rationality is the socalled veto-
theorem. The origin of this theorem is Mas-Collel and Sonnenschein 
(1972). The theorem is extensively discussed in Blair and Pollale (1982), 
Schwartz (1986) and Suzumura (1983). In this context it can be formulated 
as follows: 
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Theorem 5.8 Let \ X |> 4. Let F e QSDF and suppose F satisfies 
Unrestricted Domain, the Pareto condition and Positive Reponsiveness. 
Then the ordered pair (N, Wp) is a weak game. 
For a proof, consider Blair and Pollack (1982), Schwartz (1986) or Suzu-
mura (1983). 
These results show that there is a relationship between social choice 
theory and simple game theory. In fact, a social choice rule determines the 
constraints for a coalition to win or loose. It determines when and how, 
under which conditions, a coalition may gain decisive power to enforce a 
social choice. Different social choice rules mean different constraints and 
therefore different winning and losing opportunities. Therefore, different 
social choice rules will, in general, lead to different sets of winning coali-
tions and hence to different simple games. As stated in the introduction to 
this chapter, we will not further explore the relationship between simple 
games and social choice rules in this monograph. Our aim is to formulate 
theories of coalition formation which are independent of the particular con-
straints of winning and loosing. So, we abstract away from the constraints 
(or rules) that determine winning and loosing. As already has been noted 
in the introduction to this chapter, this enables us to formulate general 
theories that work under any set of constraints of winning and loosing. 
5.5 Theory of Dominated Simple Games 
This section is based on Van Deernen (1987, 1989). Simple game theory 
as presented provides a first step to describe and explain the formation 
of coalitions in political systems. It is a kind of foundation on which 
other theories can be built. These other theories can be constructed by 
introducing additional concepts and specific assumptions. In this section 
we study a theoretical extension formulated by Peleg (1981). 
A dominated simple game is a game in which a dominant player calls 
the tune. It is assumed that this player has the power to act in a decisive 
way on the coalition formation process which takes place in the game. 
Accordingly, only winning coalitions in which the dominant player bears 
the sceptre will be formed. 
The terms 'dominant' and 'dominated' as used in this section and in 
the following chapters are introduced by Peleg himself. Since these terms 
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are also used by other authors (Einy 1985) within this framework, we 
also use them. These terms, however, should not be confused with the 
dominance relation among payoff structures as defined and used in chapter 
4 of this work and as used in standard n-person cooperative game theory 
(Shubik 1984). 
The concept of a dominant player is derived from a binary relation 
between coalitions. Peleg calls this relation a desirability relation (Peleg 
1980, 1981). This relation expresses the relative strenght of a coalition 
vis-a-vis another coalition. 
Definition 5.12 Let G = (І , W) be a simple game and let S and Τ be 
coalitions. 
1. S is at least as desirable as T, notation S Уо Τ, := for every 
nonempty coalition В Ç (JV - (S U Г)): 
BuTew^BöSew. 
2. S is more desirable than T, notation S Уо Τ, := S ho Τ but not 
Τ ho S. 
3. S is equally desirable as T, notation S R¿D Τ, := S Уо T and 
TyDs. 
The relation yD is the asymmetric part of the desirability relation. If it is 
nonempty, then it implies that there is a coalition В Ç N — (S U Τ) such 
that S can win with B, while Τ cannot. The relation «¿д is the symmetric 
part of yD. S « D Τ means that for every coalition В С N -(SOT), S 
can win with В if and only if Τ can win with B. Note that if both S and 
Τ are winning, then S Ыр T. 
Definition 5.13 Let G = (iV, W) be a simple game and let S bea coalition. 
1. i e N weakly dominates S := 
(a) i E S, 
(b) {i} yDS- {i}. 
2. i E N dominates S := 
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(a) i e 5, 
(b) {i} УвЗ- {i}. 
The definition of the desirability relation leads to the following result of 
which the proof is evident. 
Theorem 5.9 Let G = (JV, W) be a simple game. A player i e S dominates 
a coalition S if and only if 
1. for every nonempty coalition В С Sc: if BU (S - {i}) 6 W, then 
В U {i} € W, 
2. there is a nonempty В С Sc such that В U {i} G W and В U (S -
{i}) e L. 
The first condition says that if the internal opposition of S vis-a-vis i can 
make a winning deal with the external opposition, then so can i. Indeed, 
if t cannot win when joined with some external opposition, then neither 
can S — {i}. The second condition states that a player who dominates a 
coalition has strictly more opportunities to form a winning coalition with 
the external opposition than the internal opposition of the coalition he 
dominates. 
Definition 5.14 Let G = (Ν, W) be a simple game. Player i is called 
dominant in G := there is a coalition S G W such that г dominates S. A 
simple game with a dominant player is called a dominated simple game. 
The set of dominant players of a simple game G will be denoted by d(G). 
The following theorem is proved by Peleg. It states that if i is dominant, 
there is no other player j ^ i who weakly dominates г whenever the game 
under consideration is proper. 
Theorem 5.10 (Peleg 1981) Let G = (Ν, W) be a proper simple game 
and let i G N. If there are j G Ν, j j i, such that {j} bo {i}· then 
г І d{G). 
The next propositions are easily derived from this theorem. They give an 
indication how big d{G) might be. 
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Corollary 5.1 (Peleg 1981) Let G = [q;w\,...,w
n
] be a representation 
of a proper weighted majority game. Then there is at most one dominant 
player. 
If a dominant player exists in a weighted majority game, then it must be 
the player with the highest weight 
If G is a weak game, every winning coalition S contains every veto 
player. Hence the complement of every winning coalition must be losing. 
Thus every weak game is proper. Therefore, 
Corollary 5.2 (Peleg 1981) Let G = (N,W)bea weak game. Then there 
is at most one dominant player. 
Note that a weak game is not always a dominated game. To prove this we 
discuss the game representation of the United Nations Security Council 
(cf. Van Deernen 1989: 319). This council consists of five permanent 
members (France, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union and the United 
States) and ten small countries whose membership is temporary. Each 
permanent member has a veto. This council can be represented by the 
game: 
[39:7,7,7,7,7,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1]. 
The first five players are the permanent members. Each of them is a 
veto player. However, none of them is a dominant player. Note that the 
permanent members need at least four nonpermanent members to form a 
winning vote. However, if a dominant player exists in a weak game, then 
it must be the veto player. This veto player must be unique because of 
corollary 5.2. 
To sketch the control possibilities of a dominant player in a coalition 
he dominates we introduce the concept of subgame (see Peleg 1981). 
Definition 5.15 Let G = {N,W) be a simple game and let S С N. A 
subgame G | S associated with S is a simple game (S, Ws), where S is the 
players set and Ws is the set of winning coalitions. 
Intuitively, a subgame associated with a coalition is a game played within 
this coalition. The following theorem is proved in Van Deernen (1989). 
Theorem 5.11 Let G = (Ν, W) be a dominated and proper simple game 
and let i be the dominant player. Suppose i dominates S. Then G \ S = 
(S, Ws) is dictatorial with i as the dictator. 
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This theorem says that within a dominated coalition no decisive subcoali­
tion can be formed against the dominant player. This result together with 
theorem 5.9 show that a dominant player is really powerful. Firsdy, he 
has more opportunities to form new coalitions with the external opposi­
tion. Secondly, he fully controls the internal opposition of the coalition 
he dominates. No countervailing power is available for the rest of the 
coalition he dominates. 
Definition 5.16 Let G = (JV, W) be a simple game with exactly one domi­
nant player. Let i be the dominant player. 
1. DW(G) := {S G W | г weakly dominates S}, 
2. D{G) := {S e W | г dominates S). 
The set DW(G) is presented for the first time in Peleg (1981) in which also 
the following hypothesis is formulated: 
Hypothesis 5.1 (Peleg 1981) Let G be a simple game with exactly one 
dominant player. Then only coalitions from DW(G) will be formed. 
The set D(G) is presented in Van Deernen (1987, 1989). Since this set 
is more restrictive than Peleg's set, it is more interesting. The associated 
hypothesis is 
Hypothesis 5.2 (Van Deernen 1987,1989) Let G be a simple game with ex­
actly one dominant player. Then only coalitions from D(G) will be formed. 
5.5.1 Computation Example 
To illustrate the working of Peleg's theory we give a real life example. 
Consider the case of West Germany 1987. The game representation of the 
parliamentary system after the elections of 1987 is 
[249; 174,49,186,46,42]. 
In this game, the players are political parties. The weights represent the 
number of seats of these parties in parliament. The quota of 249 is the 
number of seats needed to form a majority cabinet. The parties are, re­
spectively, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Christian Social 
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Union (CSU), the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the Free Democratic 
Party (FDP) and the Greens (GR). 
We choose this example because it shows that political parties in a 
parliamentary system together can form one dominant alliance whenever 
no single party is dominant. In the form presented above this game has 
no dominant player. However, the parties CDU and CSU form in fact 
a Christian Democratic alliance. Together they can be conceived of as 
one actor that happens to be dominant. To see this consider the game 
representation 
[249; 223,186,46,42]. 
The first player of this game is the Christian Democratic alliance CDU+CSU. 
For the rest, this game is the same as the preceding one. Now consider 
coalition {CDU+CSU, SDP). Clearly, this coalition is winning. Further, 
{CDU + CSU} yD {SDP}, since CDU+CSU can win with FDP while 
SDP cannot. The set of all coalitions in which the Christian Democratic 
alliance is dominant is 
{{CDU + CSU, SDP}, {CDU + CSU, FDP}, {CDU + CSU, GR}}. 
According to hypothesis 5.2, one of these coalitions will be formed. Since 
both {CDU+CSU} and {SDP, FDP} can only win with {GR}, we have 
{CDU+CSU} &D {SDP, FDP}. Hence, CDU+CSU weakly dominates 
{CDU + CSU,SDP,FDP}. Likewise, CDU+CSU weakly dominates 
{CDU + CSU, SDP, GR} and {CDU + CSU, FDP, GR}. Collecting 
these coalitions together gives the set Dw : 
{{CDU + CSU, SDP}, {CDU + CSU, FDP}, {CDU + CSU, GR}, 
{CDU + CSU, SDP, FDP}, {CDU + CSU, SDP, GR}, 
{CDU + CSU,FDP,GR}}. 
According to Peleg's hypothesis 5.1, one of these coalitions will be formed. 
A serious shortcoming of Peleg's theory is that the set of coalitions as 
predicted (the prediction set) is either empty or rather large. It is empty in 
the case that a dominant player does not exist. The theory then has nothing 
to say. In the other cases, the theory is rather poor in content. It will not 
generate very discriminating predictions. A new aspect of Peleg's coalition 
theory is that it takes a particular actor (namely the dominant player) as 
a point of departure. With this, Peleg introduces a new element in the 
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game-theoretical study of coalition formation processes. His approach is 
actor-oriented. In the next section we will pursue this research line. 
5.6 Theory of Centralized Policy Games 
This section is based on Van Deernen (1991). In this section, we introduce 
three political concepts which are, in our view, important in describing 
political processes. These concepts are 'center' and the related concepts 
of 'right' and 'left'. These terms are abundantly used in political analysis. 
For a discussion of the relevance of the center of political systems, consider 
Daalder (1984). 
The terms 'center', 'left' and 'right' will be defined here with the aid 
of the notion of 'policy position'. This last notion is a primitive term, that 
is, a term that will be left undefined6. 
Definition 5.17 A policy game is a quadruple G% = (N, W, Pol, Θ) such 
that 
1. (N, W) is a simple game, 
2. Pol = {p,· | i € І }, 
3. Poljty,and 
4. θ is a binary relation on Pol satisfying antisymmetry, completeness 
and transitivity, θ is called the policy order for G
e
. 
6Any axiomatic-deductive theory consists of a set Prim of primitive от undefined 
terms; a set Def of definitions comprising only these primitive terms; a set Ass of as­
sumptions or axioms that use the primitive terms and definitions from Prim and Def, and 
a set Theo of propositions or theorems each of which is deducible Erom assumptions in 
Ass or from some previously deduced propositions by means of the rules of logic. In 
this work, the deduced propositions are called theorems. The terms 'player' and 'win­
ning' as introduced above are examples of primitive terms. The terms 'veto player' and 
'dominated simple game' aie examples of definitions. The assumption of monotonicity 
is an example of an axiom. The proposition 'in a symmetric game there is no dominant 
player' is an example of a deducible proposition or theorem. An introduction to the 
axiomatic method is Suppes (1957, Ch. 12). A difficult account of this method is given 
in Braithwaite (1953). 
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Many theorems in this and the following sections and chapter apply to 
weighted majority games. Hence, we introduce an additional definition. 
Definition 5.18 A policy game G% where G = (iV, W) is a weighted ma­
jority game is called a weighted majority policy game. 
A player i G N is said to be to the left of a player j e N if p&Pj. 
Conversely, i e N is to the right of j e N if pjOp,. Consider a coalition 
S Q N. Given the properties of Θ, it is possible to assign to each player 
г e S a set of players of S who are to the left of i and a set of players 
of S who are to the right of i. The first set is denoted with іе(г, S), the 
second set with Ri(i, S). Of course, when there are no players to the left 
or to the right of i then Le(i, S) or Дг(г', S) are empty. 
Definition 5.19 Let G% be a policy game and let S be a coalition. Then: 
Le(i, S):={j e S \j jiA ρ,θρ,·}, 
Ri(iiS):={jeS\j1¡iAptePj}. 
Note that for no coalition S and for no i e N it is the case that г 6 Le(i, S) 
or i G Ri(i, S). 
Definition 5.20 Let Ge be a policy game. A player i e N is a center 
player in GB '·= 
1. Le(i, N) 6 Land Led, N) U {г} G W and 
2. Лг'(г', Ν) e Land Riii, N) U {г} G W. 
In words, a player г is a center player if the coalition of all players who 
are to the left of i are losing without i but winning with г and if all the 
players to the right of i are losing without him but winning with him. A 
similar definition of a center player can be found in Einy (1985). The set 
Le(i,N) will be called the left of G%, the set Ri(i,N) the right of G%. 
Clearly, i is a center player in G% if no winning coalition from the left or 
from the right of G% can be formed. 
If a center player exists, then he is unique. 
Theorem 5.12 Let G» be a policy game. Then G% has at most one center 
player. 
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Proof. Suppose i andj, where i J j , are center players and suppose p&pj. 
Because j is a center player, Le(j,N) e L. (1) 
Because i is a center player, Le(i, N) U {i} G W. (2) 
But because ofp&pj, Le(i, N) U {i} С Le(j, N). (3) 
From (2) and (3), Le(j, N) G W. Contradiction with (1). 
Ifi^j and i,j are center players and pjBpi, then a contradiction follows 
in a similar way. Therefore, if i and j are center players, then i = j . •. 
The following result gives a sufficient condition for the existence of a 
center player: 
Theorem 5.13 Let G
e
 = (N, W, Pol, Θ) be a policy game. Then GB has a 
center player ifG = (JV, W) is decisive (i.e. is proper and strong). 
Proof. Let G be decisive. Let j be a player for which Le(j, N) = 0. If 
{j} І W, take a player к for which Le(k,N) = {j}. If {j,k} <¿ W, 
take a player I such that Le(l,N) = {j,k}. Proceed in this way until a 
winning coalition S = {j,k,l,...,i} has been obtained. Let i be the last 
added member. By construction, Le(i, N) G L and Le(i, N) U {i} G W. 
Since G is proper, Sc is losing. For each m G Sc, we have рі р
т
. Hence 
Sc = Ri(i,N). Since S - {i} ζ L and since G is strong, Sc U {i} G W 
and hence Ri(i, N) U {¿} G W.. • 
The following definitions arc important: 
Definition 5.21 1. A policy game G% with a center player is called a 
centralized policy game. 
2. In particular, a weighted majority policy game G9 with a center 
player is called a centralized weighted majority policy game. 
Since a decisive game need not be dominated, a center player is not 
necessarily a dominant player. Also, if a dominant player exists, it is not 
necessarily the center player. To see this consider the weighted majority 
policy game 
[4:3,2,1,1]. 
The players are labeled from left to right with a, b, с and d. This is also 
the order of their policy position. In this game, a can form a winning 
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coalition with с while b cannot. Therefore, a dominates, among others, 
the coalition {a, b) and hence α is the dominant player. However, b is 
the center player since neither {a} nor {c,<f} is winning, while {a, b} 
and {c, d, b} are winning. Further, note that a center player cannot be a 
dummy. 
The following result shows that the unique position of the center player 
in a weighted majority game is also due to his relative weight. It further 
shows how closely the notion of a center player is related to De S waan's 
notion of 'pivotal player' (De Swaan 1973: 89, 93-4). To distinguish the 
center player from the other players we will label this player in the sequel 
with с 
Theorem 5.14 Let G% be a centralized weighted majority policy game and 
с £ N be the center player. Then: 
| u;(Ie(c, TV)) - w(Ri(c, N)) \< wc. 
Proof. Let с be the center player and suppose w(Le(c, N))-w(Ri(c, N)) > 
0. Le(c,N) e LandRi(c,N)U{c} e W. Hence, w(Le{c,N)) < w(Ri(c,N))+ 
w
c
, i.e. w(Le(c, N)) - wiRiic, N)) < w
c
. In the same way, it is proven that 
w(Ri(c, N)) - w(Le(c, N)) < w
c
 in case that w(Le(c, N)) - w(Ri(c, N)) < 
0. •. 
This theorem says that the weight of a center player is strictly greater 
than the absolute value of the difference between the size of the left and 
the size of the right. Accordingly, a center player is able to hold the bal­
ance in the game. He is in the position to form winning coalitions with 
the right, with the left or with both sides. Further, according to the previ­
ous two propositions, the position of a center player is unique. No other 
player can bent to the left, to the right or to both sides. For these reasons, 
a center player has more power to control the coalition formation process 
than any other player in the game. This justifies the following hypothesis. 
Definition 5.22 Let G% be a centralized policy game and let с be the center 
player. Then 
C:={S£W\ceS}. 
Hypothesis 53 Let Ge be a centralized policy game. Then only coalitions 
from С will be formed. 
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Since the set С will be relatively large in most cases, this hypothesis 
contains little information. To increase the information content, the theory 
of centralized policy games must be refined further. In the next section 
we present Axelrod's theory. We shall see there that this theory yields 
prediction sets contained by C. After this, we present another simple 
refinement of the theory of centralized policy games, namely, the theory 
of balanced coalitions. In the subsequent chapters we will present other, 
more complex theories. 
5.7 Conflict of Interest Theory 
The source of this theory is Axelrod (1970). The theory is further studied 
in De Swaan (1971) who calls it Closed minimal range theory. We prefer 
the original name of Axelrod. To formulate this theory, we need some 
additional concepts. 
Definition 5.23 Let G» be a policy game. 
1. A player к is between players i and j := (р&Рк Л Pk&Pj) V (pjQpk Л 
PfcöPi)· 
2. Two players i and j are neighbours := there is no other player к 
between i and j . 
3. A coalition S Ç. N is closed := for all i e S there is a j e S such 
that i and j are neighbours. 
4. A coalition which is not closed is said to be open. 
The term closed is used in De Swaan. Axelrod uses the term connected. 
However, we already used this term in chapter 4. To avoid any confusion, 
we therefore use De Swaan's term. To illustrate the terms, consider the 
order ABODE, where A, B, C, D and E are players. С is between В 
and D. The coalition {B, C, D} is an example of a closed coalition. The 
coalition {B, D} is open. 
The basic assumption of Axelrod's theory is that each player strives 
to form a coalition in which the conflict of interest is minimal. However, 
according to Axelrod, this conflict of interest cannot be exactly measured 
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in the case of an ordinal policy scale. What only seems possible is to say 
that "the less dispersion there is in the policy positions of the members of 
a coalition, the less conflict of interest there is" (Axelrod: 169). But this 
only leads to a problem shift. Neither the dispersion of the policy posi­
tions on an ordinal scale can be exactly measured, according to Axelrod. 
Nevertheless, the policy position of the most left player of a coalition and 
the policy position of the most right player of that coalition provide some 
information about the dispersion in that coalition. Under some condition 
this simple form of dispersion in a coalition can be compared with the dis­
persion in other coalitions. Axelrod illustrates this condition with the aid 
of the policy order А В С D F G. According to Axelrod, "the dispersion 
of the coalition consisting of the parties А, В and С cannot be compared 
to the dispersion of the coalition consisting of В, С and D. However, the 
closed coalition consisting of А, В and С is "certain to be less dispersed 
than the coalition consisting of А, В and D" (ibid). Axelrod then says 
that for that reason, a closed coalition "tends to have relatively low dis-
perion and thus low conflict of interest" (ibid). However, this conclusion 
cannot be derived from the previous assumptions. As De Swaan (1973: 
77) correctly observes, it is unclear why for example the open coalition 
{B, D} should have a lower conflict of interest than the closed coalition 
{5, C,D}. 
Following the line of Axelrod, a winning coalition that is closed and 
minimal in the sense " that it can lose no members without ceasing to 
be [closed] and winning" (Axelrod 1970: 170), would have a minimal 
conflict of interest. Therefore, according to Axelrod, only such coalitions 
will be formecL Let us denote the set of closed and winning coalitions of 
a policy game by Wcl. 
Definition 5.24 Let G% be a policy game. A coalition S G W is minimal 
closed := S G Wcl and for every i G S, S — {i} is either losing or open. 
The set of minimal closed coalitions will be denoted by WMC 
The hypothesis of Axelrod then is: 
Hypothesis 5.4 (Axelrod) Let G9 be a policy game. Then only coalitions 
from WMC will be formed. 
How does this relate to the theory of centralized policy games? The next 
result shows that a minimal closed coalition always contains the center 
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player. 
Theorem 5.15 Let G% be a centralized policy game. If S G W and S is 
closed, then ce S. In particular, 
WMC С С 
Proof. Let с be the center player. Since both Le(c, N) and Ri(c, N) are 
losing, every closed and winning coalition must contain c. If с is in every 
closed and winning coalition, then с must also be in every minimal closed 
coalition. • 
So, Axelrod's theory reduces the set С of a policy game and thereby 
refines the theory of centralized policy game. As has been indicated in 
this section, Axelrod's hypothesis is not correctly derived. However, it 
performs statistically very well when applied to cabinet formation pro­
cesses in multi-party systems (cf. De Swaan 1973, Taylor and Laver 
1973). However, also consider Browne et.al. (1984) who obtain a quite 
different and in comparison a rather disturbing research result7. 
5.8 Theory of Balanced Coalitions 
This section is based on Van Deernen (1990). Fundamental in the theory 
of balanced coalitions is De Swaan's concept of pivotal player (De Swaan 
1973: 89, 93-4). 
Definition 5.25 Let Ge be a weighted majority policy game and let S be 
a coalition. A player i is pivotal in S := i G S and 
I w(Le(i, S)) - w(Ri(i, S)) | < to,·. 
Thus, a player г is pivotal in a coalition S if the absolute value of the 
difference between the size of the subcoalition of members of S to the left 
'Different empirical tests give different results. The difficult problem in testing coali­
tion formation theories as presented within the game-theoretical tradition is how to evalu­
ate the often very different research strategies and test procedures that are in use and that 
may be used. In other words, the problem is how to evaluate the several research designs 
and methods that may be suitable to test empirically mathematical coalition themes. 
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of i and the size of the subcoalition of members of S to the right of i is 
equal to or less than the weight of г. 
A pivotal player owes his power in a coalition to the fact that he is 
able to play off the left side of that coalition against the right side. If the 
left is in opposition to the right in a coalition and neither side can outvote 
the other, then the pivotal player can throw out this balance. He then has 
a decisive influence on the decision making process in that coalition. 
5.8.1 Balanced coalitions 
Definition 5.26 Let Ge be a centralized weighted majority policy game 
and let с be the center player. A coalition S is balanced in G% := 
1. S is winning and 
2. с is pivotal in S. 
S is nonbalanced := S is not balanced. The set of balanced coalitions of 
G% is denoted by Β
θ
 or, if the context is clear, by B. 
It is easy to verify that В is not empty. 
If each member of such a coalition supports the policy proposals that 
best accord with his own policy position, then the policy proposal of the 
center player can never be outvoted in a balanced coalition. His policy 
position will, therefore, be decisive in such a coalition. For these reasons, 
it is plausible to assume that a center player will strive to form a balanced 
coalition. 
Hypothesis 5.5 Let G% be a centralized weighted majority policy game 
Then only balanced coalitions will be formed. 
5.8.2 Maximally balanced coalitions 
Intuitively, some coalitions will be more balanced than others. We for­
malize this intuition by using the concept of balance excess. 
Definition 5.27 Let G% be a centralized weighted majority policy game, с 
be the center player and S € В. bal{S) is the balance excess of S := 
bal{S) =| w{Lc{c, S)) - w(Ri(c, S)) \ . 
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That is, if S is a coalition with center player c, then the balance excess of 
a coalition S is the absolute value of the difference between the size of 
the subcoalition of players in S who are to the left of с and the size of the 
subcoalition of players in S who are to the right of c8. The balance excess 
shows to what extent a coalition with the center player is in equilibrium. 
The greater the balance excess of a coalition, the easier it is to disturb the 
equilibrium of that coalition and, hence, the more instable this coalition 
will be. For this reason, it is plausible to assume that a center player will 
prefer a coalition with a lower balance excess to a coalition with a greater 
balance excess. 
It is possible to determine the balance excess for each balanced coali­
tion. Therefore, the set В can be ordered in a complete and transitive 
way. That is, for every balanced coalition S and Г, it is possible to say 
whether bal(S) < bai(T) or bal(T) < Ы(3). Further, it must be true 
that for all S,T,U G В, if όα/(5) < Μ(Τ) and bal(T) < bal(U), then 
bal(S) < bal(U). A coalition 5" is said to be maximally balanced if S is 
balanced and there is no Г e В such that bal(T) < bal(S). The set of 
maximally balanced coalitions for a policy game <7
e
 will be denoted by 
Bmax 
Definition 5.28 
Β
πηα
 : =
 {£
 e B | ^ з г e В [ Ы ( Г ) < bal(S)]}. 
Of course, В п , ш is a subset of B. Further, thanks to the properties of 
transitivity and completeness, the set B™1™ is not empty9. 
If a center player is rational, he will strive to form a maximally bal­
anced coalition. In such a coalition, he is in the best position to control 
the policy formation process. Thus, 
Hypothesis 5.6 Let Gs be a centralized weighted majority policy game. 
Then only maximally balanced coalitions will be formed. 
What about the preferences of the other players? Clearly, each player 
prefers a winning coalition in which he is pivotal to a winning coalition 
8This concept is also used in De Swaan's policy distance theory (see De Swaan 1973: 
Assumption S, p.96). There the name 'absolute excess' is used in stead of 'balance 
excess'. 
9Cf. chapter 2, section 4 for the definition of maximal elements of a set. Cf. chapter 
4 for a study of sets of maximal elements. 
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in which he is not. Therefore, the players who are not center will prefer 
coalitions in which the center player is not pivotal. However, the center 
player can, if the assumption of his control potential is plausible, block 
the formation of such coalitions. He is able to enforce the formation 
of maximally balanced coalitions. So the decision problem of the other 
players is reduced to the question whether they want to participate in a 
maximally balanced coalition or not. If they are rational, they will. Losing 
coalitions have nothing to offer. 
A maximally balanced coalition is a balanced coalition and a balanced 
coalition is a winning coalition in which the center player is pivotal. Thus, 
if Ge is a centralized weighted majority policy game, then Bmax is a subset 
of В and В is a subset of C. The converse, however, is not true. Hence, 
the theory of maximally balanced coalitions, which yields Bmax as the 
prediction set, is more restrictive than the theory of balanced coalitions 
which is, in its turn, more restrictive than the theory of centralized policy 
games. More restrictive theories are more interesting, since such theories 
contain more empirical content and are, therefore, easier to falsify. In this 
sense, the theory of maximally balanced coalitions is the most interesting 
presented so far. 
5.8.3 Closed (maximally) balanced coalitions 
This is a variation of the theory of maximally balanced coalitions. The 
introduction of the notion of closed coalitions is in some sense a logical 
step within the center player perspective. So far, we assumed that a center 
player owes his potential of taking the initiative to form coalitions to his 
position in a relevant policy ranking. From this position, he is able to 
bend to the left, to the right or to both sides. However, it can be argued 
that all this has limited validity if the other players have little propensity 
to form closed coalitions. That is, if the left side or right side players of 
a center player are indifferent with respect to the open or closed character 
of coalitions or if they prefer, for some reason or another, open coalitions 
to closed ones, then they can do pretty well without the center player. 
They are not, then, inhibited from making policy jumps in order to form 
winning coalitions. The consequence of this will therefore be a decline of 
the center player's power potential. 
As we have seen, another theory that uses the notion of closed coali-
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tions is Axelrod's conflict of interest theory. De S waan also formulates a 
closed version of his policy distance theory (De Swaan 1973: 117-119). 
In a later chapter on policy distance theory we also will discuss this closed 
version (see chapter 6). The notion of closed coalitions is especially rel­
evant in the study of cabinet formation processes in multi-party systems. 
In the database presented in the classical work of De Swaan, 85 of the 
108 cabinets are closed. Hence, the notion is not without relevance. 
Let Ge be a centralized weighted majority policy game. A coalition 
which is simultaneously closed and (maximally) balanced will be called 
a closed (maximally) balanced coalition. Let Cd denote the set of closed 
winning coalitions that contain the center player. It is easily verified that 
this set is not empty. Clearly, the propensity of the players from the left or 
the right to form closed coalitions only provides a power base for the center 
player. It does not imply that only closed coalitions will be formed. The 
center player might have other preferences. To present a real variation, we 
therefore have to assume that the propensity of forming closed coalitions 
is a general behavioral pattern that applies to each player, including the 
center player. 
The relevant hypothesis then are: 
Hypothesis 5.7 Let G9 be a centralized weighted majority policy game. 
Then only closed balanced coalitions will be formed. 
and 
Hypothesis 5.8 Let G9 be a centralized weighted majority policy game 
Then only closed maximally balanced coalitions will be formed. 
Let B
c
i and B™" denote, respectively, the set of closed balanced coalitions 
and the set of simultaneously closed and maximally balanced coalitions. 
Clearly, there are balanced coalitions that are not closed. Therefore, hy­
pothesis 5.7 is more restrictive than the corresponding hypothesis 5.5 in 
the open version. With respect to hypotheses 5.8 and 5.6 we note that 
these hypothesss may yield conflicting results. That is, a coalition from 
Β™
ω
 need not be a member of B m M or conversely. 
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5.8.4 Computation example: The Dutch election of 6 Septem-
ber 1989 
This section is taken over from Van Deernen (1990). Consider the game 
representation of the Dutch parliament according to the election of 6 
september 1989: 
[76; 6,49,12,54,22]. 
The parties arc, from left to right, GL (Green Left), PvdA (Social Democrats), 
D66 (Left Liberals), CDA (Christian Democrats) and W D (Conservative 
Liberals). The policy positions of these parties are accordingly ordered 
from left to right. Parties with less than 2.5 % of the total number of 
votes have been left out. These parties, which are all to the right of 
the conservative liberals, are dummies that will have no influence on the 
cabinet formation process. 
The CDA is the center party. To check this, take the sum of the weights 
of the parties which are to the left of CDA. This sum is less than 76. The 
sum of the parties to the right of the CDA is also less than 76. Hence 
any combination of parties to the left or to the right of the CDA needs the 
CDA to form a closed majority cabinet. Neither side can form a majority 
cabinet on its own. In contrast, the CDA can form a majority cabinet 
either with parties from the left or with parties from the right. Notice that 
| w(Lé) - w(Ri) |= 45 < WCDA = 54, 
where w(Le) and w(Ri) are, respectively, the sizes of left and right for 
the CDA. 
Let us determine the preference of the CDA between two cabinets by 
using the theory of maximally balanced coalitions. Consider the coalition 
{CDA, VVD, D66}. This coalition is winning since its size is 54 + 22 + 
12 = 88. It is also balanced since W D is to the right of CDA and D66 
is to the left of CDA and | WIM - IVVVD |< WCDA- The balance excess 
for the CDA in this cabinet is | WD66 — WVVD |= 10. Compare this with 
coalition {CDA, W D } . This also is a winning coalition and again the 
CDA is the pivotal player. The balance excess is 22. Therefore, according 
to the theory of maximally balanced coalitions, the CDA will prefer the 
cabinet {CDA, W D , D66} to the cabinet {CDA, W D } . Also compare 
the {CDA, D66, W D } combination with the {CDA, PvdA} combination. 
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Cabinets with center party 
{CDA, VVD} 
{CDA, VVD, D66} 
{CDA, VVD, D66, PvdA} 
{CDA, VVD, D66, PvdA, GL} 
{CDA, VVD, PvdA} 
{CDA, VVD, GL} 
{CDA, VVD, D66, GL} 
{CDA, D66, PvdA} 
{CDA, D66, PvdA, GL} 
{CDA, PvdA} 
{CDA, PvdA, GL} 
Pivotal player 
CDA 
CDA 
CDA 
CDA 
CDA 
CDA 
CDA 
D66 
D66 
CDA 
PvdA 
Balance excess 
22 
10 
39 
45 
27 
16 
4 
n.d. 
n.d. 
49 
n.d. 
Table 5.1: Majority cabinets with the center party CDA. N.d. means 'not 
defined'. 
In the last combination, the balance excess of the CDA is 49. Hence, for 
the CDA it is far more difficult to keep the balance in this cabinet than 
in a cabinet with D66 and W D . However, the CDA prefers a cabinet 
{CDA, PvdA} to a cabinet {CDA, D66, PvdA}. In this last cabinet, D66 
is the pivotal party and, hence, the CDA will prevent the formation of this 
combination. 
The full set of cabinets with the center party CDA is given in table 1. 
This table also indicates which of these cabinets is balanced and what 
the balance excess is of a balanced cabinet10. 
According to hypothesis 5.3й, one of the cabinets in the first column 
of this table will be formed. In fact, the combination {CDA, PvdA} has 
been formed. Hence, this hypothesis is correct for this case. 
From table 1, column 2 the set of balanced coalitions can be read off. 
This set is, in order of increasing balance of excess, { {CDA, VVD, D66, 
GL}, {CDA, VVD, D66}, {CDA, W D , GL}, {CDA, W D } , {CDA, 
VVD, PvdA}, {CDA, W D , D66, PvdA}, {CDA, W D , D66, PvdA, 
10Since we defined the notion of balance excess only for combinations for which a 
center player is pivotal (see section S.8.1), the combinations for which the CDA is not 
pivotal will not have a balance excess. 
11
 Cf. section 5.6. 
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Closed cabinets with center party 
{CDA, VVD} 
{CDA, VVD, D66} 
{CDA, VVD, D66, PvdA} 
{CDA, VVD, D66, PvdA, GL} 
{CDA, D66, PvdA} 
{CDA, D66, PvdA, GL} 
Pivotal player 
CDA 
CDA 
CDA 
CDA 
D66 
D66 
Balance excess 
22 
10 
39 
45 
n.d. 
n.d. 
Table 5.2: Closed majority cabinets with the center party CDA. N.d. means 
'not defined'. 
GL}, {CDA, PvdA} }. According to hypothesis 5.5, one of these cabinets 
will be formed. Since the cabinet {CDA, PvdA} is formed, hypothesis 
5.5 is correct for this case. 
Hypothesis 5.6 is more restrictive. Looking again at table 5.1, we 
see that {CDA, VVD, D66, GL} is the cabinet with the least balance 
excess and, hence, is maximally balanced. The set of maximally balanced 
cabinets consists only of this cabinet. So the theory of maximally balanced 
coalitions leads to the unique prediction of the cabinet {CDA, VVD, D66, 
GL}. Clearly, hypothesis 5.6 fails for this case. Unfortunately, it is more 
than just a failure. Notice that, according to column 2 of table 1, the 
formed cabinet {CDA, PvdA} has the greatest balance excess. Hence, it 
is the most difficult cabinet for the CDA to hold in balance. Therefore, 
according to the theory of maximally balanced coalitions, there is very 
little reason for the CDA to form this cabinet. 
The picture changes when the notion of closed cabinets is introduced. 
The set of closed cabinets with the CDA is given in table 2 together with 
information about their balance excess. 
According to hypothesis 5.7, only closed and balanced cabinets will 
be formed. Hence, the prediction is that one of the first four cabinets in 
the first column of table 2 will be formed. Since D66 is not a member, the 
formed cabinet of PvdA and CDA is open and, therefore, this hypothesis 
must fail for this case. 
The closed maximally balanced cabinet is {CDA, VVD, D66}. Ac-
cording to hypothesis 5.8, this cabinet must have been formed. Also this 
hypothesis fails. 
149 
150 
Chapter 6 
Coalition Preferences 
6.1 Introduction 
In the coalition theories as presented in the previous chapter, the play-
ers' preferences with respect to winning coalitions are not explicated. In 
contrast, in this chapter we discuss two theories in which the formation 
of players' preferences with respect to winning coalitions is explicated. 
So, each of these theories lead to a preference profile concerning a set 
of winning coalitions. Both theories then show how to use these players' 
coalitional preferences in order to obtain a social preference with respect 
to the set of winning coalitions and how to obtain a solution, that is, a 
selection of one or more coalitions. 
The first theory we discuss in this context is De Swaan's policy distance 
theory. The theory of De Swaan is, as far as we know, the first theory in 
which the formation of preferences has been made explicit. The second 
theory is new. In this theory the notion of power excess is basic. First, 
we re-examine policy distance theory. 
The aim of this chapter is to solve the first part of our problem 2 
(cf. chapter 1). The second part of this problem will be dealt with in the 
following chapter. 
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6.2 Policy Distance Theory 
The origin of policy distance theory can be found in De Swaan (1973). 
The essence of this theory is "that an actor strives to be included in a 
winning coalition that he expects to adopt a policy which is as close as 
possible to his own most preferred policy position" (De Swaan 1973: 88). 
The theory can be divided into two parts that coirespond with what 
we have called in chapter 2 the descriptive part and the solution part. The 
descriptive part of the theory consists of axioms that describe and explain 
the choice behavior of the players and the expected policy positions of 
the possible coalitions. These axioms lead to a policy scale on which the 
policy positions of the possible coalitions are placed and to a preference 
profile which contains the players' preferences concerning the possible 
coalitions. 
The second part of the theory is a solution part. This part predicts 
sets of coalitions on the basis of the preference profile constructed in 
the descriptive part. De Swaan uses a version of the game theoretical 
core-concept (cf. de Swaan 1973: 103-4) as a solution concept. For an 
explanation of the core-concept, consider Ordeshook 1986 or Shubik 1984. 
De Swaan does not prove that his theory always leads to a nonempty core. 
De Swaan (1973: Ch. 5) formulates several versions of his policy 
distance theory. The most important are the open version and the closed 
one. A coalition is said to be closed if it consists only of players who are 
adjacent on a policy scale. Otherwise it is called open1 .The open version 
of policy distance theory predicts both open and closed coalitions; the 
closed version only closed ones. In de Swaan's work, both versions are 
confronted with data about nine European parliamentary systems. With 
respect to the open version of the theory the results of this empirical 
confrontation are deceptive. It cannot stand the test. With respect to the 
closed version there is more hope. The results for this version are "not 
entirely sufficient to accept, but too good to reject the theory" (De Swaan 
1973: 153). 
In this section, we re-examine De Swaan's policy distance theory. This 
re-examination will lead to rather negative results. First, it is proven that 
the open version of policy distance theory is inconsistent The first who 
'Cf. chapter 5.7, definition 5.20. 
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has noticed the inconsistency of the open version is Boute (1981). We 
also discuss the question how an inconsistent theory can pass a statistical 
test. At first sight this question seems absurd. From an inconsistent the-
ory any proposition can be derived and thus such a theory is in principle 
untestable. However, a posteriori, this is a luxury point of view, since 
it only can be said when, indeed, the contradicions are discovered. The 
fact is that theories may be tested before its contradictions are discovered. 
The idea that an inconsistent theory always must confront us with its in-
consistencies is a naive point of view. Usually it takes time to discover 
theoretical inconsistencies even in the mathematic field. To give a clear 
example, mathematicians working with Cantorian set theory in the end of 
the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century did not know that 
this theory was inconsistent. They did not meet for example the Russell 
paradox until Russell discovered it. In practice, contradictions in a theory 
are not always easy to detect. Also, it is quite possible that the contradic-
tions only are of minor importance and therefore hardly have any influence 
on the test procedure. Anyway, to find this out, we compute in a detailled 
way the set of coalitions predicted by the theory (the prediction set) for 
a "dubious" case in De S waan's dataset. We then investigate the closed 
version of the theory. It appears that also this version is inconsistent. As 
we shall see, this inconsistency is due to the two in essence incompatible 
ideas on which this version is based. 
De Swaan's theory has been a major inspiration source of this work. 
The in essence negative results do not haggle anything of this. On the 
contrary. In all honesty, we think that neither inconsistency nor refutation 
by an empirical test are sufficient grounds to throw a theory away. We 
agree with the philosopher of science I. Lakatos who writes that " [a] 
theory can only be eliminated by a better theory, that is, by one which 
has excess empirical content over its predecessors . . . (Lakatos 1978: 150, 
italics in original). Hence, if we want to eliminate policy distance theory 
we first have to construct better alternatives. This work is both a reflection 
and a result of this research stratagem. In the next section we formulate 
a new theory that continues the theoretical research path as paved by De 
Swaan. This theoretical path will be pursued in the next chapter. 
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6.2.1 Policy Distance Theory: Open Version 
The theory of policy distance theory is formulated for weighted majority 
games with a relevant policy order (see chapter 5 for these concepts). 
However, in chapter 5 we defined a policy order as a linear order. Instead, 
De Swaan defines a policy order as a weak order, that is, as a binary 
relation over the set of policy positions of the players satisfying reflexivity, 
completeness and transitivity (Cf. De Swaan 1973: 68, 91). In order to 
stay as close as possible to De Swaan's formulation of the theory we will 
assume throughout this section but only in this section that θ is a weak 
order. This assumption will be formulated explicitly (see assumption 1 
below). 
In the rest of this section, all definitions, assumptions and discussion 
apply to a weighted majority game Ge = [q',wi,W2,...i'U)n\ with policy 
order θ. N = {1,2,..., n} is the set of players. As ususal, the set of win­
ning coalitions is denoted by W. That is, W := {S Ç jV | ^ 6 S ω, > q}. 
The key idea of the theory is the minimization of the distance be­
tween the policy position of a player and the expected policy position of 
a coalition. The expected policy position of a coalition is supposed to 
be determined by the weights and the policy positions of the players that 
are member of that coalition. In words of De Swaan: "it is assumed that 
all actors have some kind of expectation about the future policy of the 
coalition and that they base that expectation on the policies and weights of 
the actors that are members of that coalition" (De Swaan 1973: 91). The 
expected policy position of a coalition S will be denoted by ps. In fact, 
the theory is meant to extend Θ, the weak order of policy orders of the 
players (or, equivalently, of one-member coalitions), in such a way that 
the distances between the players and the coalitions can be used in order 
to construct coalitional preferences. 
The following assumption formulated by De Swaan says that the policy 
positions of the players can be weakly ordered. 
Assumption 1 G = (W, N, Pol, Θ) is a policy game1 where θ is a weak 
order, that is: 
1. for all pi^j e Pol, piSpj or pjSpi. 
2See chapter S for the definition of policy game. 
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2. for all p„Pj,pk € Pol, if ρ,θρ^ and PjQpk, then ptSpk. 
See De Swaan (1973: 91) for this assumption. 
Crucial in policy distance theory is the concept of distance3. The 
distance concept used by De Swaan does not satisfy any of the usual 
properties of a metric. It is not a distance function on the set of the 
policy positions of the players and coalitions in the usual sense of distance 
function. What then does De Swaan mean with distance? In an earlier 
chapter, he formulates the following set of statements on the distance of 
players' policy positions (De Swaan 1973, 69): 
• The "distance" between the policy positions of actors г and j is 
written as "d(pt,pj)". 
• If ptep}Spk, and only then 
d(pt,P]) < d(ptipk) 
andd(p,,p f c) > dipjiPk) 
and d(pt,pj) and d(p},pk) cannot be compared. 
There is a problem with this definition. What is the precise meaning of the 
expression "if . . . and only then"? This is important. If the expression is 
intended to be an implication, then it is not allowed to say that ρ,θ^θρ^ 
when dip^pj) < d(p,,pk) and d(p,,pjt) > dip^pk). In contrast, if it is 
an equivalence, then it is allowed. Kleene (1967: 63-4) does not mention 
the expression in his list of expressions that may be translated by one of 
the logical connectives. We are inclined to read it as "exactly if', thus 
as an equivalence. This is supported by the fact that De Swaan sees the 
statements as a definition of distance (see De Swaan 1973: 90) and by the 
fact that he uses equivalence on several places in his work (see De Swaan 
1973: 95, 105). Later, we give another argument for our interpretation. 
De Swaan does not make explicit whether his notion of distance be­
tween the policy positions of players may be extended to include the 
distances between the expected policy positions of coalitions. However, 
3In his discussion of the concept of distance, De Swaan remarks in a footnote: "It may 
be seen from the rest of the argument that the notion of "distance" can be dispensed with 
entirely; its use may help understanding, however." (De Swaan 1973: 69 (footnote)). 
However, in policy distance theory, the notion is, as the name of the theory already 
suggests, indispensable. See e.g. assumptions 2 and 4 of the theory as presented here 
(assumptions 3 and S in De Swaan's work). 
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his intention is clear enough. So we use his definition of distance also for 
the expected policy positions of the 'more-than-one-member' coalitions. 
Essential in the determination of an expected policy position p
s
 is 
the notion of pivotal player. This notion is defined in definition 5.22, 
chapter 5, section 8. Since θ is supposed to be a weak order according to 
assumption 1, we give a slightly different definition. Further, we define 
the basic notion of 'excess4. 
Definition 6.1 1. Let G* be a weighted majority policy game where θ 
и a weak order. Let S bea coalition. A player i G S is pivotal in S 
| w(Le(i,S)) - w(Ri(.i,S)) \< to,-. 
2. The difference е(і, S) := w(Le(i, 8))—г (пі(г, S)) is called the excess 
of i in S. 
For the definitions of the sets Le(i,S) and Riii^S), consider chapter 5.6, 
definition 5.17. Thus, a player is pivotal in a coalition S if the absolute 
value of the difference between the size of the subcoalition of the members 
from S to the left of г and the size of the subcoalition of the members 
from S to the right of г is equal to or less than the weight of г. A pivotal 
player is able to play off the left side of a coalition against the right side. 
This ability is the root of his power. If the left side of that coalition is in 
opposition to the right side of that coalition and if neither side can outvote 
the other, then the pivotal player can throw out this balance. He then 
has a decisive influence on the decision-making process in that coalition. 
Hence, coalitions in which a player г is pivotal are important for i. The 
set of all coalitions in which player г is pivotal is denoted by Σ(Γ). 
Definition 6.2 
lit) := {S Ç JV | г is pivotal in S}. 
Let а(рз,рт) denote the distance between the policy positions of S 
and T. If we are dealing with one person, say i, then we write p, instead 
of p{,}. Thus, the distance between the policy position of player г and 
coalition S is denoted by d(pt,ps). 
4This term is taken over from De Swaan. It should not be confused with 'balance 
excess' (chapter S, section 8) or 'power excess' (this chapter). 
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Assumption 2 Let 0% be a weighted majority policy game. For all i G Ν, 
for all 5, Τ С Ν, if S € Σ(0 and Τ <£ Σ(0, then ¿(р„ ps) < ¿(ρ,,Ρτ)· 
This assumption can be found in De Swaan (1973: 94). According to De 
Swaan (1973: 95), it 
""groups" the expected policies of coalitions with the same 
pivotal actor, the sets [Z(Jt)], around the policy position of 
these pivotal actors and in this manner among the sets of 
coalitions, [Zjt], the same order prevails as among the actors, 
fc, that are pivotal for the coalitions in those sets." 
Note that in the assumption itself distances between players' policy po­
sitions and coalitional policy positions are used while in the elucidation 
only the policy positions are used. Therefore, we again may conclude that 
'if ... and only then' in De Swaan's formulation of the distance concept 
must be read as an equivalence. 
The next assumption of policy distance theory can be found in De 
Swaan (1973: 95). 
Assumption 3 Let G% be a weighted majority policy game. Forali i G Ν, 
for all S, T£ Σ(0, 
PseexpT&e(i,S)>e(i,T). 
We must formulate two notes here. First, De Swaan makes no distinction 
between θ and the extension of Θ. That is, he uses Θ5 both to denote a 
binary relation on Pol = {p, | г G Ν} and on 
Polex = {ps | S Ç Ν}. In orderte avoid confusion we have introduced ех 
as the extension of , that is, as a binary relation on Polex - {ps | S Ç Ν}. 
Of course, ех must include . 
Secondly, De Swaan uses strict inequality in the original formulation of 
this assumption. However, this must be an error. Firstly, θ is defined as a 
weak order (see assumption 1). Seeking an extension of θ in order to place 
the policy positions of the coalitions, cannot make a linear order out of it 
since individuals are solo coalitions, i.e. if p.öpj then рщ руу. Secondly, 
there may be coalitions such that е(г', S) = е(г, Τ) with S, Τ G І(г'). So, 
5In fact. De Swaan uses the symbol <. Cf. De Swaan 1973). 
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ties of the expected policy positions of coalitions cannot be precluded6. 
Assumption 3 orders the policy positions of the coalitions in I(i) from left 
to right for each i 6 N. 
The next assumption can be found in (De Swaan 1973: 96): 
Assumption 4 Let G% be a weighted majority policy game where θ is a 
weak order. For all i e Ν, if S, Τ Ε lit), then 
d(p„ps) < dipupr) e>\ e(i,S) \ < \ e(i,T) | . 
Again, De Swaan uses strict inequality, both for distances and for the 
absolute values in this assumption. Again, this precludes possible ties and 
hence possible indifference of the players with respect to coalitions. Since 
this is not the aim of De Swaan, we have adjusted the assumption by 
using <. The idea expressed by assumption 4 is plausible. The smaller 
the absolute excess of a player in a coalition for which he is pivotal, the 
better he can outvote both sides and hence the better he can throw out 
the balance. The better he can throw out the balance, the better he can 
influence the policy making process in that coalition and, hence, the closer 
the policy position of that coalition will be to his policy position. 
With respect to the coalitional preferences of the players De Swaan 
formulates two assumption. The first assumption is that if S, Τ G Wi, 
then г will prefer S to Τ if the policy position of S is closer to his policy 
position than that of T. 
Assumption 5 Let G
e
 be a weighted majority policy game. Leti ξ. N and 
let S, Τ be coalitions, г strictly prefers S to T, notation SViT if and only 
ifS}Te Wi and dipups) < dipupr). 
This is assumption 1 in De Swaan 1973,p. 91. The second assumption De 
Swaan formulates with respect to preferences concerning coalitions is that 
each player prefers a winning coalition to a losing one or to a coalition he 
is not a member of. 
'This is in line with the intention of De Swaan. On page 100 of his work he states: 
" In this manner, assumptions (2) - (4) establish a complete and transitive order of all 
coalitions, including losing coalitions, and of all actors on a single scale." (My emphasis). 
However, if strict inequality is used in assumption 3, then the expected policy positions 
of two coalitions 5 and Τ such that e(i, S) = e(t, T) and S, Τ e ЦО cannot be scaled, 
and thus the "order of all coalitions" cannot be complete. 
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Assumption 6 Let Ge be a weighted majority policy game. Forali i G Ν, 
if S e Wi and Τ <¿ Wi then 5Ρ,Γ. 
This is assumption 6 in De Swaan 1973, p. 99. De Swaan does neither 
define indifference nor weak preference. However, since ties between pol­
icy positions of coalitions are not ruled out, it is possible that players are 
indifferent with respect to some coalitions. In fact. De Swaan uses im­
plicitly an assumption about indifference that we will formulate explicitly 
in the following way: 
Assumption 7 Let G% be a weighted majority policy game. Let i G N and 
S and Τ be coalitions. 
1. i is indifferent between S and T, notation ST|7\ if and only if 
(a) S,T<¿ Wi or 
(b) S^TeWi and (1(р{,рз) = ¿(pi,Ρτ). 
2. i weakly prefers S to T, notation SRiT, if and only ifSPiT or SliT. 
Note that d(pi,p
s
) = а(р{,рт) if the positions of S and Τ are tied and i is 
pivotal in S and T. 
The assumptions presented sofar lead to a preference profile concerning 
the set of possible coalitions. That is, the assumptions of policy distance 
theory imply a preference for each player concerning the possible coali­
tions. 
In the solution part, De Swaan defines a dominance relation on the basis 
of the preferences as constructed with the assumptions of the descriptive 
part. In order to find a prediction set. De Swaan uses the core concept for 
this dominance relation. 
Definition 6.3 Let 0% be a weighted majority policy game. Coalition S 
dominates coalition T, notation SbT, := Vi e S[SPiT]. S is undominated 
:= there is no coalition Τ such that Τ AS. The core is the set of undominated 
coalitions. 
The core is the set of coalitions which are Δ-maximal. Clearly, if a coalition 
S belongs to the core, then for all coalitions Τ there must be г G Τ such 
that SRiT. 
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The set μ( W, Ri) of maximal choices for an i 6 N is the set of coali­
tions for which there are no better ones according to the preference Rf. 
Definition 6.4 
μ(\ν,Κι) := {S С W I -.ЗГ С N[TPiS]}. 
For a study of sets of maximal choices see chapter 4, section 3. Of course, 
we would like to prove that μ(]ν, R|) J 0 for every i 6 N and that this 
set is the set of minimum distance coalitions for every i. Unfortunately, 
this is not the case. The theory as presented sofar happens to be in­
consistent. The first who has noticed this is, as far as we know, Boute 
(1981). To prove the inconsistency, we provide a calculation for a game 
that leads to different policy positions for the same coalitions. This allows 
the contradictory propositions that for a player i, ¿(p,,ps) < ¿(ρϊ,ρτ) and 
а(рі,рт) < d(pi,ps). 
6.2.2 The Inconsistency of the Open Version of Policy Dis­
tance Theory 
Consider the decisive game [2; 1,1,1]. The players are, in the given order, 
a, b and с Without loss of information, we will restrict ourselves to the 
set of winning coalitions for this game. Table 6.1 gives the size of each 
winning coalition, the pivotal players in each winning coalition and the 
excess of the pivotal player in each winning coalitions. To see how the 
excesses are calculated, consider coalition {a, 6}. Player a has 0 players 
to the left of him and 1 player, namely 6, to the right of him. Hence 
the excess of a in {a, b} is 0 - 1 = — 1. The remaining excesses can be 
calculated in the same way. According to this table: 
Z(
a
) = {{a,6},{a,c}}, 
Z(6) = {{ò,c},{a,b},Kb,c}}, 
*(с) = {{Ь,с},{а,с}}. 
We prove the contradiction: 
Since α is pivotal in {a, c} but not in {a, b, c}, we conclude from assump­
tion 2 that d(p
a
,p{aiC}) < d(pa,p{aibtC}) and, hence, that the policy posi­
tion of {a, c} lies between those of a and {a, Ь, c}. Since e(b, {a, 6,c}) = 
c(6, {b}) = 0, we conclude from assumption 3, рь егР{о,ь,с} and Р{а,ь,с}&ехрь, 
i.e., that the policy position of b ties with the policy position of {a, 6, c}. 
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Winning coalitions 
{α,ο} 
{Ь,с} 
{α, с} 
{α, b, с} 
Size 
2 
2 
2 
3 
Pivotal player 
a 
b 
b 
с 
a 
с 
b 
Excess 
-1 
+1 
-1 
+1 
-1 
+1 
0 
Table 6.1: Table for the game [2; 1,1,1]. 
Since р{
а<е} is to the left of P{0,¡,iC} we conclude that p{aiC} is to the left of 
рь, i.e. р{
аіС
} ехрь and not р
ь
 ех
р{аіС} (*). 
Since с is pivotal in {a,c} but not in {a, &,c}, we conclude from assump­
tion 2 that d(p
c
,p{
a
,
c
}) < d(p
c
,p{aib<c}). Hence, since Р{а,ь,с} and pb are 
tied, we conclude that p^.c} is to the right of рь, that is, рь ехр{а,с} and 
not р{
аіС
} е і ;р
ь
, which is in contradiction with (*). 
Note that assumption 5 leads to the anomaly {a, b, c}Pc{a,c} and 
{a, c}Pc{a, 6, c} for this case. 
The source of the inconsistency of De Swaan's theory is not difficult 
to detect. It is due to the fact that the sets Ці) with i e N may not be 
mutually disjoint. This is, in its tum, caused by the fact that some coali­
tions may contain more than one pivotal player7. And this is allowed by 
the 'less than that or equal to' relation in the definition of pivotal player8. 
Therefore, a remedy for this inconsistency seems easy to formulate: forbid 
the possibility of more than one pivotal player for a coalition9. This result 
7Also cf. Boute (1981). 
'See De Swaan 1973: 94, footnote * for the simple proof. 
'Boute (1984) does not want to preclude the existence of coalitions with two pivotal 
actors. He assumes that a nonpivotal actor "follows the point of view of the pivot 
which is closer to his own position" (Boute 1984: 126). Also see his assumption 10. 
However, looking at the game as given above, it is easily seen that this does not lead to a 
solution. The inconsistency with respect to the position of coalition {а, c} and therefore 
the inconsistency of c's preference with respect to this coalition does not disappear when 
applying Boute's assumption. The only remedy is, in our view, to foibid the existence 
of coalitions with two pivotal players. Another argument is that any rational player will 
prefer a coalition in which he is the only pivotal player to any coalition in which he and 
161 
can be obtained by using the strict inequality instead of the 'less than or 
equal to' relation in the definition of pivotal player. 
But, as may be guessed, for this interdiction a price must be paid. It 
is possible that, when using strict inequality, the expected policy positions 
of some winning coalitions cannot be determined, simply because these 
coalitions do not have a pivotal player. As a consequence, these coalitions 
cannot be ordered or scaled and therefore the distances of the players' 
policy positions and the policy positions of such coalitions cannot be de­
termined. To illustrate this, consider, again, the game [2; 1,1,1] (see table 
6.1). If we determine the pivotal player of each coalition with the aid of 
< instead of <, then the coalitions {a, 6}, {a,c} and {b,c} do not have a 
pivotal player. Since α is a member of {a, b, c} but not of {6, c}, we may 
infer that α strictly prefers {a, b, c] to {b,c). Hence, we may conclude 
that Р{а,ь,с} lies somewhere between p
a
 and Р{ь,с}· But what about P{o,c}? 
Is it to the left of р{а
І
ь,с} от to the right of it? We do not have sufficient 
information to answer this question. 
Boute (1984) proposes another way to avoid the inconsistency. He 
wants to make a distinction between an "objective scale" and a "subjec­
tive scale" for the policy positions of the players and coalitions. The scale 
is objective if "every actor places all parties in exactly the same way on the 
scale". Otherwise, it is subjective (Boute 1984, 114). Then, he formulates 
in assumption 2a the existence of "objective positions for actors" and in 
assumption 2b the existence of "objective positions for coalitions" (Boute, 
1984: 115). Boute asserts that De S waan implicitly uses the assumption 
of objective positions for coalitions, hence assumption 2b. He proposes 
to maintain the assumption of an objective actors' policy scale, hence as­
sumption 2a, but to "define the expected policy positions of coalitions to 
be subjective" (ibid, 115). However, Boute neither gives a definition nor 
an assumption that show how different actors may place the coalitions in 
a different way on a scale. Consequently it is impossible to construct the 
subjective policy scales and thus to calculate the actors' coalition prefer­
ences on the basis of these scales. Moreover, the policy order for coalitions 
is a consequence of policy distance theory, not an implicit assumption10. 
another player are pivotal, since in a coalition with two pivotal players each of these 
players can undermine the power position of the other. 
10Also see page 125 of Route's work. There he writes: "De Swaan's assumption of 
a complete ordering of coalitions on the policy scale ...." Again, the completeness (and 
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Apparently, Boute's proposal neither is a solution to the inconsistency 
problem of the open version of policy distance theory. 
De Swaan statistically tests the open version of his theory with data 
about cabinet formation processes in nine European multi-party systems 
(cf. De Swaan 1973: Part Π). The question arises how an inconsistent 
theory can be tested empirically. It is well known that from an inconsistent 
theory any proposition can be derived. Thus, from a logical point of view, 
such a theory is untestable (cf. Popper 1959: 92). However, this is an a 
posteriori point of view, that is, a view that works when the inconsistencies 
are known. In practice, the inconsistencies first have to be discovered. And 
it is false to believe that empirical tests can do this job. 
We have two arguments for the assertion that empirical tests need not 
reveal the logical inconsistency of a theory. 
1. There may be no data that reveal the contradictions. For example, 
in the case of De Swaan's policy distance theory the data may be 
such that there are no coalitions with more than one pivotal player. 
2. Even if the data set contains information that leads to contradictions, 
then still most empirical tests will be blind for this information. Em­
pirical tests are designed to confront the theory with reality. Incon­
sistency has to do with logic. To discover it requires logical tests, 
not empirical ones. 
With respect to the inconsistency of policy distance theory, we may argue 
in the same way. It is not necessary that the data in De S waan's dataset 
lead to contradictions. The data need not lead to coalitions with two pivotal 
players. Moreover, even when there are cases in which coalitions have two 
pivotal players, the contradictions need not be revealed by the empirical 
test employed by De Swaan. Contradictions only can be discovered by 
logic. Of course, we cannot prove this. However, we can give this view 
more support by looking at a case in De S waan's dataset that a posteriori 
surely must lead to contradictions. Let us keep in mind that we already 
know that the theory is inconsistent. 
transitivity) of the "scale" of coalitional policy positions is intended to be a consequence 
of policy distance theory, not an assumption. See De Swaan, 1973: 100. Also cf. 
footnote 6 in this chapter. 
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The case concerns the data as given for The Netherlands 1952 (De 
Swaan 1973: 220). The game representation is: 
[51; 6,30,30,12,9,9] 
The parties are, from left to right, 
1. the Communists, henceforward a, 
2. the Social Democrats, henceforward 6, 
3. the Catholics, henceforward c, 
4. the Anti-Revolutionaries, henceforward d, 
5. the Christian Historicals, henceforward e and 
6. the Liberals henceforward ƒ. 
The policy positions of the parties are ordered in the indicated way from 
left to right. The positions of the с and d are tied. Clearly, this game is 
decisive. Therefore, there are 25 = 32 winning coalitions. However, since 
the parties with less than 2.5 percent of votes have been left out (cf. De 
Swaan 1973: 131), there are only 27. The next table contains all winning 
coalitions including the pivotal players and including the excesses of these 
pivotal players in the several coalitions. The pivotal player is determined 
with the aid of the original definition as is also used by De Swaan. In 
order to detect what exactly happens with the anomalies when computing 
the prediction set, we present a very detailled computation. Without loss 
of information we only will work with winning coalitions. The sets of 
coalitions with pivotal players are: 
1. Σ(α) = 0, 
2. ЭД = {{о,с},{о,с,а},{М,е}, 
{ò, d, e, ƒ}, {Ь, d, ƒ}, {ò, d, ƒ, а}, {6, d, e, а}, {6, e, ƒ, а}, 
{M, e,/, а}}, 
3. Z(C)={{b,c},{ò,C,(i},{b,C,e},{6,c,/}, 
{b,c,íí,/},{b,c,<í,e},{b,c,e,/},{o,c,á,a},{o,c,e,a}, 
{6, с, а, ƒ}, {Ь, с, d, e, ƒ}, {b, с, d, e, ƒ, а}, {с, d, e}, {с,d, f }, 
{с, d, e, ƒ}, {с, d, e, а}, {с,d, ƒ, а}, {с, d, e, ƒ, а}, {с, е, ƒ, а}}, 
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Winning coalition 
{Ь,с} 
{b,c,d} 
{ò,c,e} 
{b,cj} 
{Ь,с,а} 
{b,c,dj} 
{ò,c,d,e} 
{Ь,с,е,/} 
{b,c,d,a} 
{b, с, e, α} 
{b,c,a,f} 
{6,c,(í,e,/} 
{6,c,d,e,/ ,a} 
{0,^,6} 
{¿,rf,/} 
{M,e,/} 
{6,d,e,o} 
{6,d,/ ,a} 
{b,e,/ ,a} 
{b,d,e, / ,a} 
{c,d,e} 
МП {c,d,e,/} 
{c,d,e,a} 
{c,(í,/,a} 
{c,d,e, / ,a} 
{c,e, / ,a} 
Pivotal player 
ò 
с 
с 
с 
с 
Ь 
с 
с 
с 
с 
с 
с 
с 
с 
& 
6 
ь 
d 
Ь 
b 
Ь 
b 
с 
с 
с 
d 
с 
с 
с 
с 
Excess 
-30 
+30 
+18 
+21 
+21 
-24 
+9 
+9 
+12 
+24 
+27 
+27 
0 
+6 
-21 
-21 
-30 
+12 
-15 
-15 
-12 
-24 
-21 
-21 
-30 
+12 
-15 
-15 
-24 
-12 
Table 6.2: Table for the Netherlands 1952 
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4. Z(d) = {{b,d,e,/},{c,d)e,/}}, 
5. Σ(β) = 0, 
6. Σ(/) = 0, 
Assumption 3 orders the coalitions in the sets Σ(ι) for party i by means 
of the notion of excess. The greater the excess, the more left the policy 
position of the coalition is. We first order each set of coalitions for which 
a party is pivotal. To avoid itching notation, we write S instead of ρ$. We 
put the excess of the concerned player in the relevant coalition in subscript 
between parentheses. Strict ordering is denoted by -<, ties are denoted by 
• Σ(α) : a 
• Σ(6) : ò ^ {ò,e,/,a}(_i2) X {ò,d,e,a}(_i5) и { M , ./»(-15) 
-< {6,d,e}_(2i) и {6, of, /}(_2i) -< {Ь,с,а}(_24) « { M , e, ./»(-24) 
-< {Ь,с}(-эо) 
« {b, d, e, ƒ }(_зо) 
• E(c) : {b,c}(30) -< {Ь,с,е,а}(27) » {Ь,с, f,a}çn) -< {о,с,а,а}(24) 
-< {*>С,е}с2і) И {Ь,С,/}(21) X {6,C,(Í}(18) X {Ь, С, С,/}(12) 
-< {b,C,¿,/}(9) 
« {Ь, с, ci, е}(9) -< {6, с, d, e, ƒ, α}(6) -< {Ь, с, d, e, ƒ}(o) 
« с -< {с, e, ƒ, α}(_ΐ2) -< {c,<í,e,a}(_i5) и {c,d, /,o}(_i5) 
-< {с,d,e}(_2i) « {с,«/,/}(_2i) X {c,d,e,/,α}(_24) -< {c,rf,e,/}(_зо) 
• Z(d) : {&, d, e, ƒ}(i2) и {с,а,е,/}(i2) -< d 
• Z(e) : e 
• ВД : ƒ 
According to assumption 2, ¿(р^, ps) < ¿(ρ^, ρτ) with χ,· = α, 6, e, d, e, ƒ, 
if S 6 Σ(χ,) and Τ ^ Σ(χ,). In plain language, the distance between a party 
and a coalition for which this party is pivotal is smaller than the distance 
between this party and a coalition for which it is not pivotal. This allows 
to put side by side the sets Σ(0 and subsequently to stick together the 
ordering of coalitions in those sets. This leads to the following ordering 
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of coalitional policy positions: 
a -< b -< {b, e, ƒ, a} -< {6, d, e, a} и {6, d, ƒ, a} 
-< {b,d,e} « {ò,d, ƒ} ^ {6,c,a} « {6,d,e,/ ,a} 
-< {b, c} « {6, rf, e , /} X {6,c} X {o,c, e,a} 
и {ò,c,/,α} -< {6,c,d,a} -< {Ь,с,е} и {6,с,/} 
-< {o,c,d} -< {Ь,с,е, ƒ} -< {Ь,с,а,/} « {ò,c,d,e} 
-< {b, с, d, e, ƒ, a} -< {b,с, rf, e, ƒ} w с X {с, e, ƒ, a} 
-< {с, </, e, a} и {с, d, ƒ, a} X {с, d, e} « {с, d, ƒ} 
-< {c,<í,e,/,a} -< {c,d,e, ƒ} X {ò,d,e,/} 
« {c,<í,e,/} -<d<e^ f. 
Clearly, a number of coalitions are "double-scaled", namely, {6, c}, 
{ò,d,e,/} and {c,<i,e,/}. This is unavoidable, since these coalitions 
contain two different pivotal players. This leads to a number of anomalies, 
for example, 
d(b, {6, d, e, ƒ) < ¿(6, {6, c}) and ¿(6, {6, c}) < d(ft, {6, d, e, ƒ}). However, 
we do as if we are blind for these anomalies and proceed in a consequent 
way. 
Assumption 4 allows the comparison of the distance between the policy 
position of a party and the policy position of a coalition for which that 
party is pivotal and the distance of that party between a coalition for 
which it is pivotal and that is on its other side. The measure for this 
comparison is the absolute value of the excess of the concerned pivotal 
party in the relevant coalitions. If the absolute value of the excess of 
a player in a coalition is smaller, then the distance to this coalition will 
be smaller. By definition of preference this coalition will, then, be more 
preferred. For example, consider the position of the Catholics (c) in the 
constructed ordering. Coalition {6,c, d} is to the left of с while coalition 
{c, d, e, a} is to the right of it. The Catholic party is pivotal in both 
coalitions. To detennine the preference between these coalitions look at 
the absolute value of the excess of this party in the coalitions. We find that 
| e(c, {c,d,e,a}) |= 15 and that | e(c, {6,c,d} |= 18. Hence, according to 
assumption 4, d(c, {c, d, e, a}) < d(c, {6, c, d}). Applying the definition of 
preference we obtain {c, d, e, a}P
c
{6, c, d}. The distances between a party 
and coalitions which are on either side of that party but for which this 
party is not pivotal cannot be compared. Hence, the preference between 
such a pair of coalitions cannot be determined for this party. 
By using assumption 4 together with the position of the coalitions in 
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the constructed ordering and the definition of preference the coalitional 
preference of each party can be determined. We only construct the prefer­
ences for Wi, where г is one of the parties. These coalitional preferences 
are: 
1. Communists (a): 
{b, e, ƒ, α}Ρ{ό, d, e, a}I{6, d, ƒ, a} 
P{ò, с, a}I{ò, á, e, ƒ, a}P{6, с, e, a} 
Щ, с, f, α}Ρ{6, с, d, o}P{ò, с, d, e, ƒ, a} 
P{c, e, ƒ, a}P{c, d, e, a}I{c, d, ƒ, a} 
P{c,if,e,/,a}. 
2. Social Democrats (6): 
{b,e,/,a}P{ò,d,e,a}I{M,/,a} 
P{6,d,e}I{ò,(i,/}P{ò,c,a} 
I{6,d,e,/,a}P{b,c}I{ò,d,e,/} 
P{6,C}P{6,C,e,a}I{6,c,/,a} 
P{ò,C,<i,a}P{ò,c,e}I{6,c,/} 
P{bìc,d}P{b,cìeJ}V{b,cìdJ} 
I{b, e, d, e}P{i>, e, <i, e, ƒ, α}Ρ{ό, с, d, e, ƒ} 
Р{М,е,Л. 
3. Catholics (с): 
{6, с, d, e, ƒ }Р{Ь, с, d, e, ƒ, α}Ρ{6, с, d, с} 
1{Ь, с, d, ƒ }I{ò, с, e, /}1{с, e, ƒ, α} 
P{c,d,c,a}I{c,d,/,a}P{b,c,d} 
P{c,d,e}I{C,d,/}I{&,c,/} 
I{ò, e, e}P{c, d, e, ƒ, a}I{¿, с, d, α} 
P{ò,c,/,a}I{ò,c,e,a}P{6,C} 
I{c,d,e,/} 
l)P{ò,c}P{ò,C,a}. 
2)P{C,d,e,/}. 
4. Anti-Revolutionaries (d): 
{e, d, e, ƒ }I{ò, d, e, /}P{c, d, e, ƒ} 
P{c, d, e, ƒ, a}P{c, d, ƒ }I{c, d, e} 
P{c, d, ƒ, a}I{c, d, e, a}P{6, e, d, e, ƒ} 
P{b, e, d, e, ƒ,
 a}P{ò, e, d, e}I{6, e, d, ƒ} 
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Ρ{ό, с, ¿}Р{6, С, d, a}PP{ò, ¿, e, ƒ} 
Р{6,а,е,/,а}Р{о,а,/}І{о,а,е} 
P{¿>, d, ƒ, a}I{i>, d, e, a}. 
5. Christian Historicals (e): 
{c, d, e, ƒ }I{b, d, e, ƒ }P{c, d, e, ƒ} 
P{c, d, e, ƒ, a}P{c, d, e}P{c, d, e, a} 
P{c, e, ƒ, a}P{6, c, d, e, ƒ }P{6, c, ci, e, ƒ, a} 
P{ò,c,d,e}P{6,c,e,/}P{ò,C,e} 
P{6, c, e, a}P{ò, d, e, ƒ }P{0, d, e, ƒ, a} 
P{M,e}P{ò,d,e,a} 
P{6,e,/ ,a}. 
6. Liberals (ƒ): 
{с, d, e, ƒ }1{Ь, d, e, /}P{c, d, e, ƒ} 
P{C,d,e,/,a}P{c,d,/}P{c,d,/,a} 
P{c, e, ƒ, a}P{ò, с, d, e, ƒ}}Р{Ь, с, d, e, ƒ, a} 
P{6,c,d,/}P{b,C,e,/}P{ò,C,/} 
P{ò, e, ƒ, a}P{ò, d, e, ƒ }P{6, d, e, ƒ, a} 
P{M,/}P{M,/ ,a}P{ò,e, / , a}. 
Note the several anomalies in these preferences. For example, the Catholics 
strictly prefer {6,c} to, indeed, {b,c} and {c,d,e, ƒ} to {c,d,e, ƒ}. How-
ever, we stick to our task and continue the computation. The last task is 
to determine the prediction set. Therefore the core-concept as defined in 
definition 6.3 must be applied. De Swaan (1973: 107) argues: 
"In order to determine what coalitions are undominated, it is 
simplest to eliminate those that are dominated. A coalition 
- or, more precisely, the preference vector that goes with it 
- is dominated when there exists some other coalition all the 
members of which are better off than they would be if the 
former were to form." 
However, some care must be taken with eliminating dominated coalitions 
since dominated coalitions may dominate other coalitions. Thus the proce-
dure is as follows: take a coalition S and compare it with other coalitions 
until one is found that according to the preferences of its members is bet-
ter than S. Then S is dominated. If no other coalition is found that is 
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better, then S is undominated and it then belongs to the prediction set. We 
assume that this procedure only takes the first occurrence of a coalition in 
a preference. We are not sure whether De Swaan uses this assumption, but 
it seems plausible11. Why looking for more when only one is expected? 
To illustrate, take a look at the preference of the Social Democrats (ò). In 
this preference, the coalition {b,c} occurs two times. The procedure only 
takes the first time it occurs in consideration and neglects the other one. 
In this way the anomalies are not discovered. 
To see how the procedure works, consider coalition {о, с} and compare 
it with the coalitions as presented in table 6.2 until one is founded that 
dominates it. Going from top to bottom in table 6.2, we take coalition 
{b,c,d}. Clearly, d strictly prefers this coalition to {6,c}. Party b strictly 
prefers {b, c} to {b, c, d}, while с strictly prefers {6, c, d) to {6, c}. Hence, 
neither {6, c} dominates {δ, с, d}, nor {6, с, d) dominates {b, с}. Now take 
coalition {6, c, e} and compare it with {6, c}. Again we find that neither 
{ò,c, e} dominates {6, с}, nor {6, с} dominates {¿», с, e}. Proceeding in 
this way we arrive at coalition {δ,<ί, e}. Now b strictly prefers {b,<i, e} 
to {ò,c}. Clearly, also d and e strictly prefer {ò,d, e} to {6, с}. Hence, 
since every player in {6,rf, e} strictly prefers {ft,d, e} to {i>,c}, {ò,d, e} 
dominates {6, с} and therefore {6, c} is dominated. Proceeding in this 
way we find the following undominated coalitions: {6, c, d, ƒ}, {6, c, d, e}, 
{ò, c, e, ƒ}, {6, c, rf, e, ƒ}, {6, c, d, e, ƒ, a}, {c, d,e, ƒ} and {c, e, ƒ, a). Thus 
the prediction set contains these seven coalitions. 
Sticking to the job, we have computed a nonempty prediction set for 
a case for which the theory clearly yields contradictory propositions. It is 
quite possible to compute a nonempty prediction set without noticing that 
there are anomalies. When, a priori, inconsistencies are not expected, we 
may not hope that an empirical test may reveal them. 
There are other cases in De Swaan's dataset that must lead to contra-
dictions (e.g. Finland 1924). 
11
 It is impossible to conclude from the computing example given by De Swaan 
(1973, especially 107-8) or from his discussion of the core concept whether he uses 
this assumption. 
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6.2.3 Policy Distance Theory: Closed Version 
The notion of closed coalition has been extensively discussed in chapter 
S12. We do not discuss it here again. In the open version of policy distance 
theory, assumption 6 states that for every i £ N and every S, Τ Ç Ν: 
SPiT^S € WuT#Wi. 
In the closed version of his theory, De Swaan substitutes this assumption 
for a version in which closed coalitions are basic (see De Swaan 1973: 
117-119). 
Assumption 8 Let G% be a weighted majority game with relevant policy 
order Θ. Let Wcl denote the set of all winning coalitions in С which are 
closed according to θ and let 
Wf = {S eW\ S £Wcl,i G S). 
ThenVieN andS,TÇN: 
SeWf.T^Wf =• S?\T. 
We shall prove that this assumption is inconsistent with respect to the 
other assumptions of policy distance theory. First we shall proceed in a 
logical way, that is, without performing any computation. After this, we 
illustrate the contradiction on the basis of a concrete case. 
1. Contradiction 1. 
Let S G Wf and Γ G (Wi - Wf). Let 5, Τ e Σ(ί) and suppose 
| e(i, Γ) | < | e(», S) | . Then by assumption 8, 8?{Τ so that, by 
assumption 5, d(pi,ps) < d(p¿,pr). However, since | е(г,Г) | < | 
e(i,S) |, а(рі,рт) < d(pi,ps) by assumption 4. Contradiction. 
In words: if 
(a) player i is in S and S is a closed winning coalition and 
(b) player i is in Τ and Γ is a winning but not closed, 
then г strictly prefers S to Τ by assumption 8, and hence d(pi,ps) < 
¿(ρ,,ρτ) by assumption 5. However, if 
lzCf. 5.7 and 5.8.3. 
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(а) г is pivotal in S and in Τ and the absolute value of the excess 
of г in Τ is strictly less than the absolute value of the excess 
of t in S, 
then сІ(рі,рт) < d(pi,ps) by assumption 4. 
2. Contradiction 2. 
Let S e W?, Τ e Wi¡ - W?. Ut Τ G Zìi) and 5 ^ Σ(0. Then 5Ρ,Γ 
by assumption 8 and hence, by assumption 5, ti(p,,ps) < ¿(Ρί,Ρτ)· 
By assumption 2, since г is pivotal in Τ but not in 5, ¿(ρ,,ρτ) < 
d(pi,ps). Contradiction. 
In words: if 
(a) player г is in S and 5 is a closed winning coalition, 
(b) player г is in Г and Τ is winning but not closed, 
then SPiT by assumption 8, and hence d(p,,ps) < ¿(ρ,,Ρτ)· How­
ever, if 
(а) г is pivotal in Τ but not in S, then ¿(ρ,,ρτ) < ¿(PnPs) by 
assumption 2. Contradiction. 
We will illustrate these contradictions on the basis of a real-life example. 
Consider the results of the elections of 21 may 1986 for the Netherlands 
[76; 3,52,9,54,27,5]. 
The parties are, from left to right, SL (Small Left), PvdA (Social Democrats), 
D66 (Democrats), CDA (Christian Democrats), W D (Liberals) SR (Small 
Right). Clearly, this game is decisive. Therefore there are 25 = 32 win-
ning coalitions. However, to illustrate the contradictions we do not need 
to compute every winning coalition. 
1. Illustration of contradiction 1. 
Consider coalitions {CD^VVD} and {SL,D66,CDA,VVD}. 
Since wiiCDA^VVD}) and г ({8Ь,066
у
СВА, О}) are , re­
spectively, 81 and 93, both coalitions are winning. The CDA is piv­
otal player in both coalitions. We have: | e(CDA, {CDA, VVD}) | 
= 27 and | eiCDA, {SL, D66, CDA, VVD}) \ = 15. 
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Hence, (ommitting the ρ in order to avoid itching notation), 
d(CDA,{SL,D66,CDA,VVD}) < d(CDA,{CDA,VVD}) ac­
cording to assumption 4. Therefore the CDA strictly prefers 
{51,В66,СВА, В} to {CDA,VVD}. Now, the coalition 
{CDA, VVD} is closed but the coalition 
{SL, D66,CDA, WD} is open since the party PvdA that is be­
tween party D66 and SL is not a member. Therefore, by assumption 
8, the CDA strictly prefers coalition {CDA, VVD} to coalition 
{SL, D66, CDA, VVD} which is a contradiction. 
2. Illustration of contradiction 2. 
Consider coalition {PvdA, D66, CDA} and coalition 
{PvdA, D66, VVD}. Both coalitions are winning. D66 is the piv­
otal player for the first coalition and PvdA for the second coalition. 
Hence, by assumption 2, 
d(PvdA, {PvdA, D66, VVD}) < d(PvdA, {PvdA, D66, CDA}) 
and therefore {PvdA,D66, VVD}VpydA{PvdA,D66,CDA}. 
However, {PvdA,D66,CDA} is closed but 
{PvdA,D66, WD} is open. Therefore, 
{PvdA, D66, CDA}PpváA{PvdA, D66, VVD} by assumption 8 and, 
hence, 
diPvdA, {PvdA, D66, CDA}) < d(PvdA, {PvdA, D66, VVD}), 
which is a contradiction. 
The inconsistency of the closed version of De Swaan's theory is due to 
the fact that assumption 7 with respect to closed coalitions expresses an 
idea that is irreconcilable with the basic idea of policy distance theory. 
The basic idea of policy distance theory is that a player strives to form 
a coalition with a policy position which is as close as posible to his own 
position. The new introduced assumption 7, however, says that a player 
prefers a closed coalition to an open one. The point is that it is not 
precluded by the theory that an open coalition has an expected policy 
position that is closer to the position of a player than the expected policy 
position of any closed coalition with that player. In this case, assumption 
7 and the other assumptions of the theory clash. The original assumptions, 
with the exception of the subsituted one, say to choose for the coalition 
with the minimum distance from the set of possible coalitions. However, 
the added assumption 7 says to choose then for the closed coalition. The 
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idea of minimal distance coalitions and the idea of closed coalitions as 
formulated by De Swaan are in this sense incompatible. 
Because of its fundamental character it is very difficult to repair the 
inconsistency of the closed version. A first thought is to partition W, 
in the sets W?1 and W, and to put a priority on the set Wf'. That is, 
define the assumption that every player prefers any coalition in Wf to 
any coalition not in that set, irrespective of whether it is pivotal in such a 
closed coalition or not. Then make a partition of Wf into a set of closed 
coalitions in which ι' is pivotal and a set of closed coalitions in which i is 
not pivotal. Then apply the assumptions of policy distance theory first to 
this partitioning and subsequently to the set of remaining open coalitions. 
That is, order the set of closed coalitions in which i is pivotal on the basis 
of excess and use the assumption that the distance between i and a closed 
coalition for which i is pivotal is smaller than the distance between i and a 
closed coalition for which i is not pivotal. Then do the same with respect 
to the open coalitions. Note that this implies that a player may prefer a 
closed coalition in which he is not pivotal to an open coalition in which 
he is pivotal. 
However, this reparation procedure leads to another inconsistency. 
Since a closed coalition S e W will, in general, occur in every W?1 
when i 6 S, and since not every i e S will be pivotal in S, the conclusion 
is that ps must be scaled several times. And this leads to anomalies with 
respect to distance. 
With respect to the open version of policy distance theory we have 
tried to show how small the basis is to free the theory from the source 
of inconsistency. With a plausible adjustment, i.e., with leaving coalitions 
with more than one pivotal player outside the calculations, the theory 
becomes incomplete. It is no longer possible to place all coalitions on 
the extended policy scale. With respect to the closed version, we must 
conclude that there is a clash of ideas. We did not found any room for 
reparation in this case. One of the two ideas must be dropped. However, 
dropping the minimum distance idea leads to a rest assumption that may 
work on its own13 that, altogether, is a real impoverishment of the theory. 
13
 In fact. De Swaan also tests this 'rest assumption' in his work. There, he calls it 
the "the closed coalition proposition". His conclusion is that "though the results are 
not clearly insignificant, they are insufficient to accept the theory as an independent 
explanatory construct." (De Swaan 1973: 155). 
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Dropping the idea of closed coalitions leads to the open version including 
the indicated problems. Apparently, the policy that remains is trying to 
find better theories. 
6.3 Power Excess Theory 
The following part is based on Van Deernen (1991). The basic idea of this 
theory is that each player seeks to form coalitions in which the size of the 
internal opposition is minimal. He can then maximally exert his control 
potential and hence maximally influence the decision-making processes in 
such a coalition. 
The theory will first be presented for coalition formation processes in 
a non-policy context and without employing the actor-oriented approach. 
We then restore the actor-oriented approach. It will then be assumed that 
the formation of a coalition takes place in a political system that can be 
modelled as a centralized policy game. 
6.3.1 Power Excess 
The concept of power excess of a player in a coalition is essential: 
Definition 6.5 Let G be a weighted majority game, let i e N and let 
sew. 
pow(i, S) := Wi — w(S — {i}) 
is called the power excess of i in S. 
In words, the power excess of a player in a coalition is the difference 
between the weight of that player and the size of the internal opposition 
for that player in that coalition. It is a simple measure of the control 
potential of a player in a coalition. The greater his power excess, the 
greater his control potential. 
Instead of w, a power index p(i) can be used. Consider a simple 
game G = (Ν, W). A power index ρ is a function from JV into the 
set of positive real numbers Яе+. The best known power indices arc the 
Shapley-Shubik power index (Shapley and Shubik 1954, Shapley 1981) 
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and the Banzhaf index (Banzhaf 1965)и. Other indices are the Deegan-
Packel index (Deegan and Packel 1983, Packel and Deegan 1980), the 
Holler index (Holler 1982, Holler and Packel 1983) and the Curiel index 
(Curici 1987). Some care must be taken when working with one of these 
measures. They express the a priori power of a player in the complete 
game. Within the power excess theory a measure is needed that indicates 
the (expected) power of a player in a coalition once this coalition has been 
formed. A possible approach to this problem is to calculate the power 
index for a player i in each of the subgames Gs = (S, Ws) associated with 
coalitions S G W when г G S. This means that Ws is the set of winning 
subcoalitions of S. Working with a power index in the way indicated has 
the advantage that the theory of power excess coalitions can be generalized 
to the whole class of simple games. However, because of its simplicity we 
prefer to use the notion of 'weight' instead of the notion of power index15. 
Note that if we had worked with p(i) instead of tu,, we would have had a 
bundle of theories, namely one for each particular index. 
A dummy is a player who cannot possess any control potential. Such 
a player is not able to exert any power in any coalition. 
Theorem 6.1 Let G be a simple game and let i e N be a dummy. Then 
for every S G W with i G S, pow(i, S) < 0. 
Proof. Let i be a dummy and suppose there is an S e W such that 
pow(i, S) > 0. Then tu, > w(S - {г}). Since i is a dummy, S — {i} G W 
and thus w(S - {г}) > q. Hence, u>¿ > q. Contradiction. • . 
With respect to dominated simple games, the following result is relevant. 
Theorem 6.2 Let G = [q; wi, u^ , . . . , wn] be a dominated weighted major-
ity game. If i dominates S, then pow(i, S) > 0. 
Proof. Suppose i dominates S and pow(i, S) < 0. Then u\ < w(S - {г}). 
But then i cannot dominate S. Hence pow(i, S) > 0. •. 
In words, a dominant player has positive power excess in each coalition 
he dominates. 
1 4
 An excellent study of these indices is Straffin (1983). 
l sMost of the results presented below also will hold for the power indices when used 
in the way as indicated. 
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6.3.2 Power Excess Coalitions in Weighted Majority Games 
Let Wi be the set of all winning coalitions with player i, i.e. 
И ;^ := {S G W I г' G S}. In general, г' will prefer a coalition in Wi to any 
coalition not in Wi. Losing coalitions or winning coalitions he is not a 
member of, have nothing to offer. Further, the greater the power excess of 
i in a winning coalition, the better he can control the internal opposition 
in that coalition. The better he can control the internal opposition, the 
greater his influence on the decision-making process in that coalition and 
therefore the better he can enforce his own wants. Therefore, a player 
г Ε N will prefer a coalition with a greater power excess for him. 
Definition 6.6 Let G = (Ν, W) be a weighted majority game, S, Τ e W 
and i G Ν. 
1. i strictly prefers S to Τ, notation S π {Γ := 
(a) S G Wi. Τ <¿ Wi or 
(b) 5, Τ € Wi and pow(i, S) > pow(i, Τ). 
2. г' is indifferent between S and Τ, notation 8цТ := 
(a) S,T<¿Wior 
(b) S,TeWi and pow(i, S) = pow(i, T). 
3. г weakly prefers S to T, notation SpiT, := 5п{Т or SiiT. 
Given pi, π; and t¿ are also called, respectively, the asymmetric part and 
the symmetric part of the weak preference />,·. The strict preference may 
be read as 'is strictly better than', the indifference as 'is as good as' and 
the weak preference as 'is at least as good as'. It is easy to verify that 
Pi is complete and transitive with respect to W for every i G N. The set 
MWJ Pi) 0f ¿»i-maximal choices is: 
Definition 6.7 
μΟν,ρυ ·= {S e w l -a r G WTTV.-S]}. 
In words, //( W, pi) is the set of all coalitions for which there are no better 
ones for г. Because of the completeness and transitivity of /»,·, this set is 
not empty16. Clearly, coalitions in p(W, pi) have maximal power excess 
16See chapter 2.4 and 4.3 for the definition and relevant results of sets of maximal 
choices. 
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for г. That is, if S 6 μ(,\ν,ρί), then there is no Γ G Wi such that 
pow(i, T) > pow(i, S). The converse also happens to be true. Therefore, 
each rational player will strive to form a coalition from μ(\ν, />,·). 
So far the descriptive part of the theory of power excess coalitions for 
weighted majority games has been presented. The next step is to formulate 
a predictive part that is logically related to the descriptive part. In game 
theory, the predictive part is the subject of the socalled solution theories17. 
In the theory of power excess coalitions, we exclusively use the solution 
theory of the core. For this we need to explicate a domination relation 
over W. 
Definition 6.8 Let G = (Ν, W) be a weighted majority game and 5, Γ G 
W. 
1. S dominates Τ := 
(a) for every i £ S: SpiT, 
(b) there is at least one i G 5 such that STI-.T. 
2. S e W is undominated := there is no Τ G W such that Τ dominates 
S. The set of undominated coalitions is called the coalitional core of 
G, in short, Co(G). An S e Co(G) will be called a core-coalition. 
The core is a frequently applied solution concept in game theory. In this 
case it is equivalent to our concept of a set of maximal choices of W. 
Then, the relation that establishes the maximal elements is the dominance 
relation. Unfortunately, for many games the core is empty. This will, 
however, not be the case for the coalitional core in the case of proper 
weighted majority games: 
Theorem 6.3 Let G be a proper weighted majority game. Then 
Co(G)jb. 
Proof. Let G be a weighted majority game. Then W"ze =/ 0. Hence, by 
theorem 6.4, Co{G)j$. •. 
"The distinction between a descriptive part and a solution part is explicitly made in 
Shubik (1982: 127). 
178 
If S is a core-coalition, then for every i G S, S G /¿(И7, Л')» a n d, hence, 
every г e S must have maximal power excess. Otherwise, S would be 
dominated. So, there is no better coalition for the members of that coali­
tion. 
Hypothesis 6.1 Let G be a proper weighted majority game. Then only 
core-coalitions of G will be formed. 
The next result expresses a clear connection between Riker's minimum size 
principle and the theory of power excess coalitions for weighted majority 
games. 
Theorem 6.4 Let G be a proper weighted majority game. Then 
Co{G) = Wsi2e. 
Proof. 
1) Let S e Co{G), but suppose S is not of minimum size. Then there is a 
coalition Τ e W such that w(T) < w(S). Since G is proper, S Π Τ i 0. 
So, there is an г G S Π Τ such that TTT.S. Then w(T - {г}) < w(S - {г}). 
Consequently, for all г G Τ, Τ ρ,-S. Since i G S П Τ, Тж{8 by definition 
and therefore TdominattsS. Contradiction with S G Co(G). Therefore, 
S is of minimum size. Thus Co{G) Ç Waize. 
2) Let S G Waize, i.e. w(S) < w(T) for every Τ G W and hence 
pow(i, S) > pow(i, T) for every i G S and every Τ eW. Therefore, SpiT 
for every i G 5" and Τ G W and hence, since pi is complete, S G ^ (VV, />¿ 
for every i G S. Since G is proper, SnTjQfor every Τ G W. Hence, if 
S G p(W, pi), then there is no coalition Τ G W that dominates S. There­
fore, S G Co(G) and thus Wsi2e С Co(G). •. 
According to this theorem, a core-coalition is of minimum size and a 
minimum size coalition is a core-coalition. This provides an explanation 
of the entry of minimum size coalitions in systems that can be modelled as 
weighted majority games. Players prefer such a coalition because there is 
no other coalition in which they can better control the internal opposition. 
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6.3.3 Power Excess Coalitions in Centralized Weighted Ma­
jority Policy Games 
In this section we use again the actor-oriented approach as introduced in 
Peleg (1981) and apply it to centralized weighted majority games18. Again, 
the fundamental behavioral assumption will be that each player strives to 
form a coalition in which his power excess is maximal. However, within 
the actor-oriented context, each player must reckon with the constraint that 
only coalitions with the center player will be formed. 
Let C, be the set of all winning coalitions with the center player that 
contain ι. That is, d := {S G С | г' € S}. A player г' will prefer a coalition 
S € Ci to a coalition not in C,. Further, he will prefer S e Ci to Τ e Ci 
if he has a greater power excess in S. 
Definition 6.9 Let Ge be a centralized weighted majority policy game and 
i e Ν, and suppose S, Τ e С. 
1. i strictly prefers S to Τ, notation SnfT, := 
(a) S e Ci, Τ i Ci, 
(b) S, Τ e Ci and pow(i, S) > pow(i, T). 
2. i is indifferent between S and Τ, notation StfT, := 
(a) S <¿ Ci, Τ ? d, 
(b) S,T€ d andpow(i,S) = роі (і,Τ), 
3. i weakly prefers S to Τ, notation Sp^T, := SirfT or 5tfΓ. 
The superscript θ in these notations is used to remind us that we are 
dealing with coalition preferences of players in a policy game <7
Θ
· The 
binary relation π? is the strict preference of г for the coalitions in C; the 
relation ¿f is the indifference of г over С and />? is his weak preference. 
This latter relation is, in fact, the union of π ƒ and ¿f. 
It is not difficult to prove that each /sf is complete and transitive with 
respect to C. Therefore, the set /i(C, /»?) defined by 
18See chapter S for the definition of centralized weighted majority policy games. 
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Definition 6.10 
μ(0,ρθ,) := {S e С I -.ЗГ e 0[Τπθ,8]}, 
is not empty. If S € μ(0, pet), then there is no Τ G С such that pow(i, T) > 
pow(i, S). The converse is also true: if there is no coalition Τ G С such 
that pow(i,T) > pow(i,S), then S e μ((7,/>?). Clearly, a player i will, if 
rational, strive to form a coalition from μ((7, pf ) within this context. 
Definition 6.11 Let Gs be a centralized weighted majority policy game 
and с be the center player. 
1. A coalition S 6 С dominates a coalition Τ e С in G9 := 
(a) for each ieS: SpetT, 
(b) 8ж
 с
Т. 
2. A coalition S E С is undominated := there is no other coalition 
Τ £ С that dominates S. The set of undominated coalitions in 
a centralized policy game Gs is called the coalitional core of that 
game. This set will be notated with Cc^G%). An S € Gs is called a 
core-coalition of G». If the context is clear, we only speak of core-
coalitions. 
In words, a coalition S dominates a coalition Τ if each player in 5 finds 
S at least as good as Γ and if the center player finds S strictly better than 
T. 
Theorem 6.5 Let (7© be a centralized policy game. Then 
Co(Gs)¥9. 
Proof. This is a consequence of theorem 6.6 and the fact that μ(0, рв
с
) ^ 0. 
D. 
If S is a core-coalition of G%, then for each i 6 S, S G μ(0,p8%). Other­
wise, S would be dominated. Hence, there is no better coalition for the 
members of a core-coalition. Therefore: 
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Hypothesis 6.2 Let Ge be a centralized policy game. Then only core-
coalitions of G% will be formed. 
The computation of the core for centralized policy games will, in gen­
eral, be rather involved. First, the coalition preference of each player 
must be constructed. Next the dominance relation between each pair of 
winning coalitions with the center player must be computed on the base 
of these preferences. Then the coalidonal core can be determined. The 
following result, which is as such perhaps somewhat surprising, simplifies 
the computation process of the coalitional core. 
Theorem 6.6 Let G% be a centralized weighted majority policy game and 
let с be the center player. Then 
Co(Ge) = ßiCip5. 
Proof. 
1) Let S 6 μίΟ,ρΐ). Then pow(c,S) > роі (с,Т)М all Τ G С. If there 
is α Τ e С such that Τ dominates S, then pow(c, T) > рог (с, S). But 
then not pow(c, S) > рои>(с, Г) for all Τ G С. Contradiction. Hence, 
S G CoiGe). 
2) If S e Co(Ge), then pow(c, S) > pow(c,T)forall TeC. Hence, Spe
c
T 
for all Τ e С and therefore S e μ{€, р
 с
). •. 
That is, the coalitional core equals the set of coalitions with maximal 
power excess for the center player с Hence, to compute the coalitional 
core of a centralized policy game, it suffices to compute the preference 
of the center player and to determine the set of maximal elements for 
this preference. Thus, if the players maximize their power excess under 
the constraint that the center player must be a member of each winning 
coalition, then the center player will firstly be in each core-coalition and 
secondly have maximum power excess in each core-coalition. 
If a core-coalition in GB is not minimal winning, then the power excess 
is maximal for no member. Therefore a core-coalition is minimal winning. 
The connection with Riker's minimum size theory, however, is ompletely 
cut off in this context. In general, a core-coalition is not necessarily a 
minimum size coalition and a minimum size coalition is not necessarily 
a core-coalition in a centralized policy game. A reason for this is that a 
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minimum size coalition need not contain the center player. However, it is 
possible to adjust the size parameter to the policy context. 
Definition 6.12 Let G% be a centralized weighted majority policy game. A 
coalition S E С is of minimum size in G
e
 := 
w{S) < w(T) for all Τ G С. 
In words, a coalition in a centralized weighted majority policy game is 
of minimum size if it contains the center player and if its size is at least 
as small as every other coalition that contains the center player. Let us 
denote the set of minimum size coalitions for Gs by Cstze. 
Theorem 6.7 Let Gebe a centralized weighted majority policy game. Then 
CoiGs) = Caize. 
Proof. This proof goes in the same way as the proof of theorem 6.4. In 
stead ofW, the set С is used. O. 
Hence, a core coalition for G
e
 is a coalition with the center player that 
has a size less than or equal to any other winning coalition with the center 
player. 
6.3.4 Theory of Power Excess Coalitions: Closed Version 
This is a variation of the theory of power excess coalitions. To formulate 
this variation, we need the concepts as defined in definition 5.23. We will 
repeat them informally. Let G% be a policy game. A player к is said to 
be between players i and j if p.öpjt and pkOpj. Two players i and j are 
neighbours if there is no other player к between them. A coalition S is 
said to be closed if it consists only of neighbours. A coalition which is 
not closed is said to be open. 
The fundamental behavioral assumption now will be that each player 
maximizes his power excess under the constraint that the coalition to be 
formed must contain the center player and, simultaneously, must be closed. 
For a discussion of the relevance of closed coalitions, consider 5.8.3. 
In this version of power excess theory, the coalition preferences of the 
players will have a more complicated structure. 
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Definition 6.13 Let G% be a centralized weighted majority policy game, с 
be the center player and Ccl be the set of closed winning coalitions with 
the center player. Ut Cf := {S e Ccl \ i G S). For each S, Τ G С, 
1. STfT:= 
(a) SeCt,T<¿ C„ 
(b) s e cf, τ e (a- Cf), 
(c) S, Τ G (С, - Cf) and powd, S) > рог (і, Г), 
(d) 5, Τ G Cf and pow(i, S) > pow(i, Τ). 
2. SifT:= 
(a) s, ту C„ 
(b) S,Te (С, - Cf) andpow(i,S) = pow(i,Τ), 
(c) S, Τ e Cf and pow(i, S) = pow(i, Τ). 
3. SpfT := SirfT or StfT. 
These relations may be interpreted in the same way as in the open version. 
That is. Sir f Τ means that t finds S better than 7\ S if Τ means that i is 
indifferent between S and T, and SpfT means that t' finds S at least as 
good as T. The superscript cl in these notations reminds us that we are 
dealing with coalition preferences in the closed version of the theory of 
power excess coalitions. 
It is easy to prove that for each t' G Ν, pf is complete and transitive 
with respect to Cc'. Therefore, for each i the set 
MC^tf') = {S G Ccl | -.3Γ G C[TirfS}l 
is not empty. This set contains the maximal elements for i according to 
his closed coalition preference. If a player is rational, then he will strive 
to form a coalition from p{Cc\pf). 
A coalition S G p(Ccl, pf) is closed and has maximal power excess for 
i. That is, there is no other closed coalition with a greater power excess for 
L Note, however, that S G MCC', Ρ?) d o e s n o t imply that S G р(С, ρ*). 
Conversely, a coalition S G /x(C, />?) need not be a member of /i(Cc', pf). 
In defining a dominance relation for C, we proceed in the same way 
as in the open version. 
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Definition 6.14 Let Gs be a centralized weighted majority policy game 
and S, Τ be coalitions. 
L S e С dominates Τ e С := 
(a) for every i e S, SpfT and 
(b) there is at least one player i G S such that SirfT. 
2. S G С is undominated := there is no other coalition that dominates 
S. The set of undominated coalitions will be called the core of closed 
coalitions. Notation: Cocl(Ge). An S e Cod(G%) is called a closed 
core-coalition. 
The following result runs parallel to that in the open version: 
Theorem 6.8 Let G% be a centralized weighted majority policy game. Then 
Cod{Ge)i$. 
Proof. This is a consequence of theorem 6.9 and the fact that /i(Cc', pcJ) -j-
0. •. 
If S is a closed core-coalition, then for each i e S, S e ß(Cd,pf). 
Otherwise, S would be dominated. Hence, there is no better coalition for 
the members of S. 
Hypothesis 6.3 Let (7
Θ
 be a centralized policy game. Then only coalitions 
from Cocl(Ge) will be formed. 
The computation process for the core of closed coalitions can be simplified 
in a similar way as in the open version. 
Theorem 6.9 Let Ge be a centralized policy game and let с be the center 
player. Then 
Cocl(Gs) = ß(Cdipccl). 
Proof. This proof goes in an analogues way as the proof of 6.6. ü. 
However, the coalitional core must not be confused with the core of closed 
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coalitions. Since μ((7, ρ? will, in general, deviate from μ((7, p¡, the coali-
tional core is definitely not the same as the core of closed coalitions. Also 
note that a closed core-coalition is not necessarily a minimal winning 
coalition. 
A closed winning coalition within this context is called of minimum 
size if it contains the center player and if its size is not greater than any 
other closed winning coalition with the center player. 
Definition 6.15 Let G% be a centralized weighted majority policy game. 
Coalition S is of closed minimum size in 0% := 
1. S e Сы and 
2. w(S) < w(T)for every Τ e Ccl. 
The set of closed minimum size coalitions will be denoted by СЦ". 
Theorem 6.10 Let G% be a centralized weighted majority policy game. 
Then 
Cocl(G») = C
c
s
r . 
Proof. This proof goes in the same way as the proof of theorem 6.4. In 
stead ofW, the set С is used. •. 
That is, a closed core coalition for a policy game Gs is a closed coalition 
that contains the center player and that has a size that is less than or equal 
to the size of any other closed winning coalition with the center player. 
6.4 Center Parties and Cabinet Formations in 
Parliamentary Systems: Some Hypotheses 
In this section we translate the hypotheses as deduced in the theory of 
power excess coalitions in empirically testable hypotheses about cabinet 
formation in parliamentary systems. To illustrate the working of the the­
ories, we compute a prediction for the Dutch election of 6 September 
1989. 
A parliamentary system can be seen as a policy game 
GB = [q; wi, tü2,..., Wn], where the players are political parties and where 
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the weights are the number of seats of a political party in parliament. The 
policy order corresponds with the order in which the parties are given. 
Thus, party i is to the left of party г +1 etc. A coalition in a parliamentary 
system is called a cabinet. The quota is the number of seats necessary to 
form a majority cabinet. 
The theory of power excess coalitions for weighted majority games 
without policy order says, in fact, that only minimum size cabinets will be 
formed in parliamentary systems. This hypothesis has been thoroughly in­
vestigated and discussed (for example: De Swaan 1973, Taylor and Laver 
1973, Browne and Dreijmanis 1982), and has been coupled to hypotheses 
about the durability of cabinets (especially Dodd 1976, see also Grofman 
1989). We do not discuss it here. 
From the theory of power excess coalitions the following hypotheses 
can be derived: 
Hypothesis 6.4 In centralized parliamentary systems only core-cabinets 
will be formed. 
In such cabinets, each party, including the center party, has maximal power 
excess. According to the closed version of the theory, the hypothesis is 
Hypothesis 6.5 In centralized parliamentary systems only closed core-cabinets 
will be formed. 
As the theory indicates, a closed core-cabinet need not coincide with a 
core-cabinet. 
6.4.1 Computation example 
Consider the game representation of the Dutch parliament according to the 
election of 6 september 1989: 
[76; 6,49,12,54,22]. 
The parties are, from left to right, GL (Green Left), PvdA (Social Democrats), 
D66 (Left Liberals), CDA (Christian Democrats) and W D (Conservative 
Liberals). The policy positions of these parties are accordingly ordered 
from left to right. Parties with less than 2.5 % of the total number of 
votes have been omitted. These parties, which all are to the right of the 
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Cabinets with CDA 
{CDA, VVD} 
{CDA, VVD, D66} 
{CDA, VVD, D66, PvdA} 
{CDA, VVD, D66, PvdA, GL} 
{CDA, VVD, PvdA} 
{CDA, VVD, GL} 
{CDA, VVD, D66, GL} 
{CDA, D66, PvdA} 
{CDA, D66, PvdA, GL} 
{CDA, PvdA} 
{CDA, PvdA, GL} 
CDA 
32 
20 
-29 
-35 
-17 
26 
14 
-7 
-13 
5 
0 
VVD 
-32 
-44 
-93 
-99 
-81 
-38 
-50 
D66 
-64 
-113 
-119 
-70 
-91 
-97 
PvdA 
-39 
-45 
-27 
-17 
-23 
-5 
-12 
GL 
-131 
-70 
-82 
-109 
-97 
Table 6.3: 
conservative liberals, are dummies which have no influence on the cabinet 
formation process19. 
Clearly this game is decisive. Hence there must be a center party (cf. 
theorem 5.13). This is the CDA. To see this, take the sum of the weights 
of the parties which are to the left of the CDA. This sum is less than 76. 
Also, the sum of the parties to the right of the CDA is less than 76. Hence 
any combination of parties to the left or to the right of the CDA needs the 
CDA in order to form a closed majority cabinet. Neither side can form 
a majority cabinet on its own. In contrast, the CDA can form a majority 
cabinet either with parties from the left or with parties from the right. To 
check, note that 
| w(L) - w(R) |= 45 < wcDA = 54, 
where w(L) and w(R) are, respectively, the sizes of Left and Right. 
Thanks to theorem 6.6, the preference of the CDA suffices to compute 
the coalitional core. The full set of cabinets with the center party CDA is 
given in table 1. This table also indicates the power excess of the several 
parties in the several possible winning combinations. From this table, the 
power excess of the CDA in the several cabinets can be read off (column 
two). It has greatest power excess in the combination {CDA, VVD}. 
19A similar convention is adopted in De Swaan (1973). 
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Hence, this coalition is the most preferred by this party. By theorem 6.6, 
it is the core coalition and, according to hypothesis 6.4, a {CDA, VVD} 
cabinet will be formed. To check, note that this is also the cabinet that is 
mostly preferred by the WD. In this cabinet, this party too has maximal 
power excess. With respect to the first column of table 6.3, the {CDA, 
VVD} cabinet is, as expected, of minimum size (cf. theorem 6.7). 
Consider the closed cabinets in the first column of table 6.3. Since 
{CDA, VVD} is a closed cabinet, the picture does not change. According 
to hypothesis 6.5, this cabinet will be formed. Note that it is, again, the 
best possibility for the WD. In this combination, the W D has maximal 
power excess. Adding more parties (f.e. D66) only would increase the 
internal opposition for the W D and hence decrease its power excess. With 
respect to the set of closed cabinets, the {CDA, WD} combination is, as 
expected, of minimum size. This cabinet even happens to be of minimum 
size with respect to the set of all winning cabinets. This, however, is an 
accidental fact. 
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Chapter 7 
Coalition Formation in 
Social Choice Games 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we will solve the second part of problem 2 formulated 
in chapter 1. Consider a nonempty and finite set ./V = {l,2,...,n} of 
players and a nonempty set X of social states. Let ρ = (Ri, R2,..., Än) 
be a preference profile concerning X. Now suppose that a social choice 
only can be made by cooperation, that is, by forming a coalition. What 
coalitions will be formed? What coalition preferences will each player 
form in order to realize a social choice that is as close as possible to his 
most preferred alternative? 
A social choice game is a 4-tuple (N, W, X, p) where 
1. (N, W) is a simple game, 
2. X is a social choice problem (a nonempty set of social states), and 
3. ρ is a preference profile (Αι,Α2,···,-β
η
), where Ri e 0(X) for 
every i e N. 
More precisely, the above mentioned problem now is how players in a 
social choice game form preferences concerning W on the basis of their 
preferences in ρ and how they use their thus formed coalitional preferences 
in order to form a winning coalition. 
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In this chapter two theories of coalition formation in social choice 
games are presented. In both theories the concept of distance is crucial. 
In the first theory distance is used as a measure of conflict between two 
preferences. The basic idea is that the greater the distance between two 
preferences Ä, and Rj, the greater the conflict of interest between individ-
uals i and j . By defining a measure of dispersion for the set of distances 
for each pair of preferences in an arbitrary preference profile, a conflict 
index can be obtained. By using the preferences of the individuals in a 
coalition, also the conflict index of each coalition can be determined. The 
basic behavioral assumption of this theory is that each player strives to 
form a coalition with a minimal conflict index. Because of this assumption 
this theory will be called conflict minimization theory. 
The other theory is related to De Swaan's policy distance theory. De 
Swaan's theory is treated in chapter 6. Point of departure of our the-
ory is the distance between a player's preference with respect to X and 
the social preference that he expects to be formulated when that coalition 
will be formed. As we have tried to make clear in chapter 2, generat-
ing a social preference requires a social choice rule. Thus, it is assumed 
that each player knows the social choice rule to be used in each relevant 
coalition. Further it is assumed that each player exactly knows the other 
players'preferences with respect to X. A player then can calculate the so-
cial preference for each coalition and therefore he can compute the distance 
between his preference and the social preference of each winning coali-
tion. The basic behavioral assumption is that each player strives to form 
a winning coalition such that the distance between his preference and the 
social preference of that coalition is minimal. Because distances between 
preferences are fundamental in this theory, it will be called preference 
distance theory. 
Distance in the first place is a geometrical concept and therefore it 
is natural to employ the usual geometrical methods to develop a theory 
of preference distances. In fact, these geometrical methods are employed 
in the theory of spatial voting (cf. Elenow and Hinich 1984; Riker and 
Ordeshook 1973: Ch. 11 and 12; for an intuitive introduction to these 
methods see Grofmann et. al. 1988). However, crucial for the methods 
in that field of application is the presupposition of the continuity of space. 
This makes these methods less appropriate for our purpose. The sets we are 
dealing with all have a discrete character. In chapter 2, we have assumed 
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that X is finite. Consequently, individual preferences, which are relations 
on X are also finite. Further, the set of players is assumed to be finite, 
so that the set W is finite (cf. Chapter 5). Clearly, each set derived in 
some way or another from these basic sets must be finite (cf. for example 
the several prediction sets in chapters 5 and 6). Methods for analyzing 
continuous space will ignore the essentially discrete character of these 
sets and are therefore less appropriate. The use of discrete mathematical 
methods seems to be more natural. 
Another argument for the use of discrete mathematics is more filo-
sophical in nature. We think that the social and political realm in essence 
is inhabited by discrete combinatorial structures. The social and political 
world itself is combinatorial in nature. This 'Weltanschauung' has some 
consequences. If social and political life is in essence discrete and com-
binatorial in nature, then the empirical domain for the social and political 
science must consist mainly of discrete variables. In order to be meaning-
ful, social and political theories must reflect the discrete and combinatorial 
character of the empirical domain. This only can be done by using discrete 
mathematical methods. 
For these reasons we explicitly choose for the use of discrete mathe-
matics in this chapter. This decision is in line with the research policy as 
used in chapter 4 of this monograph. Also in that chapter we decided to 
use discrete mathematics, especially digraph theory, for developing solu-
tion theories for preference profiles. 
In section 2 of this chapter we define the concept of social choice 
game. This concept is very important since it is the starting point of 
the coalition theories presented in this chapter. In section 3 a theory of 
preference distances is presented that is entirely formulated in terms of 
discrete mathematics. With the aid of the set-theoretical operation of sym-
metric difference we define a discrete metric space in which the distance 
between each pair of preferences can be measured. This metric space is 
called Hamming space. In the thereupon following section - section 4 -
we present conflict minimization theory. First the descriptive part of this 
theory is presented. After this the solution part of the theory is presented. 
Finally, in order to illustrate the working of conflict minimization theory, 
we provide a computation example. In section 5 preference distance the-
ory is presented. Again the presentation has a similar structure: first we 
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present the descriptive part and then the solution part. Since the concept 
of a set of maximal elements will not work for this theory, we employ 
the theory of generalized stable sets as developed in chapter 4. Finally, in 
order to illustrate the working of preference distance theory, we provide a 
computation example for this theory too. In the final section we discuss 
the possibility of empirical applications of the presented theories. Further, 
we discuss other application fields of the concepts of Hamming space and 
Hamming conflict indices. 
7.2 Social Choice Games 
In this section simple game theory will be complicated by introducing ex­
plicitly the preferences of the individual players concerning a social choice 
problem. The games will be called social choice games. An important im­
puls to the study of this kind of games is given in Nagamura (1975, 1979). 
Nagamura calls these games 'simple games with ordinal preferences'. 
Definition 7.1 A 4-tuple (N, W,X,p) is a social choice game := 
1. (N, W) is a simple game, 
2. X is a social choice problem, 
3. ρ eu is a preference profile concerning X. 
We will abstract away, just as in the other types of simple games, from 
the rules that specify winning and losing coalitions1. We are thus able to 
formulate propositions that are independent of the rules of winning and 
losing. 
7.3 Hamming Space 
The origin of the distance theory presented in this section is Kemeny 
and Snell (1963) and Bogart (1973). Also see Barthélémy and Mon-
jardet (1981). Kemeny and Snell and also Bogarts use matrix-theoretical 
lCf. chapter 5.1. 
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terms to define distances between preferences. In contrast we will use 
set-theoretical terms without referring to matrices. 
Intuitively, the notion of distance between two preferences has to do 
with the dissimilarity between those preferences. The greater their dis­
tance, the greater their dissimilarity. However, before formalizing this 
intuition, we first have to specify exactly what distance on a set of prefer­
ences is. This specification will be done by using the notion of preference 
distance function. 
Definition 7.2 Let Re be the set of real numbers. The function d : B(X) χ 
B(X) —• Re is a preference distance function or, equivalently, a preference 
metric := 
1. diR^Rj) > Ofor every Я„Д, e B(X) and d(R,R) = O/or every 
R G B(X); 
2. d{Rt,R3) = d{R},R,)for every Rtì R2 e B{X); 
3. diR^Rj) + diRj, Rk) > ¿(Д., Rk) for every Rt, Rj, Rk e B(X). 
Remember that B(X) is the set of complete and reflexive preferences on 
X (see chapter 2). An ordered pair (B(X), d), where a is a preference 
distance function, is called a metric preference space. Since X is finite, 
{B{X),d) where d is a preference distance function is a discrete metric 
space2. 
The first property of a preference distance function states that the dis­
tance between two preferences is always nonnegative and that the distance 
between two preferences is zero if the two preferences are identical. Both 
parts of this property are intuitively acceptable. The second property is a 
symmetry condition. It states that the distance between R
x
 and Rj equals 
the distance between # , and Л,. Again this corresponds with our intuition 
of distance and dissimilarity. The third property is called triangle inequal­
ity. This property is somewhat more difficult to understand. It asserts, in 
fact, a kind of transitivity of distance. 
2In genera], a point υ G V in a metric space (V, d) is isolated if the set {v} consisting 
of ν alone is open. A metric space (V, d) is discrete if every point in V is isolated. An 
extensive study of discrete metric spaces can be found in Storcken (1989, esp. chapter 
3). 
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In the following sections we want every preference profile to be a 
metric space. In order to make this possible, we need the concept of a 
subspace. Let (B(X),d) be a metric space. A subspace is obtained by 
taking a subset Bi(X) from B(X) and subsequently by restricting d to 
Bi(X) χ Bi(X) (cf. Mendelson 1973: 56). 
Definition 7.3 Let (B(X),d) be a metric preference space. Let B\(X) Ç 
B{X) and let 
d' = d\Bx{X)xBi{X). 
Then (-Si(X), d') is said to be a subspace of (B(X), d). 
Though we now know what properties a preference distance function 
must satisfy, we do not yet know how to determine the distances between 
preferences. For this it is necessary to specify a particular preference 
distance function. The general idea we will use for this purpose is that 
the smaller the number of ordered pairs of social states two preferences 
have in common, the more dissimilar the two preferences are. A distance 
function that captures this idea in an exact way is the Hamming distance 
function. In general, the Hamming distance between two sets is the number 
of elements in the symmetric difference of these sets (cf. Barthélémy and 
Monjardet 1981, Bollobas 1986); that is, the number of elements that are 
in either one of the two sets but not in both. Since preferences are binary 
relations and since binary relations are sets, this notion can also be applied 
to preferences. 
Definition 7.4 Let Ri, Rj e B(X). The symmetric difference of R¡ and 
Rj, denoted by Ä, φ Rj, is the set of all ordered pairs of social states that 
are in Ri or in Rj but not both, i.e. 
Ri Θ Rj := (Ri U Rj) - (Ri η Rj). 
The precise definition of the Hamming preference distance function is: 
Definition 7.5 The mapping h : B(X) χ B(X) -> Re such that 
h(Ri,Rj) = \(Ri®Rj)\i 
for every (Ri,Rj) 6 B(X) χ B(X) is called the Hamming preference 
distance function. 
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It must be proven that h really is a preference distance function. 
Theorem 7.1 The ordered pair (B(X), h) is a metric preference space, 
that is, h is a preference distance function. 
Proof. We only prove triangle inequality, that is, 
(Ri Φ Rk) Ç ((Ri θ Rj) U (Rj φ Я*)). 
Let (χ, у) e Ri Φ Rk but suppose (χ, y) g ((β, φ Rj) U (Rj φ # f c)). Γ/ωί 
is, (χ, y) g -R¿ φ A, and (χ, y) g Rj φ Rk. But then (χ, y) e Ri Π Rj 
and (χ,y) e Rj Π Rk, that is, (χ,y) G 0{Ri,Rj,Rk}. This implies 
(x,y) $Ri®Rk. Contradiction. Therefore, (χ,y) G ((Ri®Rj)U(Rj®Rk)). 
•. 
Thus, Λ is a metric on Б(Х). As we wanted, h shows how many 
different ordered pairs of social states a couple of preferences have and 
therefore how dissimilar they are. The less they have in common, the 
greater the Л-distance between them3. 
Since the space (B(X), h) is so fundamental in our story, it is useful 
to give it a particular name: 
Definition 7.6 The metric preference space (B(X), h) is called Hamming 
space. 
In order to avoid cumbersome notation we also will use the notation h for 
every subspace of a Hamming space unless confusion may be raised4. 
To illustrate the working of the concept of Hamming distance, consider 
the preference profile (Ri, R2) where Ri = {(xi, хг), (хг, ^з), (χι, хз)} and 
3
 Barthélémy and Monjardet (1981) use the Hamming distance to study median rela-
tions of preference profiles. In their study, the remoteness Δ(Λ, ρ) between a relation R 
and a profile ρ is defined as A(R,p) = £" . , h(R, Ri). A relation M is defined to be 
a median for a preference profile if and only if Δ(Μ,ρ) = тіплев(Х)^(і2,р). That is, 
medians are relations that minimize the remoteness from a profile. A social choice system 
that selects a median for each profile is the system of majority decision (see chapter 3 for 
a definition of this system). The socalled Kemeny procedure (Kemeny 1959, Fishbum 
1977) selects a linear ordering as a median for every preference profile, hence also for 
profiles for which the majority relation is cyclic. 
4For the concept of subspace, cf. definition 2.2 of this section. 
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Ri = {(а;з,а;і),(хі,Х2),(хз,і2)}· In compact notation (cf. chapter 2, 
section 5), this profile can be written as 
R\ '. X\X2X3 
R2 ' X3X1X2 
RiURi = {(xi,X2),(хг,xi),(xu 13),(яэ, art), (^3,^2)}· R^Ri = {(^1,^2)}· 
(Л, U Ä2) - (Ri Π Яг) = {(хг,хз),(хі,хз),хз,хі)Лхз,Х2)}. Therefore, 
ВД,Я2) = 4. 
Since h is a preference distance function, it satisfies symmetry. There­
fore, for each preference profile, we only have to compute (n(n — l))/2 
Hamming distances, where η is the number of individuals. 
With the aid of h other useful concepts can be defined5. 
Definition 7.7 Let B,(X) ç B(X). 
1. The diameter of B\(X) is 
maxihiRi^Rj) \ R^Rj 6 Bi(X)} 
and is denoted by diam(,B\(X)). 
2. The mesh width ofB\(X)is 
min{h{Ri,Rj) I R^Rj G Βχ(.Χ)}· 
and is denoted by mesh(B\(X)). 
The diameter and the meshwidth of a set of preferences are, respectively, 
the largest distance between two preferences in that set and the smallest 
5The following definitions of course can be given for any distance function on a set. 
However, since we will not work with other distance functions, we only define these 
concepts for Hamming space (and subspaces of Hamming space). A similar research 
procedure is employed in the field of spatial voting. In that field, the relevant space is 
Euclidian space. The distance measures mostly used are Euclidian Distance and its gen­
eralization Weighted Euclidian Distance (WED). Preferences of voters and other concepts 
are defined with the aid of these measures. Cf. Riker and Ordeshook (1973: Chapters 
11 and 12), Enelow and Hinich (1984). In contrast, Storcken (1989: chapter 3) studies 
discrete metric spaces in general without reference to any particular distance function. 
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distance between two different preferences in that set. Both terms are 
standard in topology and digraph theory. In Storcken (1989: 149) the 
definitions of diameter and meshwidth are given with respect to an arbitrary 
set V and a distance function d on V. Instead of the operations of max 
and min, Storcken uses, respectively, the operations of sup (least upper 
bound) and inf (greatest lower bound). The operation of max is also used 
in Bollobas (1986: 102). Since we are exclusively dealing with finite sets, 
there is no difference in this respect. 
7.3.1 Normalization of Dissimilarity 
The Hamming distance is a measure of the dissimilarity between two 
arbitrary preferences. In order to compare the dissimilarities between pairs 
of arbitrary preferences, it may be necessary to normalize the Hamming 
distances of these pairs of preferences. For this, we propose the following 
normalization procedure. 
Let Ri and Rj be linear orders and suppose Rj is the converse of R^ 
that is, xPjy if yPix for every x,y e X. Then Л, П Rj = 0. Therefore, 
since | Ri |=| Rj \= (m(m - l))/2 where m is the number of alternatives, 
h(Ri, Rj) = m(m — 1). If one of the preferences is a weak order or if their 
intersection is not empty, then, clearly, the Hamming distance must be less 
than m(m — 1). Therefore, m(m — 1) is the maximal possible Hamming 
distance between preferences. This justificates the following definition: 
Definition 7.8 Let m be the number of alternatives in X and let Ri and 
Rj be preferences. 
h (RR \— bfàiRj) 
т(тп — 1) 
hnorm(Ri, Rj) is called the normed Hamming distance between Ri and Rj. 
According to this definition, the greater h
n0Tm between two preferences, the 
greater their dissimilarity or the less their similarity defined as 1 — h
noTm. 
The dissimilarity is maximal, if h
norm
 = 1. Then, the similarity is minimal. 
It is now also possible to compare the dissimilarities between arbitrary pref­
erences from different preference profiles. To be more specific, let ρ and 
q be two different preference profiles. If h
n0Tm(R?, R^) < hnorm(Rl, Д'), 
then it is allowed to say that Rl and i2f are at least as dissimilar as i?,' 
and Щ. 
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7.3.2 Betweenness of Preferences 
In general, three elements in a set will satisfy the triangle equality if one 
element is, in some way or another, between the two other elements. The 
same is true for a set of preferences if we use the following notion of 
betweenness6: 
Definition 7.9 Ut Ä,, ϋ
άί
 Rk e B(X). Щ is between Д, and Rk := 
• Rj С Л, U Rk; 
• RjDRiH Rk. 
According to this definition, a preference Rj is between two other prefer­
ences Ri and Rk if, firstly, it is contained in the union of Ä, and Rk and if, 
secondly, it contains all ordered pairs of social states common to i?, and 
Rk. This notion has some resemblance with our intuition of betweenness 
of a point between two other points on a straight line. However, some care 
is necessary. For the straight line, betweenness is a transitive notion. If a 
point 6 is between points a and с and if с is between 6 and d, then both 6 
and с are between a and d. In order to obtain transitivity of betweenness 
of preferences we need a similar concept as 'straight line'. Let us first 
study an example. 
Preference Profile 7.1 
Ri '. X1X2X3X4 
Ri '. Х3Ж1 £4X2 
Ri '. X3Z4X1X2 
R4 '. 14x2x3^1 
Since Rz С R1UR3 and Rz D RiHRj = {(Х\,Х2)ЛХЗ,ХА)}, RI is between 
R\ and Ri. Since #3 с Rz U A» and Ri D Ri Π RA = {(хз, χι), (χ4, хг)}, 
'This notion is used in another formulation in the work of Restie (1959). There a set 
Sj is defined to be between two sets S, and Sk if and only if 
1. S,· η s; η S* = 0, 
2. 5ίη5,·η5£ = 0, 
where Se denotes the complement of 5. As the reader can easily verify, this definition 
is equivalent to ours. 
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Лз is between R2 and RA. However, neither R2 nor A3 is between R\ and 
RA since, for example, (x2, ^з). which is in the intersection of R\ and RA, 
is neither in R2 nor in A). 
The Hamming distances of the preferences in profile 7.1 are as fol­
lows. R\ Π i?2 = {(хі,і2),(а;і,х4),(жз,а:4)}. This makes: (R\ U Я2) -
CRi Π Лг) = {(χ2ιΧ3))(3;2>Χ4)«(χ3«χι)*(χ3ιΧ2))(χΐι^3)ι(χ4,Χ2)}· There­
fore, h(R\,R2) = 6. In the same way, we compute h(R\,R3) = 8, 
h(Ri,RA) = 10, h(R2,R3) = 2, h^RJ = 8 and Л(Лз,А,) = 6. This 
leads to the observation that Л(Аі, R2)+h(R2, R3) = ^(#1, A3) and Л(Л2, Яз)+ 
h(R3,RA) = h(R2,RA),buth(R
u
R2)+h(R2,RA) > h(Ri,RA)andh(R
u
R3)+ 
h(R3,RA) > h(Ri,RA). The next proposition shows that this observation 
holds in general. 
Theorem 7.2 For every .п,-,і^,Д* e ß(X).· .Rj is between Л, ала ßjt if 
and only if hiRi, Rj) + Л(Д,-, Д
к
) = Л(Д„ Äfc). 
Proof. 
7) Leí Rj be between # , a/iJ Rk. It suffices to prove that \ R¡ φ Rj \ + 
\Rj®Rk |=| Ri Θ Rk \, that is, (Л,· Θ Rj) U (R,· Θ Е
к
) = Ä, θ Rk- Now: 
(Ri Θ Äj) U (Я,- Θ Äfc) = (Ai U Rj U ñfe) - (Ri Π Я,- Π Rk)). 
Since Rj С (Д, и Rk), we have: 
((Ri U Rj U Д*) - (Ri η Д, Π Л*)) = ((Ri U Д*) - (Д, Π Rj Π Äfc)). 
Since Rj D ( Д, η Rk), we must have: 
(Ri nRjH Rk) = (Ri Π Д*). 
Therefore, 
(Ri Θ Rj) U (Rj φ Д*) = ((Ri U Äfc) - (Д, Π Rk) = Д; Φ Д ь 
2) Leí ¿(Я,-, Д;) + ад, Rk) = ЛСД,, Rk), 
i.e. Ri φ Д, U Rj Φ Д* = Ä, θ Дь 
i.e. 
((ДІ U Д, U Rk) - (Ri Π Rj Π Д*)) = ((ДІ U Д
к
) - (ДІ П ДО). (*) 
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We have to prove: 
a) Rj QRiO Rk, and 
b) Rj 2 Ri П Rh-
First we prove a). Let (x, y) e Rj and suppose (x, y) 0 Д, U Rk- (x, y) & 
Ri U Rk, implies (x, y) $ Д, П Rk- Hence, (x, y) £ ((Я, U Rò - (Rt Π Rk)). 
Since (х,у)е Rj, (x,y) G (Я,URjURk). Clearly, (χ,y) i (A¿ПR, ПД*). 
Яела?, (χ, у) 6 ((Я, U Rj U Äfc) - (Я, Π Rj Π .Rjt)). 5mce (χ, у) £ ((Д, U 
Д*)-(п,ПіУ), 
((Я, U Л,- U Rk) -(Ri Г) Rj Π Äfc)) ^ ((Ä, U Äjt) - (Ri Π Я
к
)), 
wA/cA w in contradiction with (*). Hence (x, y) G Я, U Я*. 
Now wc prove о). Let (χ, у) 6 Я, П Я* am/ suppose (χ, у) # Rj. Then, 
(x, y) G ЯІ Π Я*) imp/íw (χ, y) <¿ (Ri U Я*) - (Я, Π Rk). 
Further, (x, y) e Ri Π Я*) also implies (χ, y) G (Я, U Я*). Hence, (x, y) G 
(Я, U Rj U Я*). Smc<? (χ, у) G (Я, П Я*) but (χ, у) £ Я;, (х,у) ¿ (Я, П 
Rj П Я*). Hence, 
((Ri U Я, U Я*) - (Ri П Я, П Я*)) j ((Ri U Rk) - (Ri П Я*)), 
WAÍCA /i in contradiction with (*). Hence, (x, y) G Rj. П. 
In order to obtain transitivity of betweenness of preferences as defined 
in definition 7.9, we use the concept of 'linear profile'. This concept is 
obviously inspired by the term 'interval' on the real line. 
Definition 7.10 Let ρ = (fíi ,A2,· · · ,#„) be a preference profile, ρ is 
called a linear profile := for all i,j,k = 1,2,..., η and г < j < k, Rj 
is between Ri and Rk. 
In terms of Restie (1959), a linear profile is a linear array of preferences7. 
Note that the preferences in preference profile 7.1 cannot be re-arranged 
such that they form a linear profile. 
Linear profiles will play a curious role in the solution part of preference 
distance theory of coalition formation (cf. section 7.5 below). Before 
turning to the coalition formation theories we first formulate a connection 
between linear profiles and majority choice. 
'Consider Restle's definition of linear array (Restie 1959). To see that his definition of 
linear array applied to preference profiles is equivalent to our definition of linear profile, 
use theorems 5 and б in his work. 
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7.3.3 A Sufficient Condition for the Existence of Majority 
Choice 
The system of majority decision has been discussed in chapter 3 of this 
monograph. In this subsection we show that there is a majority choice for 
every linear profile. 
Lemma 7.1 For every i,j e TV.· M(Ri,Rj) is between Д, and Rj. 
Proof. If (x,y) e M(Ri,Rj), then (x,y) e Ri U Rj. If Ri П Rj i 0, then 
there is unanimity between i and j vis-a-vis χ and y and hence (x,y) G 
M(Ri,Rj). О 
Theorem 7.3 Let ρ = (Ri, Ri,..., R
n
) be a linear profile. Then 
1. M(p) = -R(n+i)/2 when η is odd, 
2. M(p) = МЦИп/г, Ä(n/2>*i)) when η is even. 
Proof. 
la). Let ρ be a linear profile, let η be odd and let (x, y) G R{n+\)ß· Since 
ρ is a linear profile, R(
n+\)/2 is between Rj and Rkfor every j < (n +1)/2 
and к > (η + l)/2. Therefore, (x,y) e Rj U Rk for j < (n + l)/2 and 
к > (η + l)/2 by definition of betweenness. Suppose (x,y) £ Rj for 
j < (n + l)/2. Then (x,y) e Rk for every к such that ((n + l)/2) < 
к < η and hence, since (χ,ι/) G R(
n
+\)/2 by hypothesis, (x,y) G M(p). 
In the same way, if (x,y) # Rk, then (x,y) G Rj for every j such that 
1 < j < ((" + I)/ 2 ) - 1} and hence, since (x, y) G fí(n+i)/2 by hypothesis, 
(ж, y) G M (ρ). If (χ, y) G Rj and (x, y) G Rk, then there is unanimity and, 
hence, {x,y) G Μ (ρ). 
lb). Let ρ be a linear profile and suppose (x, y) G M(p). Suppose 
(x,y) g R(n+\)ß· But then, since | {t G Ν | χΛ,ι/} |> (n + l)/2, there 
must be Rj and Rk with j < (n + l)/2 and к > (η + l)/2 such that 
(x,y) G Rj Π Rk- This implies that i2(
n
+i)/2 is not between Rj and Rk. 
Contradiction. Hence, (x,y) G #(п+і)/2· 
2а). Let ρ be a linear profile, let η be even and let (x, y) G M(R
n
/2, R{n/2y+\)-
Since M(R
n
/2,R{n/2}+i) is between R
n
/2 and R(n/2)+i by lemma 7.1, and 
since ρ is a linear profile, MiRnß, Α(η/2>+ι) is between every Rj and Rk 
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with j < n/2 and к > (n/2) + 1. Therefore, (х,у) e R, U Rk for every 
j < n/2 and к > (n/2) + 1. Suppose (x,y) g Rj for j < n/2. Then 
(x, y) e Rk for every (n/2) + 1 < к < η. Hence, (χ, y) G M(p). /η гЛе 
same way we prove that (x, y) e M(p) w/iew (x, y) £ Rj with 1 < j < n/2. 
2b). Let ρ be a linear profile, let η be even and suppose (x,y) G M(p). 
If(x,y) & M(Rn/2,R<nßyn), then (x,y) & Rnp and (x,y) g R<n/2)+ì· 
Hence, since (x, y) e M(p), there must be Rj and Rk with j < n/2 and 
к > (n/2) + 1 such that (x, y) e Rj U Rk- However, then neither R
n
/2 nor 
R{nßy\ between Rj and Rk and, hence, ρ is not a linear profile. Contra­
diction and thus (x, y) e M(Rnßi R(nßy\). • 
This theorem provides us with a sufficient condition for the existence 
of majority choice. 
Corollary 7.1 Let ρ = (Яі, i^, · · ·, Яп) be a linear profile. Then there 
exists a majority choice. 
Proof. If η is odd, then by theorem 73, M(p) = Л(
п
+і)/2. Since this indi­
vidual preference is complete and transitive, M(p) is complete and tran­
sitive and hence Соп(Х,М(р)) ^ 0. If η is even, then by theorem 7.3, 
M(p) = M(Rnß, R(nß}^). Since M(Rnß, %/2κι) is complete and acycli-
cal, M(p) is complete and acyclical and, hence, Con(X, M(p)) ^ 0. ü. 
Note that this result differs from the well known result of Black that a 
majority choice exists when a preference profile is single peaked (Black 
1957: 16; Fishbum: 105). In the case of single peakedness, there is 
a linear order on the set of alternatives X such that "each individual's 
preference increases up to a peak or to an indifference plateau, and then 
decreases thereafter" (Fishbum 1973: 101). In the case of linear profiles, 
there is a weak ordering on the set of individuals TV such that the prefer-
ences are between each other. Either condition, however, is sufficent for 
the existence of majority choice. 
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7.4 Conflict Minimization and Coalition Forma-
tion 
In chapter 5, we discussed Axelrod's conflict of interest theory. The basic 
behavioral assumption of that theory is that each player strives to form a 
coalition with minimal conflict of interest. But, as we have discussed in 
chapter 5, there are some problems with the measurement of conflict of 
interest. In Axelrod's view, the conflict of interest notion has to do with 
the dispersion of the policy positions of the players. Since these policy 
positions are on an ordinal scale, the dispersion hardly can be measured. 
What only seems possible to say is that the range of the dispersion of the 
policy positions of the members in a coalition positively correlates with 
the degree of conflict in that coalition (Axelrod 1970: 169; also cf. chapter 
5, section 7). 
In this section we present a theory that is based on Axelrod's conflict 
of interest theory of coalition formation. The theory starts from the same 
behavioral assumption as Axelrod's one, namely, that each player strives 
to form a coalition with minimal conflict. However, our theory will go 
further. To solve the problem of the measurement of conflict in a coalition, 
we will use the theory of Hamming spaces as developed in the previous 
section. With the aid of this theory the notion of conflict index of a coalition 
will be developed. With this notion, the degree of conflict in each coalition 
can be measured. Another important difference with Axelrod's theory is 
that we assume that coalition formation processes take place in political 
systems that can be modelled as social choice games. Thus, the theory 
presented in this section uses more parameters than Axelrod's one (and is 
therefore comparatively more complex). In this sense, our theory may be 
thought of as a refinement of Axelrod's theory. Since conflict minimization 
is so important for our theory, it will be called the conflict minimization 
theory of coalition formation. Before presenting this theory, we first define 
and discuss the concept of conflict index. 
7.4.1 Conflict Indices for Sets of Preferences 
A conflict index is a mapping which assigns a real number to each subset of 
B(X). The number assigned to a set of preferences Bi Ç B(X) is called 
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the conflict index of B\. Clearly, not every mapping is suitable. Firstly, a 
conflict index of a set of preferences must at least be zero. Either there 
is some conflict or else there is none. Secondly, if all preferences in a 
set of preferences are identical then the conflict index of this set must be 
equal to zero. Then, there is absolute consensus and hence no conflict. 
Formally: 
Definition 7.11 A conflict index С is a mapping from the power set of 
B{X) into the set of real numbers Re such that for all B\ Ç B(X), 
i. cm > 0, 
2. C{Bx) = 0 if and only if for every R,QeBx:R=Q. 
The real number C(B\) assigned to a B\ Ç B(X) by a conflict index С is 
called the conflict index of Βχ. 
A conflict index using information about the Hamming distances be­
tween preferences in a set of preferences is called a Hamming conflict 
index. 
Definition 7.12 Let (B(X),h) be a Hamming space. AfunctionH : V(B(X)) -» 
Re is a Hamming conflict index := 
1. Η is a conflict index and 
2. there is a function ƒ that assigns a real number to each set of Ham­
ming distances such thatfor every B\ Ç B(X), H{B\) = f({h(R,Q) | 
RiQeBx}). 
Clearly, there are many possible Hamming conflict indices. For example, 
the usual measures of dispersion like the standard deviation, the variance 
or the coefficient of variation of the Hamming distances for a set of pref-
erences may be used. Another possibility is the ratio between the sum of 
Hamming distances Σ M-ñ, Q) for R,Q £ B\ с B(X) and the maximum 
possible value this sum can take for B\. 
A Hamming measure that is most in accordance with the work of 
Axelrod (1970) and De Swaan (1973) is what we call the conflict range. 
Since our theory owes a great deal to the conflict of interest theory we shall 
explicate this concept. In section 7.4.4 we will use it in a computation 
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example. The notion of dispersion as used in Axelrod's conflict of interest 
theory has been made explicit in the work of De Swaan (1973). There it is 
explicitly associated with the notion of range. De Swaan defines the range 
of a coalition S as the segment of the policy order that is between the most 
left player in S and the most right player of S. With the next definition, 
we keep in line with this approach. Remember that the diameter and the 
meshwidth of a set of preferences are defined in section 2 of this chapter. 
Definition 7.13 Let 5,(X) ς B(X). 
The conflict range of Bi(X) is the difference 
diam(Bi(X)) - mesh(Bi(X)). 
Notation: r(Bi(X)). 
2. The normalized conflict range of B\(X) is equal to 
аіатп(Ві(Х)) - meshjB^X)) 
diam(B\{X)) 
Notation: rnorm(ßi(X)) 
It is easy to verify that for every B\ Ç B(X) the conflict range is nonnega-
tive and that the conflict range is zero if for every R, Q g B\, R = Q.. The 
same is true for the normalized conflict range. Further, 0 < г
п о г т
( Б і ) < 1 
for every Βχ Ç B(X). The normalized conflict range can be used for com-
parison purposes. 
The concept of Hamming conflict index is basic in conflict minimiza-
tion theory. However, the theory will be formulated such that it works for 
any Hamming conflict index. No reference to a particular index will be 
made. 
7.4.2 Conflict Minimization Theory: Descriptive Part 
Starting point is that each player wants to be a member of a winning 
coalition with a minimal Hamming conflict index. Consider a social choice 
game G = (Ν, W, Χ,ρ). Remember that 
Wi :={S eW\ie S}. 
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Define 
RP(S) := {R? | i e S}. 
Now consider a Hamming conflict index Я and let Η(ΚΡ(5)) denote the 
Hamming conflict index for S. A player i e N will strictly prefer a 
coalition S to Τ if and only if 5, Γ G W, and H(RP(S)) < H(RP(T)). 
Formally: 
Definition 7.14 Let G = (Ν, W, Χ,ρ) be a social choice game, let S,T e 
W, let i e N and let Η be a Hamming conflict index. 
1. i strictly prefers S to T, notation: Sv^T, := 
(a) S e Wi,T $ Wi or 
(b) S,Te Wi and H(Rp(S)) < H(RP(T)). 
2. i is indifferent between S and T, notation: S^T := 
(a) S^T^Wior 
(b) S, Τ e Wi and H(Rp(S)) = Я(пр(Г))· 
3. i weakly prefers S to T, notation: Sp^T, := £ < Τ or SfT. 
The superscripts in the notation of these preferences are used to remind us 
that we are dealing with preferences as defined in conflict minimization 
theory. Since p? is complete and transitive with respect to W, the set 
μΟν,ρΐ) = {S e W Ι -3Γ e W[TT<S]} 
is not empty8. 
7.4.3 Conflict Minimization Theory: Solution Part 
The following step is to specify the solution part of conflict minimization 
theory. In accordance with De Swaan (1973, also see chapter 6), we may 
say that coalition S dominates coalition Τ if and only if every i in S 
strictly prefers S to T. Since every i e S - Τ strictly prefers S to Τ and 
8For a general definition of maximal choice sets, consider chapter 2 and 4. For a 
study of the properties of such sets, consider chapter 4. 
208 
since every i e Τ — S strictly prefers Τ to S by assumption 6 of policy 
distance theory9, only the strict preferences of the members in S Π Τ must 
be investigated in order to determine the dominance relation between S 
and Г. 
In this chapter we explicitly use the idea that only the preferences 
of the players in the intersection of two coalitions are decisive. This 
idea is worked out in In McKelvey, Ordeshook and Winer (1978) and in 
McKelvey and Ordeshook (1978). In their view, if 3i e S Π Τ : SpiT, 
then S is said to be viable against T. Clearly, if S Π Τ = 0, then there 
is no г e S1 Π Γ such that 7Υ,5 and, hence, S is viable against T. Thus, 
the notion of viability is explicitly based on the idea that players in the 
intersection of two coalitions are 'critical' in the determination of the 
survival chances of the respective coalitions. This idea is attractive. To 
feel this intuitively, suppose that everyone in S Π Τ weakly prefers S to 
Τ and that at least one individual in S Π Τ strictly prefers S to T. Then 
Τ has little chance to be formed since the members in Τ Π S all prefer S 
to T. The players in Τ — S are not able to realize Τ since all the players 
who are in S Π Τ will immediately leave Τ in order to participate in S 
(since they prefer 5). Therefore, Τ is not viable against S. Now suppose 
there are г G S" Π Τ who prefer S to Τ and there are i e S П Τ who prefer 
Τ to S. Then, clearly, S and Τ both have a chance to be formed and thus 
S is viable against Τ and Τ is viable against S. 
Definition 7.15 Let G = (N,W,X,p) be a social choice game and let 
s,Tew. 
1. S is viable against T, notation: S X
c
 T, := there are i € S Π Τ : 
such that SplT. 
2. S and Τ are viable with respect to each other, notation S «
c
 T, := 
StcTandTtc S. 
3. S is strictly viable against T, notation: S У
с
 Τ, := S У
с
 T but not 
ТУ
С
8. 
4. The set 
'See chapter 6.2.1. 
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is called the c-core of G. 
A minimum conflict coalition in a social choice game is a coalition 
that has the smallest Hamming conflict index of all winning coalitions. 
Formally: 
Definition 7.16 Let G = (iV, W, X, p) be a social choice game and let H 
be a Hamming conflict index. A coalition S G W is a minimum conflict 
coalition in G := 
H{R?(S)) < H(RP(T)) 
for every Τ 6 W. The set of all minimum conflict coalitions in G is denoted 
Wmc(G). 
It is not difficult to verify that the c-core of a proper social choice game 
equals the set of minimum conflict coalitions in G. 
Theorem 7.4 Let G = (TV, W, X, p) be a proper social choice game. Then 
Coc(G) = Wmc(G). 
Proof. Let G be a proper social choice game. 
1). First we prove Coc(G) С Wmc(G). Let S G Coc(G). We have to prove: 
S e Wmc(G), i.e. H(RP(S)) < H(R?(T)for every TeW. 
Since S e Coc(G), -пЗГ G W[T y
c
 S], i.e. 
-ЗТ G W[T hcSA^ShcT), ie. 
-іЗТ G W[3i G 5 Π TITpiS] Λ -ιΞϊ G 5 П T[SpiT]l i.e. 
Г G WW G S Π T[SwfT] V 3i G S Π T[StfT\. 
Since G is proper, for every Te W, S П Τ i 0. If Vi G S Π Τ\8τχΓ\ 
for every Τ G W, then H(RP(S)) < H{R?{T)) for every Τ £ W. If 
3t G Sr\T[Sp<iT]for every Τ G W, then H{RP{S)) < H(Rp(T))for every 
TçW. Thus, S G W^iG). 
2). We now prove Wcm(G) С Coc(G). Let S e Wcm(G). Since G is 
proper, for every Τ G W, S Π Τ ^ 0. Now, since for every Τ G W, 
H(RP(S)) < HiRPCD), we have Vi G S Π T[SplT] for every Τ G W. 
Hence, -.ЗТ G W[T y
c
 S], i.e. S G Coc(G). •. 
Clearly, only coalitions from the c-core of a social choice game will 
be formed. These coalitions all are minimum conflict coalitions. 
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Hypothesis 7.1 Let G = {Ν, Ж, Χ, ρ) be a social choice game and suppose 
that the c-core of G is not empty. Then only coalitions from the c-core of 
G will be formed. 
When applying conflict minimization theory to an empirical domain, for 
example, cabinet formation in multi-party systems, then this hypothesis 
states that only minimum conflict cabinets will be formed. The following 
result shows that this hypothesis can be used for any proper social choice 
game. 
Theorem 7.5 Let G be a proper social choice game. Then Coc(G) J 0. 
Proof. By definition, Coc(G) = /i(W, ^
c
) . It suffices to prove that ^
c
 is 
complete and transitive. 
Completeness. Let S, Τ € W. Since G is proper, S Π Τ j - 0. Let i e S П T. 
Since рс; is complete, Sp^T or Трс{8. Therefore, S Ус Τ or Τ Ус S. 
Transitivity. Let S, Τ, U e W and suppose S У
с
 Τ and Τ У
с
 U. Then: 
3ieSnT: SpIT, hence H{W>{S)) < H(IV(T)). 
3i£TnU: TplU, hence H{B?(T)) < H{B?{U)). 
Since H{BP{S)) < H(Rr(T)) and H{B?{T)) < Я(ЯР(С/)), H(RF(S)) < 
H(RP(U)). Since G is proper, SnUjt Hence, 3t G S П U : Sp\U and 
therefore S У
с
 U. o. 
According to theorem 7.5, to compute the c-core of a game, it suffices 
to determine the Hamming conflict index of every coalition and then to 
determine the coalitions with the smallest index. 
7.4.4 Conflict Minimization Theory: Computation Exam­
ple 
To illustrate the working of conflict minimization theory we apply the 
theory to an imaginary case. In order to be able to determine the coalitional 
preferences of the players, we use the concept of conflict range as defined 
in definition 7.13. 
Consider the social choice game G = (iV, W, X,p), where 
1. N = {iìj,kìl}, 
2. W = {{i,j, k}, {i,j, /}, {i, k, /}, {j, к, /}, {i J, к, /}}, 
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3. Χ = {χ,y, ζ}, 
4. ρ is, in compact notation (cf. chapter 2): 
Ri : xyz 
Rj : x(yz) 
Rk - yxz 
Ri : zxy 
In general, Hamming distances for a preference profile can conveniently 
be presented in a symmetric matrix whose columns and rows consist of 
the individual preferences and whose cells contain the Hamming distances 
between the preferences. Leaving the names of the rows and columns 
aside, the matrix for the presented situation is: 
Ri 
Rj 
Rk 
Ri 
Ri 
0 
1 
2 
4 
Я; 
1 
0 
3 
3 
Rk 
2 
3 
0 
6 
Ri 
4 
3 
6 
0 
To see how these numbers are calculated, consider eel RiRk- We see 
that the symmetric difference Ri φ Rk = {xy,yx}. Hence, the Hamming 
distance between β, and Rk is 2, which we fill in in eel RiRk-
Let us investigate the conflict range of each winning coalition (see 
definition 7.13). 
1. Coalition Si = {i,j, к}: <йат({Я,,Л7,Лк}) = 3 and 
mesh({Ri, Rj, Rk}) = 1. Hence r({#¿, Rj, Rk}) = 2. 
2. Coalition S2 = {ij, I}: diam({Ri, Rj, R,}) = 4 and 
mesh({Ri,Rj,Ri})= 1. Hence, r({Ri,Rj,Rl}) = 3. 
3. Coalition S3 = {j, к, I}: diam({Rj,Rk, R¡}) = 6 and 
mesh({Rj,Rk, Ri}) = 3. Hence, r({Rj, Rk, Д,}) = 3. 
4. Coalition SA = {г, к,/}: diam({Ri, Rk, Ri}) = 6 and 
mesh({Ri,Rk,R,}) = 2. Hence, r({Ri,Rk,R,}) = 4 . 
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5. Coalition 55 = {ij, к,/}: dmm(Ä,, Д,,Äjt,Ri}) = 6 and 
т е а Л ( { Д „ Д „ Д
к
, Д | } ) = 1 . Hence, r({Rt,R],Rk,R¡}) = 5. 
According to theorem 7.4, a c-core coalition is a minimum conflict coali-
tion. Since {г,,;,к} is the coalition with the smallest conflict range, this 
coalition is in the c-core. In order to be complete, we construct the indi­
vidual preferences with respect to the winning coalitions. 
Using definition 7.14 we obtain the following preference profile con­
cerning the set of winning coalitions. 
І '. і9і7Г,5,27Г|5,47Г,5,57Г,5'з 
к : ЗітгкЗзіГкЗАТГкЯзтгкЗг 
I '• S2llS3iriS4ir¡S5'K¡Sl 
To see how the viability relation is constructed, consider coalition Si and 
coalition 52. We have: 5 Π Τ = {i,j}. Now i stricdy prefers 5i to 52 
and j also strictly prefers 5i to 52- Hence, by definition 3.5, 5i y
c
 82-
Proceeding in this way, we get: 
5i x 52 via {i,j), S2 « 5з via {j,/}, 
5з >- 54 via {k, /}, 54 >- 55 via {i, к, /}, 
5i У Ss via {г, j , к}. Si У SA via {г, к}, 
Si У 5з via {j, к}, Sz У S* via {¿, /} , 
52 У S5 via {ij, /}, 5з У Ss via {;, *, /}. 
As expected, 5i = {г, j , к} is the core coalition since there is no coalition 
Г such that Τ y
c
 Si. It is predicted that this coalition will be formed. 
7.5 Preference Distance Theory of Coalition For­
mation 
In chapter 2, we discussed the concepts of social choice rule, social pref­
erence and social choice. These concepts will be used in the preference 
distance theory of coalition formation presented in this section. 
Let G = (Ν, W, A", ρ) be a social choice game. Starting point is the 
idea that in every coalition once formed, a social preference must be pro­
duced concerning a social choice problem X. The production of this social 
preference in a coalition will be done with the aid of a social choice rule. 
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Now suppose that every player knows the other players' preferences con­
cerning X. In addition, suppose that every player knows the social choice 
rule of each coalition. Then every player is able to calculate the social 
preference of every winning coalition and thus he can compare the calcu­
lated social preferences with his own individual preference. In comparing 
these preferences, we assume that each player uses the Hamming distance 
function and that each player will prefer coalition S to coalition Τ if the 
Hamming distance between his preference and the social preference of S 
is smaller than the Hamming distance between his preference and that of 
T. The behavioral assumption is that each player strives to minimize the 
distance between his preference and the social preference of the coalition 
to be formed. 
Preference distance theory as presented in this section is related to and 
in any case inspired by De Swaan's policy distance theory10. Instead of 
policy positions, however, we use preferences concerning a social choice 
problem. Further we use the Hamming distance function to calculate 
the distances between the individual preferences and the expected social 
preferences of the coalitions with respect to a social choice problem while 
De Swaan uses a non-metric policy distance notion. 
7.5.1 Preference Distance Theory: Descriptive Part 
Let G = (N,W,X,p) be a social choice game and consider a coalition 
S 6 W. The basic idea is that in each coalition a social choice rule will be 
used in order to determine a social preference. In chapter 2 we define a 
social choice rule as a function with domain Π = (0(X))N. In the present 
context, we need social choice rules with domain (0(X))S where S is 
a coalition. However, this does not change the basic results of chapter 
2. Let us call a member of (0(X))S a coalitional preference profile. A 
member of (OCA"))5 will be denoted by ps. 
Definition 7.17 Let G = (Ν, W, Χ, ρ) be a social choice game and S be a 
coalition. . A social choice rule for S is a junction F : (0(X))S -* B(X). 
F{ps) is called the social preference of S under F. 
In order to determine a preference concerning Wt every player will eval­
uate the distance between his preference and the social preference under 
10See chapter 6 for a discussion of De Swaan's theory. 
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some F for every S G W.. The assumption is that a player i € N will 
prefer an S G W to a Τ G Ж if the distance between R? and F(ps) is 
less than the distance between Щ and Г(рт). Remember that 
Wi = {SeW\i€ S). 
Definition 7.18 Let G = (Ν, W,X,p) be a social choice game. Let i G 
ΛΓ, 5, Г G W a rá /ι ¿>e ίΛβ Hamming distance function. Let F be a social 
choice rule for S and F' a social choice rule for T. 
1. i strictly prefers S to T, notation: SnfT, := 
(a) SeW^T^Wior 
(b) 5, T G Ж,· and h(RlF(p
s
)) < h{R^F'{pT)). 
2. i is indifferent between S and T, notation: S if := 
(a) S, T^Wior 
(b) S, T G Wi and HRl F(ps)) = h{I%, F'(pT)). 
3. i weakly prefers S to Γ, notation: Sp*T, := SwfT or SifT. 
The superscript d in the notation of these preferences remind us that we 
are dealing with preferences as defined in preference distance theory of 
coalition formation. It is easy to verify that pf is complete and transitive 
with respect to W for every i G N. Therefore, for every i G Ν : 
μ№,ρί) = {S G W | -іЗТ G ИЧГтгф} 
is not empty11. A coalition S G μζίν,ρ*) is called a minimum distance 
coalition for i. 
7.5.2 Preference Distance Theory: Solution Part 
The following step is to specify the solution part of preference distance 
theory. Just like conflict minimization theory we employ the idea that 
players in the intersection of two coalitions are 'critical' for the survival 
of these coalitions. 
11
 Cf. chapter 4, section 3 for a study of maximal choice sets. 
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Definition 7.19 Let G = (N,W,X,p) be a social choice game and let 
S,T£W. 
1. S is viable against T, notation: S b<¿ Τ, := there are i € S П Τ : 
SpÍT. 
2. S and Τ are viable with respect to each other := S Ь І Τ and Τ >zd S. 
3. S is strictly viable against T, notation: S Xd T, := S У
а
 Τ but not 
Tyds. 
4. The set 
Οο
ά
^ = μ(Ψ,±
ά
) 
is called the rf-core of G. 
We assume that if the ¿-core of a social choice game is not empty, 
then only coalitions from the ¿-core of this game will be formed. 
Hypothesis 7.2 Let G = (Ν, W, Χ, ρ) be a social choice game and suppose 
that the d-core of G is not empty. Then only coalitions from the d-core of 
G will be formed. 
When is the d-core of a social choice game nonempty? In the next 
theorem a sufficient condition is given. In this theorem, the notion of linear 
profile as developed in section 7.3.2 (this chapter), is crucial. Further, the 
system of majority decision is used12. 
Theorem 7.6 Let G = (JV, W, X,p) be a proper social choice game. Let 
F be the system of majority decision and suppose F will be used in every 
S G W. If pis a linear profile, then 
Cod(G)j<ò. 
Proof. Let G be a proper social choice game and let ρ = (Ri, Ri,..., Rn) 
be a linear profile. We must analyze two cases, namely, the case that η is 
odd and the case that η is even. 
Case 1. Let η be odd. Consider the preference Rin+iyi- By theorem 7.3, 
M(p) = R(n+i)ß. Therefore, N e /¿(W, ^ n+ij/a). We prove that N is in the 
d-core, i.e., there is no Τ 6 W such that Τ yd N. Consider a T G W. By 
theorem 7.3, there are three possibilities: 
12Cf. chapter 3, section 1 for the definition of this system. 
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1. Μ(ρτ) is between Ri and Л(
п+і)/2, 
2. M(pT) is between Щп+\^ and Rn, 
3. М(рт) = Rin*l)/2. 
Possibility 1. Let М(рт) be between Ri and R(
n+\y2· All players in Τ with 
a preference between R\ and M(pT) prefer Τ to N. Also all players with a 
preference between M(pT) and the majority relation of the preferences of 
the players between M(pT) and R(n+i)/2 prefer Τ to N. If player (n +1)/2 
is in T, then this player will strictly prefer N to T. Hence N is viable 
against Τ in this case. If player (n +1)/2 is not in T, then Τ must contain 
a player к with к > (n + l)/2 in order to be winning. Since к e N and 
since Rk with к > (η + l)/2 is between R<n+iy2 and Rn, к strictly prefers 
N to T. Thus N is viable against Τ also in this case. 
Possibility 2. Let Μ(ρτ) be between R(
n
+i)/2 and R
n
. All players with a 
preference between М(рт) and R
n
 prefer Τ to N. Also every player with 
a preference between Μ(ρτ and the majority relation of the preferences 
of the players with preferences between М(рт) and R(
n
+\)/2 prefer Τ to 
N. If player (n + l)/2 is in T, then this player will strictly prefer N to 
T. Hence, Τ is not strictly viable against N in this case. If(n + l)/2 is 
not in T, then Τ must contain a player I in order to be winning such that 
I < (n +1)/2. Since l e Ν, and since R¡ between Ri and M(p) = R(n*\)/2, 
I strictly prefers N to T. Hence, Τ is neither strictly viable against Τ in 
this case. 
Possibility 3. Let Μ(ρτ) = R(
n
+i)/2· Then, every player in Τ Π N will be 
indifferent between N and T. Hence, N and Τ are viable with resepct to 
each other. 
Case 2. Let η be even. Then, according to theorem 73, 
M(p) = M{R
n
/2, R<n/2y+i)· We again prove that N is in the d-core. Con­
sider a coalition T G W. Applying theorem 73, there are three possibili­
ties: 
1. Mipr) is between Rl and M(Rn/2, Щпі2у*\), 
2. Mipr) is between M(R
n
/2, Я(„/2ні) and Rn, 
3. M(pT) = M(Rn/2,Rin/2y+i). 
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Possibility 1. Since G is proper, Τ must contain at least (n/2)+1 players in 
order to be winning. Hence, Τ must contain a player к with к > (n/2) +1. 
Since Rk is between M(Rnß, R(n/2y*\) and Rn, к strictly prefers N to T. 
Hence Τ is not strictly viable against N in this case. 
Possibility 2. Since G is proper, Τ must contain a player I such that I < n/2 
in order to be winning. Since Ri is between R\ and M{Rnß,R(n/2)+i), I 
strictly prefers N to T. Hence Τ is not strictly viable against N. 
Possibility 3. In this case, each player inTHN will be indifferent between 
Τ and N. Hence, neither in this case is Τ strictly viable against N. ü. 
Unfortunately, the requirement that a preference profile is a linear 
profile, is rather strong. It will not frequently be met in reality. The 
d-core of a proper social choice game may be empty then. If so, then 
preference distance theory will fail in predicting coalitions. To circumvent 
this problem we propose to use the theory of generalized stable sets13. 
Definition 7.20 Let G = (Ν, W, Χ, ρ) be a social choice game. 
1. A nonempty set V Ç W is a generalized stable set of W := 
(a) for all S, Τ e V: not S yrd Τ, 
(b) for every Τ #V there is an S 6 V such that S yTd T. 
2. A coalition S in a generalized stable set VofW is called a stable 
distance coalition in G. 
Applying theorem 4.16 of chapter 4 yields the following result 
Theorem 7.7 Let G = (Ν, W, Χ, ρ) be a social choice game. Then there 
is a generalized stable set ofW ifyd is not empty. 
Proof. See theorem 4.16., chapter 4. ü. 
Hence, using the theory of generalized stable sets enables us to make 
predictions about coalition formation in any social choice game. 
13Of course, other solution theories may be used, for example, the theory of generalized 
optimal choice sets. See chapter 4. 
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Hypothesis 7.3 Let G = (TV, W, X, p) be a social choice game. Then only 
stable distance coalitions in G will be formed. 
When dealing with an empirical domain, for example, cabinet formation in 
multi-party systems, we expect that in any case stable distance coalitions 
will be formed. 
Besides coalitions, preference distance theory also predicts the social 
preference to be produced in a social choice game. That is, if the predicted 
coalitons are known, then the social preferences these coalitions will pro­
duce are known. E.g., if the system of majority decision is used in a 
winning coalition, then the majority relation for the members' preferences 
of that coalition is predicted. 
7.5.3 Preference Distance Theory: Computation Example 
To illustrate the working of the theory, we provide a simple case and 
compute the relevant sets. 
Consider the social choice game G = (Ν, W, Χ, ρ) where 
1. iV = {¿,i,fc}, 
2. W={,Si,S2,S3,S4}, where 
Si = {i,j}, 
$2 = {*,&,}, 
Si = 0",*}, 
3. X= {Х,у,2,и)}, 
4. ρ is, in compact notation: 
Ri : xwzy 
Rj : yxwz 
Rk : zwyx 
In this preference profile no preference is between two other preferences. 
Hence, it is not a linear profile, so we do not have a guarantee for the 
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existence of a core-solution14. The Hamming distance matrix for this 
preference profile is: 
Ri 
Ri 
Ru 
Ri 
0 
6 
8 
Л,-
6 
0 
10 
Rk 
8 
10 
0 
We now must calculate the social preference for each winning coalition. 
We do this by using the system of majority decision. We write xy in­
stead of xMy. If χ and у are majority indifferent, we write (xy). For 
convenience, we write M (Si) instead of the cumbersome M(ps,) where 
i = 1,2,3,4. We then get: 
1. M (SO = xw, xz, wz, (xy), (yz), (wy), 
2. M(S2) = wy, zy, (zx), (xw), (wz), (xy), 
3. M(Si) = yx, (xw), (xz), (yw), (yz), (wz), 
4. M(S^) = yx,xw,wz,zy,XDy,xz. 
Now the Hamming distance between every individual preference and the 
social preference of every winning coalition can be calculated. The pref­
erences of i, j and к are denoted, respectively, by Ri,Rj and Rk. 
To illustrate, we calculate the distance between A, and M(S4). 
Ri = {xw,xz,xy,wz,wy,zy} and 
M(S4) = {yx, xw, wz, zy, wy, xz). 
Ri U M(SÍ) = {xw, xz, xy, yx, wz, wy, zy} and 
Ri Π MÍ&O = {xw, xz, wz, wy, zy}. Hence, 
Ri Θ M(S4) = (Ri U M(S4)) - (Ri η M(S4)) = {xy, yx}. • 
Since I fí, φ M(54) I = 2, /i(fl„ MÍSA) = 2. 
Proceeding in this way we obtain: 
h(Ri, M(5i) = 3, 
Λ(Α„Μ(5'2) = 3, 
KRi, М(8
Л
) = 2. 
Л(Д;,М(51) = 3, 
14See theorem 7.6. 
15
 See 7.4.4. 
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h(R],M(S3) = 5, 
KR],M{SA) = 4. 
h(Rk,M{S2) = 4, 
h(Rk,M(S3) = 5, 
h(Rk,M(S4) = 6. 
The preferences of each player with respect to the winning coalitions then 
are: 
г : 5 ^ 5 2 І 5 І 7 Г 5 З 
j : SITTS^WS^TTSZ 
к : ¿ 2 Τ S3 TT S4 TTS\ 
To illustrate the calculation of the viability relation, we provide an ex­
ample. Consider coalitions Si and 54. S\ Π S4 = {i,j}. Since г strictly 
prefers S^  to S\ and j strictly préfères Si to S4, Si yj, S4. The viability 
relation can be represented in a matrix in which the rows and columns 
consist of the coalitions Si , . . . £4 and in which each cell contains a >-
(strict viability) or an ?» (viability). We note that with S -< Τ we mean 
that Τ is strictly viable against S. 
/ Wji ?а , 2 Н з 
«21 ~22 У23 
-<31 -<tt « 3 3 
\ «41 « 4 2 « 4 3 
Looking at this matrix, we see that coalitions Si, S2 and S4 are undomi-
nated. Thus these coalitions are in the ¿-core and we may expect that one 
of these coalitions may be formed. 
A more complicated example is the proper social choice game G = 
(iV,iy,X,p)where 
1. N= {1,2,3,4,5}, 
2. W is any coalition containing at least 3 members, 
3. X = {x,y,z,w}, 
«14 \ 
«24 
«34 
«44 / 
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4. ρ is, in compact notation, 
R\ : xyzw 
Ri : xwzy 
Ri : yxwz 
R4 : zwyx 
Rs : wzxy 
The social choice rule is the system of majority decision. Calculating 
this example through yields the ¿-core {{1,2,3}, {2,4,5}}. Thus, the 
prediction is that one of these two coalitions will be formed. 
Note that the computation process of this last example already is quite 
involved. First, since the game is proper, the majority relation of 24 = 16 
winning coalitions must be calculated. Then, each player is in 11 win-
ning coalitions. Hence, 5 χ 11 = 55 distances must be calculated between 
the players and the majority relations of the coalitions. Then the pref­
erences of the players can be determined. Subsequently, the 16 winning 
coalitions must be pairwise compared in order to determine the viability 
relation. Consequently, (16 χ 15)/2 =120 intersections of coalitions must 
be investigated. For each of these intersections, the preferences of the 
members must be investigated and with the aid of this the viability must 
be determined. When putting this in a 16 by 16 viability matrix, the core-
coalitions may be detected by inspecting the rows of this matrix. When a 
row does not contain a -<, the respective coalition is undominated. 
7.6 Cabinet Formation Processes in Multi-Party 
Systems 
Conflict minimization theory and preference distance theory are formal 
theories of coalition formation processes. To embody the theories with 
empirical content, it is necessary to identify an empirical domain and to 
relate the theories with this domain. Since the theories can in principle 
be related to processes of coalition formation in any collective decision­
making body, there are several empirical domains possible. We choose 
here for cabinet formation processes in multi-party systems. 
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In chapters 5 and 6 we have modelled a multi-party parliamentary 
system as a weighted majority game in which the players are political 
parties. The weight of a player is the number of seats of a political 
party in parliament. A coalition is referred to as a cabinet. The quota 
of the game is the minimum number of seats needed to form a majority 
cabinet. In order to model a multi-party system as a social choice game, 
the social choice problem must be specified. As the social choice problem, 
we may, for example, choose the set of electoral issues about which the 
parties contested during the electoral competition, extended with additional 
alternatives that may play a role in the formation process. The preferences 
of the players then are the party preferences concerning this set of electoral 
issues and additional alternatives. Of course, the empirical investigation 
of these party preferences requires a lot of research efforts. 
Conflict minimization theory then yields the following hypothesis ap-
plied to cabinet formation in multi-party systems: 
Hypothesis 7.4 In proper multi-party parliamentary systems, only mini-
mum conflict cabinets will be formed. 
As conflict minimization theory tells us, a minimum conflict cabinet is a 
c-core cabinet. This means that it is an undominated cabinet in the sense 
that for no political party participating in that cabinet there is another 
cabinet with a lower conflict index. 
Preference distance theory yields the following hypothesis with respect 
to cabinet formation in multi-party systems. 
Hypothesis 7.5 In multi-party parliamentary systems, only d-core coali-
tions will be formed. 
Since a rf-core coalition may not exist, this hypothesis may not work. 
Therefore we have proposed an alternative hypothesis. Applying this hy-
pothesis to cabinet formation in multi-party systems we get: 
Hypothesis 7.6 In multi-parliamentary systems, only stable distance coali-
tions will be formed. 
Stable distance coalitions exist when the asymmetric part of the viability 
relation is not empty16. 
16Sce theorem 7.7. 
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Testing these hypotheses will be a labor intensive and anyway compli-
cated enterprise. Consider the hypotheses yielded by preference distance 
theory. For testing these hypotheses data are needed about the social 
choice problem, that is, about the set of alternatives, policy issues, etc. 
from which choices have to be made by the parties. Then, data about the 
preferences concerning this social choice problem must be collected and 
analyzed. Then, data about the rales determining winning and losing must 
be collected in order to calculate the set of possible winning coalitions. 
Also data about the weights of the parties in parliament must be collected 
in order to calculate the set of possible winning coalitions. Subsequently, 
data about social choice rules must be collected in order to determine 
the the social preference of each possible winning coalition concerning 
the social choice problem. After this, the distance between every party 
preference and the social preference of each winning coalition must be 
calculated. On the basis of these distances the preference of each politi-
cal party with respect to the set of possible cabinets must be calculated. 
Subsequently, the intersection of each pair of winning coalitions must be 
investigated in order to construct the viability relation. After the construc-
tion of the viability relation, the viability matrix can be constructed. From 
this matrix the prediction set of cabinets can be derived by detecting the 
d-core coalitions. Otherwise, we must investigate the viability relation 
in order to find the stable distance coalitions. Clearly, testing preference 
distance theory will not be easy. 
In testing conflict minimization theory or preference distance theory it 
may be useful to work with several social problems X,. Each social choice 
problem then may be interpreted as an issue set. X may be defined, then, 
as the cartesian product of the issue sets. This approach will not change 
our theoretical results. 
7.7 Other Fields of Application 
The purpose of Hamming distance theory as presented in this chapter is 
to measure the dissimilarity between preferences in a preference profile. 
This theory has been used to construct two formal theories of coalition 
formation, namely, conflict minimization theory and preference distance 
theory. However, Hamming distance theory together with the notion of 
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(Hamming) conflict index also can be used for other purposes. In this 
section we sketch some other fields of application. 
1. Electoral research. By gathering information by means of survey 
research about the party preferences of an electorate each time an 
election must take place, it is possible to construct a series of party 
preference profiles. The Hamming distance model can be used to 
analyze the variability of the degree of conflict in elections through 
time. This research need not be restricted to one specific country. 
The model allows the comparison of party preference profiles of 
different countries, eventually at different points of times. In this 
respect, the model provides a framework for comparative electoral 
research. 
2. Dynamic decision-making in committees. The model can be used as 
a tool to analyze the dynamics of decision-making in committees. 
This analysis can be done in several ways: 
(a) First, it can be done by observing several preference profiles 
from the start of a social choice process until the moment of 
decision-making is arrived at. This research can be coupled 
with, for example, the hypothesis that the time necessary to 
arrive at the moment of selecting a social choice is longer, the 
greater the degree of conflict is at the start. 
(b) The research theme mentioned under (a) has to do with dif-
ferent preference profiles in a committee with respect to the 
same decision-making problem. However, it is also possible to 
compare preference profiles with respect to different decision-
making problems in the same committee. Thus the patterns of 
variability of the degree of conflict in different social choice 
processes in the same committee can be mutually compared. 
(c) With the model also social choice processes in different com-
mittees can be compared. This comparison can be done with 
respect to the specific moments of voting. It can also be done 
with respect to the dynamics of the choice processes in the 
several committees. 
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3. Policy-making. The model has, besides research-technical and the-
oretical relevance, also a practical relevance. It can produce rel-
evant information in concrete policy-making situations. Knowing 
the degree of conflict in such a situation is relevant information for 
politicians and policy-makers. With this information they can make 
estimations and, therefore, form expectations about the feasability 
of the possible policy options. 
Further, the model can be used as a tool to produce information 
about the degree of consensus among the individuals and groups 
who are the target of the concerned policy. With this information, 
the policy-makers can form an image of the implementability of the 
policy option as collectively choosen by the policy-making body. 
Surely, there are other fields of application. It appears that the Hamming 
distance model is flexible enough to be used in several domains. There 
is even the possiblity to use the model in a policy-making environment. 
In this chapter, we have used it as a basic tool for the construction of 
coalition theories. 
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Samenvatting 
De essentie van politiek is winnen. Wat telt is het afdwingen van een 
collectieve beslissing en de naleving daarvan, het aannemen van een wet, het 
winnen van een verkiezing, het omverwerpen van een dictatoriaal regime, 
het doorzetten van beleid, etc. Echter, voor een overwinning is de formatie 
van een coalitie die voldoende macht heeft om deze overwining af te dwin-
gen noodzakelijk. Derhalve zijn coalitieformatieprocessen veelvuldig waar te 
nemen in het politieke leven. In dit boek staat het formeren van politieke 
coalities centraal. 
Ër bestaat binnen de politieke wetenschap een traditie om coalitieforma-
tieprocessen vanuit een speltheoretische invalshoek te bestuderen. Deze tra-
ditie is ontstaan omdat de n-persoons coöperatieve speltheorie zoals ontwik-
keld in Von Neumann en Morgensteru (1953) en zoals toegankelijk gemaakt 
voor sociale en politieke wetenschappers in het excellente werk van Luce en 
RaifFa (1957), als zodanig niet gericht is op de formatie van coalities maar op 
uitbetalingen aan spelers. De n-persoons coöperatieve speltheorie is als het 
ware blind voor de formatie van coalities. Omdat coalitieformatie nu juist zo 
belangrijk is in de politiek, dient de speltheorie derhalve uitgebreid te worden 
met additionele concepten en assumpties. Ons werk sluit aan op deze uitge-
breide speltheoretische benadering van coalitieformatieprocessen. We zullen 
binnen dit kader een aantal reeds geformuleerde theorieën kritisch bestude-
ren. Daarnaast presenteren en bestuderen we een aantal nieuwe theorieën. 
Deze nieuwe theorieën zijn geformuleerd teneinde een tweetal theoretische 
tekortkomingen binnen de speltheoretische benadering van coalitieformatie 
op te heffen. 
De eerste tekortkoming betreft de afwezigheid van een actorgerichte be-
leidstheorie. De in de loop van de tijd geformuleerde coalitietheorieën binnen 
de speltheoretische traditie kunnen in een aantal klassen onderverdeeld wor-
den. De eerste klasse is die van de machtstheorieën. Een andere klasse be-
1 
treft beleidstheorieën. Bij machtstheorieën spelen de machtsposities van de 
speler een doorslaggevende rol in de formatie van coalities. Bij beleidstheo-
rieën spelen naast de macht ρ osi ties ook de beleidsposities een verklarende rol. 
Daarnaast kunnen we de zogenaamde actorgerichte machtstheorieën onder-
scheiden. Deze proberen aan te geven wanneer en hoe de machtspositie van 
een specifieke speler (actor) doorslaggevend kan zijn in het formeren van een 
coalitie. We beschikken momenteel over zo'n actorgerichte machtstheorie, nl. 
de theorie van dominante spelers van Peleg. Nu is binnen deze classificatie 
ook een deelklassc van actorgerichte beleidstheorieën te onderscheiden. Zo'n 
actorgerichte beleidstheorie zou moeten aangeven wanneer en hoe de machts-
positie tezamen met de beleidspositie van een specifieke speler de doorslag 
geven in een coalitieformatieproces. Er bestaat echter geen actorgerichte 
beleidstheorie, ondanks het feit dat bijna alle relevante empirische onderzoe-
ken het belang van beleid in coalitieformatieprocessen ondersteunen. Een 
eerste doelstelling van dit werk is dan ook het vormen van een actorgerichte 
beleidstheorie. Dit doen we in hoofdstuk 5. 
De tweede theoretische tekortkoming is dat in bijna alle tot nu toe gefor-
muleerde theorieën de voorkeuren van de spelers met betrekking tot coalities 
een ondergeschikte rol spelen. Er is één uitzondering, nl. de beleidsafstands-
theorie van De Swaan. Deze laatste theorie leidt tot een aantal voorkeuren, 
één voor elke speler, voor coalities die gebruikt worden voor de voorspelling 
van coalities. We sluiten aan op het werk van De Swaan door verschillende 
theorieën te formuleren waarin coalitionele voorkeuren een doorslaggevende 
rol spelen. Uitgangspunt van deze nieuwe theorieën is dat het formeren van 
een coalitie gezien wordt als een collectief besluitvormingsprobleem. Binnen 
dit verband onderscheiden we een tweetal typen van besluitvormingstheo-
rieën van coalitieformatie. 
1. In het eerste type is de verzameling van mogelijke winnende coalities 
zelf het collectief besluitvormingsprobleem. Coalitieformatie wordt dan 
gezien als liet collectief kiezen van een coalitie uit deze verzameling. De 
spelers worden hierbij geacht voorkeuren te formeren met betrekking 
tot deze verzameling. Vervolgens worden deze voorkeuren geaggregeerd 
tot een sociale voorkeur die als zodanig de basis is voor het bepalen van 
een oplossing van het keuzeprobleem. 
2. In het tweede type besluitvormingstheorieën van coalitieformatie is het 
besluitvormingsprobleem een verzameling van alternatieven. De spelers 
2 
staan nu voor het probleem collectief een keuze te bepalen. Dit kan 
echter alleen gebeuren door een coalitie te formeren die deze collectieve 
keuze kan afdwingen (een winnende coalitie dus). De belangrijke vraag 
die dit type theorie tracht te beantwoorden is hoe de voorkeuren van 
de spelers met betrekking tot winnnende coalities bepaald worden door 
de voorkeuren van de spelers met betrekking tot de alternatieven in het 
collectief besluitvormingsprobleem. 
Het hoofddoel van dit boek is het formuleren van collectieve besluitvormings-
theorieën van coalitieformatieprocessen. We formuleren zowel een theorie die 
van het eerste type is, namelijk de machtsovcrschottheorïe, als twee theo-
rieën die van het tweede type zijn, nl de conflictminimalisatietheorie en de 
voorkeurafstandstheorie. 
1. De machtsoverschottheorie start vanuit de gedachte dat een speler een 
winnende coalitie S prefereert boven een winnende coalitie Τ indien 
deze speler een groter machtsoverschot heeft in 5 dan in T. 
2. De conflictminimalisatietheorie start vanuit de assumptie dat iedere 
speler zal proberen een coalitie te formeren van spelers wiens voor­
keuren zo dicht mogelijk bij elkaar liggen. Voor de specificatie van de 
termen 'zo dicht mogelijk' bebruiken we een afstandsmodel dat ons in 
staat stelt de afstanden voor elk paar voorkeuren te bepalen. De con­
flictminimalisatietheorie leidt tot profielen van coalitionele voorkeuren 
die geaggregeerd kunnen worden en waarmee voorspellingen gedaan 
kunnen worden over de te vormen coalities. 
3. De voorkeurafstandstheorie is gebaseerd op de gedachte dat binnen 
elke eenmaal geformeerde coalitie een besluitvormingsproces plaats zal 
vinden dat zal leiden tot een sociale voorkeur van die coalitie met be­
trekking tot het oorspronkelijke besluitvormingsprobleem. Deze sociale 
voorkeur is een aggregatie van de voorkeuren (m.b.t. de verzameling 
van alternatieven) van de leden van deze coalitie. De veronderstelling 
hierbij is 
(a) dat elke speler de voorkeur van elke andere speler kent en 
(b) dat elke speler van elke winnende coalitie weet welke aggregatie-
procedure gebruikt zal worden. 
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Elke speler kan derhalve de afstanden bepalen tussen haar of zijn voor-
keur en de voorkeur van elke mogelijke winnende coalitie. Op basis 
van deze afstanden zal elke speler vervolgens haar of zijn voorkeur met 
betrekking tot coalities vaststellen. De assumptie is dat een speler een 
winnende coalitie met een sociale voorkeur die dichter bij haar of zijn 
individuele voorkeur ligt zal preferen boven een winnende coalitie wiens 
sociale voorkeur verder af ligt. Voor het bepalen van de afstanden tus-
sen sociale voorkeuren van coalities en individuele voorkeuren wordt 
gebruik gemaakt van het afstandsmodel dat ook gebruikt wordt voor 
conflictniinimalisatiethcorie. Ook de voorkeurafstandstheorie leidt tot 
profielen van coalitionele voorkeuren die geaggregeerd kunnen worden 
en waarmee voorspellingen over de te vormen coalities gemaakt kunnen 
worden. 
De sociale keuzetheorie bestudeert collectieve besluitvormingsprocessen. De 
theorie gaat over het aggregeren van individuele voorkeuren tot een sociale 
voorkeur. Omdat we in dit werk coaütieformatie zien als een collectief be-
sluitvormingsproces is de sociale keuzetheorie van groot belang. We besteden 
derhalve uitgebreid aandacht aan deze theorie, nl. in hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 
4. Een bekend probleem gesignaleerd door de sociale keuzetheorie is dat een 
best of maximaal element voor een sociale voorkeur niet altijd hoeft te be-
staan. Een best alternatief is in ieder geval afwezig in geval van cyclische 
sociale voorkeuren. Omdat we apriori niet kunnen uitsluiten dat aggrega-
ties van coalitionele voorkeuren cyclisch zijn, dienen we te beschikken over 
theorieën die aangeven hoe een collectieve keuze te bepalen in geval van cy-
cli. De formulering van deze theorieën is niet alleen nodig om een adequate 
coalitieformatietheorie te bouwen, maar heeft ook waarde op zichzelf. Het 
probleem van het 'kraken' van een cyclische sociale voorkeur is één van de 
centrale problemen in de sociale keuzetheorie zelf. Een doelstelling van dit 
werk is dan ook de bestudering van methoden die keuzeverzamelingen voor 
cyclische relaties kunnen specificeren. 
In hoofdstuk 2 worden de basisbegrippen van de sociale keuzetheorie be-
sproken. We gaan hierbij in op standaardthema's als rationele keuzes en 
collectieve rationaliteit. Verder bespreken we een aantal eigenschappen van 
aggregatieprocedures. Binnen dit kader bespreken we de stelling van Arrow. 
We geven een eigen bewijs van deze stelling. 
De sociale keuzetheorie zoals gepresenteerd in hoofdstuk 2 is abstract. In 
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hoofdstuk 3 daarentegen bestuderen we een aantal concrete keuzestelsels. De 
meeste aandacht hierbij gaat uit naar het meerderheidsstelsel. Zoals bekend 
hoeft een alternatief dat een meerderheid heeft over elk ander alternatief niet 
te bestaan. Dit verschijnsel is reeds ontdekt door de Franse rationalist Mar­
quis de Condorcet en wordt derhalve wel de Condorcet paradox genoemd. 
Het doet zich voor indien de door het meerderheidsstelsel voortgebrachte 
sociale voorkeur (de meerderheidsrelatie) cyclisch is. We zullen in dit hoofd­
stuk de oplossing van Condorcet bespreken. Tevens presenteren we een eigen 
theorie voor de behandeling van dit probleem. Deze theorie noemen we de 
theorie van stabiele meerderheidsoplossingen en is gebaseerd op resultaten 
die gepresenteerd zullen worden in hoofdstuk 4. De theorie gaat uit van de 
notie van meerderheidspad. Dit is een rijtje van alternatieven Xi,X2,. • • ,a;
n 
waarvoor geldt dat er een strikte meerderheid is van χχ over ¡Г2, van X2 over 
x3, . . . , van xni over xn. Een stabiele meerderheidsoplossing nu is een deel­
verzameling V van de verzameling van alternatieven waarvoor geldt : 
1. voor elke χ en у in V geldt dat er geen meerderheidspad is van χ naar 
У-
2. voor elke у niet in V is er een χ in V zodanig dat er een meerderheidspad 
is van χ naar y. 
Door gebruik te maken van een resultaat uit hoofdstuk 4 kan bewezen wor­
den dat stabiele meerderheidsoplossingen altijd bestaan. We besteden ook 
aandacht aan de Bordaregel en de pluraliteitsregel. We zullen zien dat Mar­
quis de Condorcet deze regels eveneens uitgebreid bestudeerd heeft. Hierbij 
verwijzen we naar teksten van de Condorcet waaraan tot nu toe, voor zover 
we weten, niet gerefereerd is. De meest verrassende ontdekking hierbij is 
dat Marquis de Condorcel de Bordaregel verwierp vanwege de schending van 
deze regel van de conditie van onafhankelijke alternatieven, een conditie die 
een speciale rol speelt in de stelling van Arrow. In dit hoofdstuk bestuderen 
we ook het Nederlandse kiesstelstel. We zullen aantonen dat in Nederland 
een partij die door een meerderheid van kiezers geprefereerd wordt boven 
elke andere partij toch het kleinste aantal zetels toegewezen kan krijgen. 
In hoofdstuk 4 gaan we nader in op het probleem van cyclische sociale 
voorkeuren. Theorieën die aangeven hoe keuzes bepaald kunnen worden aan 
de hand van een sociale voorkeur, dus aan de hand van een relatie die ver-
kregen is door een aggregatieproces, noemen we oplossingstheorieën. Een 
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bekende oplossingstheorie is collectieve rationaliteit. Volgens dit concept 
dienen die alternatieven gekozen te worden die het beste zijn volgens de so-
ciale voorkeur. Echter, beste alternatieven bestaan niet indien een sociale 
voorkeur cyclisch is. Omdat we, zoals reeds gezegd, cyclische relaties niet 
kunnen uitsluiten bij de bestudering van coalitieformatie als collectief be-
sluïtvormingsprobleem is dit concept weinig bruikbaar. We bestuderen der-
halve enkele alternatieven. Eén daarvan is de theorie van maximale keuzes. 
Een keuze is maximaal indien er geen alternatief bestaat dat beter is. We 
zullen precies aangeven wanneer maximale keuzes bestaan. Hierbij zal blij-
ken dat deze kunnen bestaan in geval van cyclische relaties. Echter, hoewel 
de theorie volstaat voor een aantal theorieën in latere hoofdstukken (hoofd-
stukken 6 en 7), hebben we toch theorieën nodig die elke cyclische relatie 
kunnen 'kraken'. Het eerste thoeretisch alternatief dat hiertoe in staat is, is 
de theorie van gegeneraliseerde optimale keuzeverzamelingen. Volgens deze 
theorie dienen keuzeverzamelingen te bestaan uit elementen die zich bevinden 
in de topcycli van een relatie. Er kan bewezen worden dat gegeneraliseerde 
optimale keuzeverzamelingen niet leeg zijn voor willekeurige cycli. We pre-
senteren een stelling die deze keuzes karakteriseert en die tevens duidelijk 
maakt hoe ze gevonden kunnen worden. Een nadeel van gegeneraliseerde 
optimale keuzeverzamelingen is dat ze intern instabiel zijn. Dit betekent dat 
voor een alternatief a; uit een gegeneraliseerde optimale keuzeverzameling er 
een alternatief y uit deze verzameling kan bestaan zodanig dat y strikt so-
ciaal geprefereerd wordt boven x. Teneinde deze tekortkoming te ontlopen 
hebben we een alternatieve theorie geformuleerd die gekenmerkt wordt door 
interne stabiliteit. Deze theorie sluit aan op de stabiele verzamelingsleer zo-
als ontwikkeld in Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) en heet derhalve de 
theorie van gegeneraliseerde stabiele oplossingen. Een gegenerahseerde sta-
biele oplossing V bestaat uit elementen waartussen geen strikt voorkeurspad 
bestaat en waarvoor geldt dat voor elke y niet in V er een χ in V is zoda­
nig dat een strikt voorkeurspad bestaat van χ naar y. We geven een aantal 
stellingen met betrekking tot deze keuzeverzamelingen. 
In hoofdstuk 5 presenteren we de speltheoretische context voor de coali­
tietheorieën. Omdat winnen de essentie is van politiek gaan we in op spelen 
waarin winnen en verliezen centraal staan. Deze spelen heten simple games. 
Vervolgens bestuderen we een aantal reeds geformuleerde coalitieformatie-
theorieën. Dit zijn de minimum omvang theorie van Riker, de belangencon-
flict theorie van Axelrod en de actorgerichte machtstheorie van dominante 
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spelers van Peleg. In dit hoofdstuk presenteren we ook onze actorgerichte 
beleidstheorie teneinde de eerste bovengenoemde theoretische tekortkoming 
op te heffen. Deze actorgerichte beleidstheorie noemen we de theorie van 
centrale spelers. De definitie van een centrale speler is als volgt. Zij een 
ordening van beleidsposities gegeven. Een speler г is centraal indien noch 
de spelers met een beleidspositie voorafgaande aan die van г in een ordening 
van posities, noch de spelers met een beleidspositie volgend op die van г in 
een ordening van posities een winnende coalitie kunnen vormen zonder г. De 
hypothese is dat alleen coalities met centrale spelers gevormd zullen worden. 
De theorie van centrale spelers wordt verfijnd door de specificatie van een 
theorie, de theorie van gebalanceerde coalities, waarin aangenomen wordt dat 
centrale spelers streven naar de vorming van coalities die zij zo goed mogelijk 
in balans kunnen houden. We geven ook een rekenvoorbeeld. 
In hoofstuk 6 bestuderen we besluitvormingstheorieën van coalitieforma-
tie van het eerste type. De eerste theorie die we bestuderen is de beleidsaf-
standtheorie van De Swaan. Deze theorie die een belangrijke inspiratiebron 
voor dit werk is geweest, gaal uit van de gedachte dat elke speler streeft 
naar een coalitie met een verwachte beleidspositie die zo dicht mogelijk bij 
haar of zijn beleidspositie ligt. Teneinde de termen 'zo dicht mogelijk' te 
specificeren, formuleert De Swaan een niet-metrisch concept van 'afstand'. 
De Swaan formuleert verschillende varianten van zijn theorie. In dit werk 
bestuderen we voornamelijk de open versie en de gesloten versie. We zullen 
zien dat beide versies geplaagd worden door ernstige inconsistenties. Vervol-
gens presenteren we onze machtsoverscholtheorie. Zoals gezegd vertrekt deze 
theorie van de gedachte dat elke speler streeft naar een coalitie waarin zijn of 
haar machtsoverschot - zijnde het verschil tussen haar of zijn machtsgewicht 
en de som van de machtsgewichten van de overige leden van die coalitie -
zo groot mogelijk is. We formuleren diverse varianten van deze theorie. We 
zullen eveneens zien dat de theorie van maximale sociale keuzes gwebruikt 
kan worden als oplossingsthcorie voor deze coalitietheorie. Ook voor deze 
coalitietheorie presenteren we een berekening aan de hand van een 'real-life' 
voorbeeld (de zetelverdeling in de Tweede Kamer sinds de verkiezingen van 
6 september 1989 en een bekende links-rechtsordening van de Nederlandse 
politieke partijen). 
In het laatste hoofdstuk presenteren we de twee besluitvormingstheorieën 
van het tweede type, t.w. de conflictminimalisatietheorie en de voorkeuraf-
standstheorie. Eerst formuleren we een type spel dat we sociaal keuzespel 
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noemen. Dit spel bestaat uit een collectief keuzeprobleem (een politieke 
agenda), een aantal spelers, een voorkeursprofiel- één voorkeur voor elke spe-
ler met betrekking tot het collectief keuzeprobleem - en een aantal regels voor 
winnen en verliezen. We zullen abstraheren van de aard van regels die win-
nen en dus verliezen bepalen. Hierdoor zijn we in staat coalitietheorieën te 
formuleren die onafhankelijk zijn van deze regels en derhalve een grotere reik-
wijdte hebben. Vervolgens presenteren we een afstandsmodel dat gebruikt zal 
worden in beide theorieën. Centraal in dit afstandsmodel staat het begrip 
Hammingafstand. De Hammingafstand van twee voorkeuren is het aantal 
elementen in het symmetrisch verschil van deze voorkeuren. We zullen zien 
dat dit begrip inderdaad een metriek is. Vervolgens bestuderen we de notie 
van een lineair profiel. Deze bestudering geeft aanleiding tot de formulering 
van een voldoende voorwaarde voor het bestaan van een meerderheidskeuze. 
Lineaire profielen zullen een speciale rol spelen in de voorkeurafstandstheo-
rie. Daarna presenteren we de reeds besproken conflictminimalisatietheorie. 
We geven een aantal theoretische resultaten en opnieuw een rekenvoorbeeld. 
Vervolgens presenteren we de reeds besproken voorkeurafstandstheorie. Ook 
hierbij geven we een aantal resultaten en een rekenvoorbeeld. We gaan ver-
volgens in op hypothesen die uit deze theorieën afgeleid kunnen worden met 
betrekking tot kabinetsformaties in meerpartijsystemen en op de empirische 
toetsbaarheid van deze hypothesen. Ter afsluiting formuleren we een aantal 
alternatieve toepassingsgebieden voor het Hamming afstandsmodel zoals ge-
presenteerd in dit hoofdstuk. Hiermee zijn we dan aan het einde van onze 
reis gekomen. 
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Stellingen 
behorende bij het proefschrift 
Coalition Formation and 
Social Choice 
Ad van Deemen 
1. Bij Tweede Kamerveikiezingen in Nederland is het mogelijk dat een partij 
die door een meerderheid geprefereerd wordt boven een andere partij toch 
een kleiner aantal zetels toegewezen krijgt. Bewijs: zie hoofdstuk 3 van dit 
proefschrift 
2. De lange duur van de kabinetsformatie Van Agt-Wiegel in 1977 is veroorzaakt 
door het feit dat de PvdA als grootste partij en als de partij met de grootste 
verkiezingsoverwinning het initiatief tot het formeren van een kabinet op zich 
nam terwijl het CDA de centrumpositie innam en dus de loop van het for-
matieproces kon bepalen. 
Zie voor actoren met een centrumpositie de theorie van 
gecentraliseerde beleidsspelen in hoofdstuk 5 van dit proefschrift. 
3. D66 zit niet in het huidige kabinet Lubbers-Кок omdat 
(a) het CDA in de huidige combinatie een positief machtsoverschot heeft 
maar in de combinatie {PvdA, D66, CDA} een negatief machtsoverschot 
gehad zou hebben, 
(b) het CDA in de huidige combinatie spilpartij is maar dit niet zou zijn in de 
combinatie {PvdA, D66, CDA}. In deze combinatie is D66 spilpartij. 
Zie hoofdstuk 6 van dit proefschrift voor de machtsoveischottheorie en hoofd­
stuk S voor het begrip spilpartij. 
4. De propositie van Wittgenstein "Die Logik ist kein Lehre, sondern ein Spiegel­
bild der Welt" dient vervangen te worden door de propositie "Die Logik ist 
kein Spiegelbild, sondern eine Begrenzung der Welt," en wel omdat de logica 
de grens van het logisch mogelijke αϊ het logisch onmogelijke beschrijft en 
daarmee de grenzen aangeeft van het empirisch mogelijke. Zie L. Wittgenstein, 
(1922). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. London: Routledge & Kegan. Satz 
6.13. 
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5. Het 2-persoons prisoner's dilemma wordt opgelost in geval van wederzijdse 
liefde waarbij liefde gedefinieerd is als 'kiezen wat het beste is voor de ander'. 
Zie voor het prisoner's dilemma R. Luce &. H. Raiffa, (1989). Games and 
Decisions. New Yoik: Dover Publication. (Oorspr. ed. 1957). 5.4. 
6. Iteratie van het 2-persoons prisoner's dilemma laat zien waarom onbeantwoorde 
liefde een lijdensweg is. Immers, diegene die steeds kiest wat het beste is voor 
de ander ontvangt dan in elk constituerend spel de sucker's payoff terwijl de 
geliefde steeds de volle buit ontvangt. 
Voor iteratie van het 2-persoons prisoner's dilemma, zie R. Axelrod (1984), 
The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers. 
7. De stemparadox verdwijnt in oneindige samenlevingen. 
Bewijs: Laat к een oneindig kardinaalgetal zijn en beschouw het volgende 
profiel: 
к : xy г 
к: zxy 
к: у г χ 
Hierbij betekent bijvoorbeeld к : xyz dal к kiezers χ strikt prefereren boven 
y en у strikt prefereren boven z. 
Omdat er к+к » к kiezers zijn met xy en к kiezers met yz, к+к ~ к kiezers 
met у ζ en к kiezers met ζ у, en к + к = к kiezers met ζ χ en к kiezen met 
χ ζ, verkrijgen we totale indifferentie en is daarmee de paradox verdwenen. 
8. De stelling van Arrow Iaat zien dat het logisch onmogelijk is dat een col­
lectieve besluitvormingsprocedure voldoet aan de eisen van collectieve ratio­
naliteit, onafhankelijkheid van irrelevante alternatieven, Pareto en verbod op 
dictatuur. Omdat iets wat logisch onmogelijk is, empirisch niet kan bestaan, 
sluit de stelling het empirisch bestaan van collectieve besluitvormingsproce­
dures die voldoen aan de Arrow eisen uiL Dit laat zien dat de stelling van 
Arrow wel degelijk een empirisch aspect heeft. 
9. Elk inleidend boek in de sociale wetenschappen waarin de stelling van Arrow 
niet behandeld wordt, dient herschreven te worden. 
2 

P.O. Box 9104, 6500 HE Nijmegen 
Tel.:080-512633 
_ 
